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The Citizens of each State shall. be entitled to all 
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several 
States. 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
During the congressional debates over the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, the framers of the Amendment pointed to the terms "privileges" 
and "immunities" used in Article IV, Section 2 as precursors of the 
identical terms used in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 The 
Privileges or Immunities Clause of Section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment provided that "No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States .... "3 The terms "privileges" and "immunities" were terms of 
art that had acquired a specific legal meaning through a series of judicial 
1. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2. 
2. As Senator Bingham, the principal draftsman of Section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, stated in a Report of the House Committee on the Judiciary in 1871: 
The clause of the fourteenth amendment, "No State shall make or enforce any 
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States," does not, in the opinion of the committee, refer to the privileges and 
immunities of citizens of the United States other than those privileges and 
immunities embraced in the original text of the Constitution, article 4, section 
2. 
THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES 466 (Alfred Avins ed., 1967) (citing 
H.R. REP. No. 41-22, at 1 (1871)). Similarly, Senator Poland stated that the Privileges 
or Immunities Clause "secures nothing beyond what was intended by the original 
provision in the Constitution." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2961 (1866); see 
also infra notes 15-34 and accompanying text discussing Republicans' views concerning 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause. 
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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decisions involving the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, 
Section 2. 4 Senator Bingham, the principal draftsman of Section 1, and 
other Republicans believed that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of 
Article IV, Section 2 may have been designed to guarantee certain 
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States that were 
inherent in the concept of American citizenship uniformly throughout the 
United States. For example, Senator Bingham stated on January" 25, 
1866, prior to ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, "I 
believe that the free citizens of each State were guarantied [sic], and 
intended to be guarantied [sic] by the terms of the Constitution, all-not 
some, 'all '-the privileges of citizens of the United States in every 
State."5 Similarly, Congressman Frederick Woodbridge, a Vermont 
Radical, stated that the proposed Amendment would 
give to a citizen of the United States the natural rights which necessarily pertain 
to citizenship. It is intended to enable Congress by its enactments when 
necessary to give to a citizen of the United States, in whatever State he may be, 
those privileges and immunities which are guarantied [sic] to him under the 
Constitution of the United States.6 
4. As Justice Story noted in United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160 
(1820), when such terms derived from the common law are interpreted, "definitions are 
necessarily included, as much as if they stood in the text" of the Constitution. 
Raoul Berger has also argued that the terms "privileges" and "immunities" were 
"words of art" having a "circumscribed meaning." Raoul Berger, Constitutional 
Interpretation and Activist Fantasies, 82 KY. L.J. 1, 5 (1993). However, Berger would 
constrain the terms as used in Article IV, Section 2 to certain privileges of "trade and 
commerce." This Article contends that although the terms "privileges" and "immunities" 
did have a well-defined and circumscribed legal meaning, the meaning encompassed a 
number of capacities of the citizen besides those dealing solely with trade and 
commerce. See also infra note 17 ( collecting cases interpreting the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of Article IV, § 2); ROGER HOWELL, THE PRIVILEGES AND 
IMMUNITIES OF STATE CITIZENSIDP 9-10 (1918) ("The words 'privileges' and 
'immunities,' like the greater part of the legal phraseology of this country, have been 
carried over from the law of Great Britain, and recur constantly either as such or in 
equivalent expressions from the time of Magna Charta. For all practical purposes they 
are synonymous in meaning, and originally signified a peculiar right or private law 
conceded to particular persons or places whereby a certain individual or class of 
individuals was exempted from the rigor of the common law."). See also Earl M. Maltz, 
Fourteenth Amendment Concepts in the Antebellum Era, 32 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 305, 
305 (1988) ("An examination of antebellum thought reveals that equal protection, due 
process, and privileges and immunities were terms symbolizing a core set Qf basic rights 
in which there was substantial agreement in both free state and slave state society."). 
5. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 430 (1866). 
6. Id. at 1088. 
811 
However, most Republicans, like Senator Bingham, believed that the 
Constitution provid~d no mechanism for congressional enforcement of 
the Clause.7 For example, in discussing the proposed Fourteenth 
Amendment, Congressman Thaddeus Stevens stated: 
I can hardly believe that any person can be found who will not admit that every 
one of these provisions is just. They are all asserted, in some form or other, in 
our DECLARATION or organic law. But the Constitution limits only the 
action of Congress, and is not a limitation on the States. This amendment 
supplies the defect, and allows Congress to correct the unjust legislation of the 
States, so far that the law which operates upon one man shall operate equally 
upon all.8 
Thus, based on such statements, it is likely that Section 1 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment was thought by members of Congress as well as 
the populace at large to be analogous to provisions already present in the 
Constitution. The important innovation contained.in the Amendment 
was Section 5, which conferred upon Congress the power to enforce 
these provisions.9 
Although a number of scholars have attempted to determine what was 
originally meant by the terms "privileges" and "immunities" as used in 
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment and Article rv, Section 2, 10 no 
7. This was Charles Fairman's conclusion as well. Fairman stated that "these 
great provisions of the Constitution, this immortal bill of rights embodied in the 
Constitution, rested for its execution and enforcement hitherto upon the fidelity of the 
States." Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of 
Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5, 25 (1949). Fairman believed that this "bill of rights" was 
composed of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 and the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 33-34. 
However, some Republicans thought that there was a congressional power to enforce 
the guaranteed privileges and immunities of citizens either under the Necessary and 
Proper Clause or under the Guaranty Clause. For example, Congressman William D. 
Kelley stated, "I find in [the Constitution] now, powers by which the General 
Government may defend the rights, liberties, privileges, and immunities of the humblest 
citizen wherever he may be upon our country's soil." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 1062 (1866). Similarly, Congressman William Higby, a Radical Republican from 
California, stated that the proposed amendment would "only have the effect to give 
vitality and life to portions of the Constitution that probably were intended from the 
beginning to have life and vitality, but which have received such a construction that they 
have been entirely ignored and have become as dead matter in that instrument." Id. at 
1054; see also Ex parte Bushnell v. Ex parte Langston, 9 Ohio St. 77 (1859) (discussing 
the lack of congressional enforcement power under the Clause). 
8. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1866). 
9. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. 
10. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMA-
TION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977); MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, No STATE 
SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1986); 
HORACE EDGAR FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1908); 
Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 
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consensus has been reached. The position adopted in this Article is that 
during the nineteenth century it was the prevalent view that the 
"privileges" and "immunities" of citizens were those powers or 
capacities deemed to be inherent in the concept of citizenship, flowing 
from the principles of natural law and embodied in the positive common 
law and constitutions of the state govemments.11 The conclusion 
reached is substantially the same as that reached through an analysis of 
Section 1 in terms of the social compact theories of natural law theorists 
1193 (1992); Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation 
Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1955); Fairman, supra note 7, at 5; John Harrison, 
Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385 (1992); Trisha 
Olson, The Natural Law Foundation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 48 ARK. L. REV. 347 (1995). . 
11. Natural rights theory had been influential in American legal thought since the 
time of the Revolution. CHARLES GROVE HAINES, THE REVIVAL OF NATURAL LAW 
CONCEPTS (1965); EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE "HIGHER LAW" BACKGROUND OF 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1955); CHARLES F. MULLETT, FUNDAMENTAL LAW 
AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1933); Thomas C. Grey, Origins of the Unwritten 
Constitution: Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REV. 
843 (1978). Prominent jurists had also espoused natural law concepts. See, e.g., 
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 135-36 (1810) (Marshall, C.J.); Calder v. Bull, 
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798) (Chase, J.); United States v. La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F . 
. Cas. 832, 845-47 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 15,551) (Story, Cir. J.); Gardner v. 
Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 162, 166-67 (N.Y. 1816) (Kent, C.). See generally BENJAMIN 
FLETCHER WRIGHT, JR., AMERICAN INTERPRETATIONS OF NATURAL LAW: A STUDY IN 
THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT 288-98 (Russell & Russell Inc. 1962) (1931) 
(citing early cases). 
Several commentators have noted, in particular, the influence of natural law theories 
on the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., CURTIS supra note 10; DANIEL 
A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1990); 
HOWARD J. GRAHAM, EVERYMAN'S CONSTITUTION (1968); JACOBUS TENBROEK, EQUAL 
UNDER LAW (Collier Books 1965) (1951); David S. Bogen, The Transformation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment: Reflections From the Admission of Maryland's First Black 
Lawyers, 44 MD. L. REV. 939 (1985); Daniel A. Farber & John E. Muench, The 
Ideological Origins of the Fourteenth Amendment, 1 CONST. COMM. 235 (1984); Robert 
J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil War and 
Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 863 (1986); Earl Maltz, Reconstruction Without 
Revolution: Republican Civil Rights Theory in the Era of the Fourteenth Amendment, 24 
Hous. L. REV. 221, 224 (1987) (stating that "Republicans were committed to the 
concept of natural rights, which they saw as embodied in the statement of the 
Declaration of Independence that all men were entitled to 'life, liberty and the pursuit 
of happiness"'); Olson, supra note 10, at 350 ( concluding that "the [Privileges and 
Immunities] Clause must be placed against the backdrop of the classical natural law 
tradition embraced by the 39th Congress"). 
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influential in nineteenth century American legal thought.12 However, 
the road traversed in reaching this conclusion is quite different. The 
analysis focuses on the jurisprudence developed under the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 prior to ratification of the 
Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. The analysis presented in this Article 
is a more direct route to an identical conclusion, since members of 
Congress explicitly referred to Article IV, Section 2 when discussing 
what they meant by the terms "privileges" and "immunities" as used in 
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.13 
The purpose of this Article is to gain insight into the original meaning 
of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of Section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment by examining the understanding of the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 in nineteenth century 
America. Thus, a comprehensive inquiry into the original meaning of 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 at the time 
of ratification of the Constitution is not undertaken.14 However, the 
nineteenth century understanding of the Clause arguably comes relatively 
close to its original meaning in 1787. Furthermore, many of the sources 
utilized in this Article pre-date the ratification of the Constitution or 
were produced during the founding era. Hence, this Article does provide 
some insight into the original meaning of the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause of Article IV, Section 2, and derivatively traces the contours of 
the federal system as originally designed. · 
Part II of this Article describes the relevance of the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 to a determination of the 
original meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of Section 1 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. Several members of Congress involved in 
the debates over the Fourteenth Amendment stated that the privileges 
12. See Douglas G. Smith, Citizenship and the Fourteenth Amendment, 34 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 681 (1997) (applying social compact theories to interpretation of Section 
1 of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
13. See infra notes 15-34 and accompanying text. 
14. However, a number of other writers have touched upon the original meaning 
of the Clause. See, e.g., PAUL FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION: SLAVERY, 
FEDERALISM, AND COMITY 30-40 ( 1981) ( discussing interstate travel with slaves under 
Article IV); HOWELL, supra note 4 ( describing the relationship between Article IV and 
the historical treatment of alien merchants in England); JAMES H. KETTNER, THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, 1608-1870, at 220-30 (1978); Chester James 
Antieau, Paul's Perverted Privileges or the True Meaning of the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of Article Four, 9 WM. & MARYL. REV. 1 (1967); David S. Bogen, 
The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 794, 796 
(1987) (arguing that the Privileges and Immunities Clause was "not a reference to natural 
law, but was solely concerned with creating a national citizenship"); John M. Gonzales, 
Comment, The Interstate Privileges and Immunities: Fundamental Rights or Federal-
ism?, 15 CAP. U. L. REV. 493 (1986). 
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and immunities guaranteed under Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment were identical to those guaranteed under the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2. 
Part III analyzes the way in which the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause went beyond voluntary principles of international comity in order 
to establish certain positive obligations among the states. These positive 
obligations are textually embodied in the privileges and immunities 
language of that Clause. This Part more generally examines the 
structure of Article IV as reflecting principles of international comity and 
discusses the antebellum controversy over the Fugitive Slave Clause. 
The distinction between special and fundamental privileges recognized 
in the jurisprudence under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of 
Article IV, Section 2 is examined, as well as the state governments' 
power of regulation under the Clause. These concepts were fleshed out 
in the case law applying the principles of international comity embodied 
in the Clause. 
Part IV discusses the nature of the protection afforded under the 
Clause--whether it guarantees substantive protection of certain 
fundamental rights, such as the right to hold property, to contract, to 
testify in court, and to sue, or merely equal civil rights. Again, the 
concepts addressed in Part III relating to principles of international 
comity provide context for interpretation of the Clause. 
Finally, Part V applies the distinction between fundamental and special 
privileges in interpreting the Privileges or Immunities Clause of Section 
1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. This Part discusses the tension 
between the prohibitions of the Privileges or Immunities Clause and the 
power retained by the states to regulate the fundamental privileges and 
immunities of citizens under the Clause. It also explains the distinction 
between political and civil rights made by participants during the 
congressional debates over Section 1. 
The analysis presented in this Article provides further support for an 
interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause as guaranteeing a 
closed set of fundamental powers or capacities inherent in the concept 
of citizenship. This interpretation recognizes the. wide scope of the 
states' power to regulate these fundamental powers of the citizenry while 
guaranteeing that they will remain free from abridgment or complete 
abolition. While the states might regulate the mode or manner in which 
they could be exercised, they were powerless to prohibit the exercise of 
these capacities. Although the importance of the Privileges and 
815 
Immunities Clause as a precursor of Section 1 is widely recognized, it 
may prove useful to demonstrate the relevance of this analysis to an 
interpretation of the Amendment by canvassing the links drawn between 
Article IV, Section 2 and Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment by the 
generation responsible for its ratification. 
II. THE COMITY CLAUSE AND SECTION 1 OF THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
It is widely recognized that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of 
Article IV, Section 2 served as a precursor of the Privileges or Immuni-
ties Clause of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.15 · Several 
members of Congress expressed their belief during debates over the 
Fourteenth Amendment that the privileges and immunities referred to in 
Section 1 of the Amendment were the same as those guaranteed under 
15. See, e.g., Richard L. Aynes, Constricting the Law of Freedom: Justice Miller, 
The Fourteenth Amendment, and the Slaughter-House Cases, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 627, 
630 (1994) (discussing the controversy over the proper interpretation of Article IV); 
Lambert Gingras, Congressional Misunderstandings and the Ratifiers' Understanding: 
The Case of the Fourteenth Amendment, 40 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 41, 47 (1996) (arguing 
that "Bingham and other Republicans . . . read the comity clause as creating or 
recognizing a national set of rights, protected from state interference and similar from 
one state to another"); Earl A. Maltz, The Concept of Equal Protection of the Laws-A 
Historical Inquiry, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 499, 539 (1985) (concluding that Senator 
Bingham's intent in drafting Section 1 was to assure the enforcement of guarantees that 
were already inherent in the Constitution, "particularly those inherent in the comity 
clause"); Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. 
L. REV. 947, 999-1000 (1995) (noting that the Slaughter-House decision cannot be 
correct because it would mean that Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment protects a 
set of rights different from that protected under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of 
Article IV, Section 2). As Senator Bingham later wrote in 1871: 
The clause of the fourteenth amendment [sic], "No state shall make or enforce 
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States," does not, in the opinion of the committee, refer to privileges 
and immunities of citizens of the United States other than those [guaranteed 
by the comity clause]. The fourteenth amendment [sic], it is believed, did not 
add to the privileges and immunities before mentioned, but was deemed 
necessary for their enforcement as an express limitation upon the power of the 
States. It had been judicially determined that the first eight articles of 
amendment of the Constitution were not limitations on the power of the States, 
and it was apprehended that the same might be held as the provision of the 
second section, fourth article. 
THE RECONSTRUCTION .AMENDMENTS' DEBATES, supra note 2, at 466 (citing H. R. REP. 
No. 41-22, at 1 (1871)). Therefore, the only innovation that the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of Section 1 wrought was to make applicable to the states the 
guarantee against abridgment of the privileges and immunities referred to in Article IV, 
Section 2. 
816 
[VOL. 34: 809, 1997] Privileges and Immunities Clause 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
Article IV, Section 2.16 There was already a well~developed body of 
case law under the Privileges and Immunities Clause to which these 
members of Congress could point in explicating the meaning of the 
terms "privileges" and "immunities" as used in Section 1 of the 
Fourteenth Amendmeht. 17 The Privileges and Immunities Clause was 
discussed by members of Congress on several occasions prior to 
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment as a potential guarantee for the 
rights of free blacks. Chief among these episodes are: (1) the contro-
versy over the proposed constitution of Oregon in 1859; (2) the debates 
over the Civil Rights Bill, another precursor of Section 1; and (3) the 
debates over the proposed amendment itself. Finally, the Clause was 
also discussed by the Supreme Court dissenters in the infamous 
Slaughter-House Cases18 as being a precursor of the Amendment. 
A. Debate Over the Proposed Oregon Constitution· 
During the congressional debates over the admission of Oregon as a 
state in 1859, Senator Bingham, the principal draftsman of Section 1 of 
16. For example, Vermont Senator Luke Poland, in the debates over the Fourteenth 
Amendment, argued: 
The clause of the first proposed amendment, that "no State shall make or 
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens 
of the United States," secures nothing beyond what was intended by the 
original provision in the Constitution, that "the citizens of each State shall be 
entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States." 
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2961 (1866); see also infra Parts II.A-D (discussing 
congressional views of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV and the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause of Section I of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
17. A number of cases had been decided under the Clause, including State v. 
Medbury, 3 R.I. 138 (1855); Lemmon v. People, 20 N.Y. 562 (1860); Campbell v. 
Morris, 3 H. & McH. 554 (Md. 1797); Abbot v. Bayley, 6 Pick. 89 (Mass. 1827); Amy 
v. Smith, 11 Ky. (1 Litt.) 326 (1822); Crandall v. State, 10 Conn. 339 (1834); 
Commonwealth v. Towles, 32 Va. (5 Leigh) 743 (1835); Haney v. Marshall, 9 Md. 194 
(1856); Slaughter v. Commonwealth, 54 Va. (13 Gratt.) 767 (1856); People v. Coleman, 
4 Cal. 46 (1854); People v. Imlay, 20 Barb. 68 (S.C.N.Y. 1855); Fire Dep't v. Noble, 
3 E.D. Smith 440 (N.Y.C.C.P. 1854); Fire Dep't v. Helfenstein, 16 Wis. 142 (1862); 
People v. Thurber, 13 Ill. 554 (1852); Ducat v. Chicago, 48 Ill. 172 (1868), affirmed in 
77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 410 (1871); Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth, 68 Ky. (5 Bush) 68 
(1868); Downham v. Alexandria Council, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 173 (1869); Liverpool Ins. 
Co. v. Massachusetts, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 566 (1870); Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230). See also RAOUL BERGER, THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1989) (discussing some of the more prominent 
cases). 
18. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). 
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the Fourteenth Amendment, made the argument that the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 was intended to protect 
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States while in the 
several states, arguing that there was an ellipsis in the drafting of the 
Clause. Senator Bingham reasoned: 
The citizens of each State, all the citizens of each State, being citizens of the 
United States, shall be entitled to "all privileges and immunities of citizens in 
the several States." Not to the rights and immunities of the several States; not 
to those constitutional rights and immunities which result exclusively from State 
authority or State legislation; but to "all privileges and immunities" of citizens 
of the United States in the several States. There is an ellipsis in the language 
employed in the Constitution, but its meaning is self-evident that it is "the 
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States in the several States" 
that it guaranties [sic]. 19 
Bingham addressed certain of these rights, which he thought fell under 
the heading of "privileges and immunities of citizens" and which he 
thought were violated by the proposed constitution of Oregon.20 
Bingham distinguished between the elective franchise, which he believed 
states could restrict to "certain classes of citizens of the United States," 
and those privileges and immunities of ·citizens that were guaranteed 
under Article IV, Section 2. He concluded: "I deny that any State may 
exclude a law abiding citizen of the United States from coming within 
its Territory, or abiding therein, or acquiring and enjoying property 
therein, or from the enjoyment therein of the 'privileges and immunities' 
of a citizen of the United States."21 Bingham enumerated other rights 
that were unconstitutionally denied to "colored persons" under the 
Oregon constitution including the "benefit of the writ of habeas corpus," 
"trial by jury," holding real estate, making contracts, and maintaining 
suits. 22 These rights enumerated by Bingham were among the most 
fundamental comm.on-law rights.23 
19. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 984 (1859). 
20. Id. According to Bingham, among these unconstitutional provisions were those 
declaring that 
Id. 
large numbers of the citizens of the United States shall not, after the admission 
of the proposed State of Oregon, come or be within said State; that they shall 
hold no property there; that they shall not prosecute any suits in any of the 
courts of that State; and that the Legislature shall, by statute, make it a penal 
offense for any person to harbor any of the excluded class of their fellow-
citizens who may thereafter come or be within the State. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. 
23. See Smith, supra note 12 (discussing the fundamental privileges and 
immunities inherent in citizenship in the United States). 
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At this point in time, the same year as the Supreme Court's Dred 
Scotf-4 decision, it seems that Senator Bingham adhered to Justice 
Curtis' dissenting opinion in the Dred Scott case that being born a 
citizen of a state was sufficient to entitle one to citizenship of the United 
States and the accompanying privileges and immunities of citizens 
guaranteed under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, 
Section 2.25 The Taney majority in Dred Scott had argued that it was 
necessary that free blacks were considered citizens of the United States 
at the time of ratification of the original Constitution in order for them 
to enjoy the privileges and immunities of citizens under Article IV, 
Section 2. The Court examined the historical evidence and determined 
that free blacks were not considered citizens at the time of ratifica-
tion.26 However, Bingham disagreed with this historical conclusion and 
argued that free blacks were considered citizens at the time that the 
original Constitution was ratified.27 Echoing Justice Curtis's reasoning 
in his dissenting opinion in Dred Scott, Bingham stated: 
[P]ersons thus excluded from the State by this section of the Oregon constitu-
tion, are citizens by birth of the several States, and therefore are citizens of the 
United States, and as such are entitled to all the privileges and immunities of 
citizens of the United States, amongst which are the rights of life and liberty 
and property, and their due protection in the enjoyment thereof by law.28 
Thus, at this time, prior to drafting Section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, Bingham maintained that free black citizens of the states 
were entitled to the privileges and immunities guaranteed under the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IY, Section 2. Furthermore, 
Bingham classified among the privileges and immunities of citizenship, 
24. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). 
25. See Smith, supra note 12 (discussing the dissenting and majority opinions in 
the Dred Scott case). 
26. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 411-12. Several other courts came to the same 
conclusion as the Taney majority in Dred Scott. See Amy v. Smith, 11 Ky. (1 Litt.) 326 
(1822); Crandall v. State, 10 Conn. 339 (1834); State v. Claiborne, 19 Tenn. (Meigs) 331 
(1838). In Pendleton v. State, the court stated: 
Are free negroes or free colored persons citizens within the meaning of [the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause]? We think not. In recurring to the past 
history of the constitution, and prior to its_ formation, to that of the confedera-
tion, it will be found that nothing beyond a kind of quasi-citizenship has ever 
been recognized in the case of colored persons. 
6 Ark. 509, 511 (1846). 
27. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong. 2d Sess. 984 (1859). 
28. Id. 
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the "rights of life and liberty and property" and "due protection" thereof, 
indicating that perhaps the protections afforded under the Equal 
Protection Clause and Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to "persons" were also understood by Bingham to be conveyed to 
citizens under the Privileges and Immunities Clause.29 
B. The Civil Rights Bill and the Fourteenth Amendment 
Besides the debate over the proposed Oregon constitution, the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause was also mentioned in the context of 
the debate over the Civil Rights Bill, 30 a precursor of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which was designed to prevent inequalities with respect to 
certain fundamental rights of citizens occasioned by the Southern Black 
Codes.31 For example, it was the conclusion of James Wilson, Chair-
man of the House Judiciary Committee and floor manager of the Civil 
Rights Bill, that "[i]f the States would all practice the constitutional 
declaration [ of the Privileges and Immunities Clause] . . . and enforce it 
. . . we might very well refrain from the enactment of thi~ bill into a 
law."32 Therefore, the Privileges and Immunities Clause was identified 
29. See Richard L. Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 57, 68-69 (1993) ("It is logical to read the new amendment's 
protection of life, liberty, and property as representing one privilege and immunity of 
citizenship--and one worthy of extension equally, not only among citizens but to 'all 
persons in the several States."'). 
30. Section 1 of the Civil Rights Bill which was passed over the veto of President 
Johnson provided: 
That all persons born in the United States . . . are hereby declared to be 
citizens of the United States; and such citizens, of every race and color, 
without regard to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude 
... shall have the same right to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, 
and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and 
personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for 
the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall 
be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law, 
statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom to the contrary notwithstanding. 
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1366 (1866). As is evident from the above excerpt, 
many of the rights enumerated in the Bill were fundamental common-law rights. This 
fact is consistent with an interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment as guaranteeing 
a closed set of common-law rights to citizens of the United States. See Smith, supra 
note 12 (presenting such an interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause). 
31. See FLACK, supra note 10, at 81 (concluding that "nearly all [members of 
Congress] said that [the Fourteenth Amendment] was but an incorporation of the Civil 
Rights Bill"); Fairman, supra note 7, at 44 (noting that "[o]ver and over in this debate 
[ over the Amendment], the correspondence between Section 1 of the Amendment and 
the Civil Rights Act is noted ... [: t]he provisions of the one are treated as though they 
were essentially identical with those of the other"). 
32. THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES, supra note 2, at 163-64 
(quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1117-18 (1866)). 
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as addressing the same fundamental, common-law rights as those guaran-
teed under the Civil Rights Bill. 
If free blacks were citizens of the United States, or could be given this 
status through congressional legislation, and if the national government 
had the power to address violations of the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause of Article IV, Section 2 by the state governments through 
legislation, there would be no question of the constitutionality of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866.33 However, the constitutionality of this Act 
was called into question by Bingham himself, 34 prompting Congress to 
draft the Fourteenth Amendment in order to ensure the constitutionality 
of their actions in passing the Civil Rights Act. As Professor John 
Harrison has stated, "[a]ny theory of the Fourteenth Amendment must 
... explain how it validates the Civil Rights Act."35 By achieving an 
understanding of the phrase, "Privileges and Immunities of Citizens," as 
33. Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27. The Civil Rights Bill declared that 
"all persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power, excluding 
Indians not taxed" were "citizens of the United States." Id. § I. 
The Civil Rights Bill was widely recognized by congressional Republicans as a 
precursor to Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. For example, George Latham 
stated that the "civil rights bill which is now law ... covers exactly the same ground 
as the amendment." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2883 (1866). Martin Thayer 
stated that the Amendment was "but incorporating in the Constitution of the United 
States the principle of the civil rights bill which has lately become a law." THE 
RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES, supra note 2, at 213 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2465 (1866)); see also Steven J. Heyman, The First Duty of 
Government: Protection, Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment, 41 DUKE L.J. 507, 566 
(1991) (recognizing that "constitutionalizing the Civil Rights Act was a major purpose 
of the Fourteenth Amendment"). 
34. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1291-92 (1866) (remarks of John 
Bingham). Some state appellate courts also declared the Civil Rights Act unconstitution-
al. See, e.g., State v. Washington, 36 Cal. 658 (1869); State v. Rash, 6 Del. (1 Roust.) 
271 (1867); Bowlin v. Commonwealth, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) 5 (1867). 
35. Harrison, supra note 10, at 1390. Harrison points out that Section 1 of the 
Civil Rights Act stated that all persons born in the United States and not subject to any 
foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, were deemed citizens of the United States. 
The Act provided that in every state and territory all citizens, without regard to race, 
color, or previous condition of servitude, should have the same rights as white citizens: 
[T]o make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to 
inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and 
to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person 
and property ... and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, 
and to none other. 
Id. at 1390 n.14 (quoting Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27). 
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used in Article IV, Section 2, one can explain the enumeration of rights 
to be protected under the Civil Rights Act of 1866. 
C. The Slaughter-House Cases 
Not only had the Privileges and Immunities Clause been cited during 
the debates in Congress over the Civil Rights Bill and the Fourteenth . 
Amendment itself, but it was also cited by the Supreme Court dissenters 
in the Slaughter-House Cases, who employed the terms "privileges" and 
"immunities" in the same manner as they were used in Section 1. In the 
Slaughter-House Cases, the Supreme Court emasculated the Privileges 
or Immunities Clause of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment by a 
narrow margin, holding that the privileges and immunities referred to in 
the Amendment were only certain limited rights of national citizen-
ship.36 However, several justices wrote vigorous dissenting opinions 
in the case, arguing that the protections afforded under the Clause were 
intended to be much broader. According to one dissenting member of 
the Court, Justice Field, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article 
Iv, Section 2 provided that with respect to the privileges and immunities 
"which of right belong to the citizens of all free governments ... [n]o 
discrimination can be made by one State against citizens of other States 
in their enjoyment, nor can any greater imposition be levied than such 
as is laid upon its own citizens."37 Justice Field stated that the 
36. A number of commentators have noted the decision's effect. See, e.g., JUDITH 
A. BAER, EQUALITY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION: RECLAIMING THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT 107 (1983); ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE 
POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 37, 166 (1990) (noting that the Court's decision 
rendered the Clause "a dead letter"); 2 LOUIS B. BOUDIN, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 
106, 107, 204 (1932) (noting that the Court emasculated the Clause); CHARLES 
FAIRMAN, MR. JUSTICE MILLER AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1862-1875, at 184-85 (1939) 
[hereinafter JUSTICE MILLER]; Aynes, supra note 15, at 627-28; Michael Conant, 
Antimonopoly Tradition Under the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments: Slaughter-House 
Cases Re-examined, 31 EMORY L.J. 785, 789 (1982); Charles Fairman, -what Makes a 
Great Justice? Mr. Justice Bradley and the Supreme Court, 1870-1892, 30 B.U. L. REV. 
49, 78 (1950) (noting that the Court's decision "virtually scratched" the Clause from the 
Constitution) [hereinafter Great Justice]; Sanford Levinson, Some Reflections on the 
Rehabilitation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 12 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 71, 73 (1989) (noting that the Court "ruthlessly eviscerated 
the Clause of practically all operative meaning"); Dr. Patricia Allan Lucie, White Rights 
as a Model for Black: Or--who's Afraid of the Privileges or Immunities Clause?, 38 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 859 (1987); Walter F. Murphy, Slaughter-House, Civil Rights, and 
Limits on Constitutional Change, 32 AM. J. JURIS. 1, 2 (1987) (concluding that the Court 
"gutted the privileges or immunities clause"); John Anthony Scott, Justice Bradley's 
Evolving Concept of the Fourteenth Amendment from the Slaughterhouse Cases to the 
Civil Rights Cases, 25 RUTGERS L. REV. 552, 555 (1971); Joseph Tussman & Jacobus 
TenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 341, 342 (1949). 
37. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 98 (1873). 
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relationship between the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, 
Section 2 and the Privileges or Immunities Clause of Section 1 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment was as follows: 
What the clause in question [the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article 
IV, Section 2] did for the protection of the citizens of one State against hostile 
and discriminating legislation of other States, the 14th Amendment does for the 
protection of every citizen of the United States against hostile and discriminat-
ing legislation against him in favor of others, whether they reside in the same 
or in different States. If, under the 4th article of the Constitution, equality of 
privileges and immunities is secured between citizens of different States, under 
the 14th Amendment the same equality is secured between citizens of the 
United States. 38 
From this passage, it is apparent that Justice Field did not believe that 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 reached 
state action against resident citizens. This appears to have been the 
conclusion of Senator Trumbull also, who stated that cases involving the 
Clause "relate entirely to the rights which a citizen in one State has on 
going into another State, and not to the rights of the citizen belonging 
to the State."39 This was one of the "imperfections" in the original 
Constitution, which the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to 
correct.40 
D. "Imperfections" in the Original Constitution 
Not only was the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, 
Section 2 silent with respect to the relation between a state government 
38. Id. at 100-01. 
39. THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES,supranote2, at 137 (quoting 
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 600 (1866)). Senator Garrett Davis also noted that 
the Civil Rights Bill would apply "where the citizen is domiciled in the State where he 
was born," unlike the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2. CONG. 
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 595-96 (1866). 
40. Michael Kent Curtis has argued that Senator Bingham and other members of 
Congress were of the opinion that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, 
Section 2 protected certain rights of national citizenship, including the Bill of Rights. 
Bingham and others who framed the Fourteenth Amendment relied on a 
reading of the privileges and immunities clause of Article IV, Section 2 by 
which it protected a body of national privileges and immunities of citizens of 
the United States, including those in the Bill of Rights. This reading may 
have been incorrect. 
CURTIS, supra note 10, at 114. Raoul Berger has argued, however, that the majority did 
not share the "unorthodox" view of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. BERGER, 
supra note 17, at 96-97. 
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and its own citizens, but, additionally, where it did apply, there were 
problems with enforcement of the Clause against the states. Prior to 
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, the states did not always 
comply with the Full Faith and Credit and Privileges and Immunities 
Clauses of Article IV, Section 2. As Paul Finkelman has noted: 
States could and did deny privileges and immunities to citizens of other states. 
Full faith and credit were not always given to out-of-state judicial decrees. 
Such denials of comity, by both the North and the South, were partially 
responsible for the dissolution of the Union. The memory of such problems 
motivated the adoption of certain sections of the Fourteenth Amendment.41 
For example, whether or not the right to property in slaves was one 
of the privileges and immunities protected under the Clause was a matter 
of great dispute prior to the Civil War.42 As Professor Finkelman has 
noted, "[t]he United States Supreme Court was never asked to apply this 
clause, or Washington's interpretation of it [in Car.field v. Coryell], to 
transit with slaves. Had this happened in the late antebellum period, 
Taney's court possibly would have sustained the right of transit with 
slaves."43 The Taney Court did, however, address the issue of whether 
41. FINKELMAN, supra note 14, at 8; see also Aynes, supra note 29, at 75-76 
( discussing the problem of enforcement under Article IV); id. at 78 ("Prominent judges, 
lawyers, and members of Congress shared Bingham's conviction that the Constitution 
prohibited the states from abridging the privileges and immunities protected by Article 
IV, Section 2, but that Congress could not enforce the provision."). 
42. See infra Section 111.C.1. 
43. FINKELMAN, supra note 14, at 10. Finkelman notes that there were a number 
of cases concerning fugitive slaves in which the notion of comity and interstate transit 
played a central role. Among them, he cites Groves v. Slaughter, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 449 
(1841), Strader v. Graham, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 82 (1850), Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 
U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856), and Lemmon v. People, 20 N.Y. 562 (1860). FINKELMAN, 
supra note 14, at 12. In Groves, the Court seems to have come close to affirming the 
right of property in slaves as being one of the privileges and immunities of citizenship 
guaranteed under Article IV, Section 2. The Court stated: 
824 
As each state has plenary power to legislate on this subject [ what constitutes 
property], its laws are the test of what is property; if they recognise slaves as 
the property of those who hold them, they become the subjects of commerce 
between the states which so recognise them, and the traffic in them may be 
regulated by Congress, as the traffic in other articles; but no farther. Being 
property, by the law of any state, the owners are protected from any violations 
of the rights of property by Congress, under the fifth amendment of the 
Constitution; these rights do not consist merely in ownership, the right of 
disposing of property of all kinds, is incident to it, which Congress cannot 
touch. The mode of disposition is regulated by the state or common law; and 
but for the first clause in the second section of the fourth article of the 
Constitution of the United States, a state might authorize its own citizens to 
deal in slaves, and prohibit it to all others. 
But that clause secures to the citizens of all the states, "all privileges and 
immunities of citizens" of any other state, whereby any traffic in slaves or 
other property, which is lawful to the citizens or settlers of Mississippi, with 
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free blacks were citizens of the United States and therefore entitled to 
the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states in Dred 
Scott v. Sandford. 44 The Supreme Court concluded that free blacks 
each other, is equally protected when carried on between them and the citizens 
of Virginia. Hence, it is apparent, that no state can control this traffic, so long 
as it may be carried on by its own citizens, within its own limits; as part of its 
purely internal commerce, any state may regulate it according to its own 
policy; but when such regulation purports to extend to other states or their 
citizens, it is limited by the Constitution, putting the citizens of all on the same 
footing as their own. 
Groves, 40 U.S. at 515. Similarly, other courts also indicated that property in slaves 
might be afforded protection under the Clause. For example, in Willard v. People, 5 Ill. 
(4 Scam.) 461, 471-72 (1843), Justice Scates reasoned that since Illinois was bound to 
grant a right of transit to non-Americans without disturbing their property under 
principles of international comity, "[m]uch less could we disregard their [citizens of the 
United States] constitutional right, as citizens of one of the states, to all the rights, 
immunities, and privileges of the citizens of the several states." Id. 
However, as might be expected, the results reached by Northern courts with respect 
to the question of whether slavery need be recognized based upon the principles of 
international comity underlying the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, 
Section 2 were quite different. For example, in Jackson v. Bulloch, 12 Conn. 38 (1837), 
Chief Justice Thomas Williams declared that an individual could no longer be a slave 
within Connecticut since "slavery is contrary to the principles of natural right and to the 
great law of love; that it is founded on injustice and fraud, and can be supported only 
by the provisions of positive law .... " Id. at 39-40. Even the slaveholder's counsel 
recognized that "slavery was a system of such a character, that it can claim nothing by 
the law of comity ... that it was local, and must be governed entirely by the laws of 
the state, in which it is attempted to be enforced." Id. at 40-41; see also FINKELMAN, 
supra note 14, at 126-80 (discussing the Northern rejection of the application of 
principles of international comity to the institution of slavery). Furthermore, during the 
time that the Articles of Confederation were in effect, all of the Northern states banned 
the importation and exportation of slaves. Pennsylvania also limited the right to sojourn 
with a slave. FINKELMAN, supra note 14, at 32 (citing ARTHUR ZILVERSMIT, THE FIR.ST 
EMANCIPATION: THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY IN THE NORTH 106-8, 120, 148-53, 156-69 
(Univ. of Chicago Press 1967)). 
Eventually, even the Southern states began to recognize limitations upon the right to 
property in slaves outside slave states. Several of the Southern states adopted "The 
Slave, Grace" doctrine under which slaves who had lived in a free state and returned to 
a slave state were freed by the slave-state court. Id. at 187. The rationales for this 
doctrine included the following: that residence or presence in a free jurisdiction could 
free a slave; that once free, a person was always free; and that only positive law could 
make someone a slave, and therefore absent legislation reenslaving former slaves, they 
would remain free. Id. For example, in Rankin v. Lydia, 9 Ky. (2 A.K. Marsh.) 467-70 
(1820), Judge Mills acknowledged that the right to property in human beings was "a 
right existing by positive law of a municipal character, without foundation in the law of 
nature, or the unwritten and common law." See also infra Section III.C.1 (discussing 
cases arising under the Fugitive Slave Clause as well as the Rankin case). 
44. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 405-06 (1856). 
825 
were not and could not become citizens of the United States absent 
constitutional amendment.45 Therefore, the Court assuaged Southern 
fears that free blacks might claim the constitutional rights of the citizen 
in Southern states under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article 
IV, Section 2. However, the fear on the part of the North was that 
application of the Privileges and Immunities Clause to transit with slaves 
would lead to constitutionally-mandated recognition of slavery outside 
the Southern States.46 In fact, in Article IV of the Confederate 
45. Id. 
46. For example, Francis Lieber, a Republican and professor at the University of 
South Carolina stated that '" [ e ]ach institution of government was being strangled by an 
outreaching slave power."' FINKELMAN, supra note 14, at 12 (quoting PmLLIP S. 
P ALUDAN, A COVENANT WITH DEATH: THE CONSTITUTION, LAW, AND EQUALITY IN THE 
CIVIL WAR ERA 79-80 (Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press 1975)). Furthermore, Finkelman 
states that "Lincoln, and other northerners, saw the Dred Scott decision as a first step 
toward a judicial nationalization of slavery." Id. at 283. Finkelman cites the Lincoln-
Douglas debates wherein Lincoln stated: 
[W]hat is necessary for the nationalization of slavery? It is simply the next 
Dred Scott decision. It is merely for the Supreme Court to decide that no 
State under the Constitution can exclude it, just as they have already decided 
that under the Constitution neither Congress nor the territorial legislature can 
do it. . . . [S]lavery is to be made national. 
Id. at 317 ( quoting 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 27 (Roy P. Basler 
ed., New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers Univ. Press 1953-55)). Finkelman claims that "[i]n 
nationalizing slavery the Supreme Court could have relied on doctrine and dictum 
developed in Groves v. Slaughter, Prigg v. Pennsylvania, Strader v. Graham, and Dred 
Scott." Id. at 325. 
However, not every court recognized a constitutionally-protected right of property in 
slaves in transit. For example, in Lemmon v. People, 20 N.Y. 562 (1860), the New York 
Court of Appeals upheld the freedom of slaves brought through New York in transit. 
It was argued before the court that "the municipal law which makes men the subject of 
property, is limited with the power to enforce itself, that is by its territorial jurisdiction 
... the strangers stand upon our soil [in New York] in their natural relations as men, 
their artificial relation being absolutely terminated." Id. at 598. The court adopted this 
argument that property in slaves was not protected under the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause because slavery, being contrary to the law of nature, was merely a municipal 
regulation having no extraterritorial force. However, Judge Clerke in his dissent argued 
that New York was bound to recognize this form of property under the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause. Clerke stated: 
the relations of the different States of this Union towards each other are of a 
much closer and more positive nature than those between foreign nations . . 
. . [T]hey are one nation; war between them is legally impossible; and this 
comity, impliedly recognized by the law of nations, ripens, in the compact 
cementing these States, into an express conventional obligation, which is not 
to be enforced by an appeal to arms, but to be recognized and enforced by the 
judicial tribunals. 
Id. at 642. Clerke asked: 
826 
[i]s it consistent with this purpose of perfect union, and perfect and unrestrict-
ed intercourse, that property which the citizen of one State brings into another 
State, for the purpose of passing through it to a State where he intends to take 
up his residence, shall be confiscated in the State through which he is passing, 
or shall be declared to be no property, and liberated from his control? 
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Constitution, the wording of the Privileges and Immunities Clause was 
changed so that it was explicitly recognized that property in slaves was 
to be preserved as one of the privileges and immunities of citizenship.47 
Thus, Northern fears were probably well-founded. The foregoing 
discussion reveals the confusion in antebellum America concerning the 
meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, as well as some of the 
Id. at 636. Clerke argued that even though property in slaves was not recognized under 
the law of nations, the positive provisions of the Constitution overrode the law of 
nations. Clerke argued that the majority was wrong 
in supposing, because the law of nations refused to recognize slaves as 
property, the several States of this Union were at liberty to do the same; 
forgetting that the compact, by which the latter are governed in their relation 
towards each other, modifies the law of nations in this respect ... [therefore, 
no state is] permitted in its dealings or intercourse with other States or their 
inhabitants to ignore the right to property in the labor and service of persons 
in transitu from those States. 
Id. at 642-43. For a more thorough discussion of the Lemmon opinion, see infra notes 
113-37 and accompanying text. 
4 7. The following language was added to the Privileges and Immunities Clause: 
"[T]he citizens of each State . . . shall have the right of transit and sojourn in any State 
of this Confederacy, with their slaves and other property; and the right of property in 
said slaves shall not be thereby impaired." CONSTITUTION OF THE CONFEDERATE 
STATES art. IV, § 2; CHARLES ROBERT LEE, JR., THE CONFEDERATE CONSTITUTIONS 110 
(Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press 1963). 
The members of the constitutional convention of 1787 from the Southern states may 
have presumed that because of the enumerated powers of the federal government as well 
as the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2, the right to property 
in slaves would be maintained under the Constitution. General Charles Cotesworth 
Pinckney argued before the state's house of representatives during the debate over 
ratification in South Carolina: 
We have a security that the general government can never emancipate them, 
for no such authority is granted; and it is admitted, on all hands, that the 
general government has no powers but what are expressly granted by the 
Constitution, and that all rights not expressed were reserved by the several 
states. . . . In short, considering all circumstances, we have made the best 
terms for the security of this species of property it was in our power to make. 
We would have made better if we could; but, on the whole, I do not think 
them bad. 
3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 254-55 (Max Farrand ed., 
1937). Furthermore, individuals such as Pinckney might have thought that property in 
slaves was not merely conventional, but did have a firm foundation in natural law and, 
therefore, property in slaves would be protected under Article IV, Section 2. During the 
constitutional convention, Pinckney asserted that "[i]f slavery be wrong, it is justified by 
the example of all the world. He cited the case of Greece[,] Rome[,] & other antient 
[sic] States; the sanctiqn given by France[,] England, Holland[,] & other modem States. 
In all ages one half of mankind have been slaves." 2 Id. at 371. 
827 
dissatisfaction with its perceived defects48 in guaranteeing the rights of 
citizens of the United States as originally drafted, such as the Clause's 
inapplicability to controversies between a citizen and his own state 
government and the lack of congressional power to enforce the Clause. 
Having established the relevance of understanding the nineteenth 
century meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, 
Section 2 to understanding the original meaning of the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment,49 three 
interrelated issues arise to be resolved in interpreting the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2: (1) did the Clause give 
substantive protection to a set of well-defined privileges and immunities, 
perhaps providing for differences in regulation of these rights in different 
states, or merely provide "antidiscrimination" protection,50 ensuring that 
foreign citizens would enjoy the same privileges and immunities as 
resident citizens, but leaving it open to the states to choose which 
privileges and immunities their citizens would enjoy; (2) even if the 
protection was merely antidiscrimination protection, did the framers 
assume that there would be a set of privileges and immunities conferred 
to citizens in all of the states, but not constitutionally-mandated under 
the Clause; and (3) did the Clause merely provide protection for foreign 
citizens in the other states, or did it also afford protection for citizens 
against their own state governments? 
With respect to the last question, the evidence indicates that Justice 
Field's interpretation of the Clause in the Slaughter-House Cases as 
protecting only foreign citizens may have been the most historically 
accurate.51 This would not be a surprising result since there is a 
48. As Congressman Thaddeus Stevens noted, prior to adoption of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, "the Constitution limits only the action of Congress, and is not a limitation 
on the States. This amendment supplies that defect, and allows Congress to correct 
unjust legislation of the States, so far that the law which operates upon one man shall 
operate equally upon all." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1866). 
49. See supra Part II. 
50. This has become the prevailing interpretation of the Clause by modem courts. 
See Downham v. Alexandria, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 173, 175 (1869) (Field, J.) ("It is only 
equality of privileges and immunities between citizens of different States that the 
Constitution guarantees."); HOWELL, supra note 4, at 20 ("The view that a citizen of one 
State carries with him into any other State certain fundamental privileges and immunities 
which come to him necessarily by the mere fact of his citizenship in the first-mentioned 
State, has been definitely abandoned."). 
51. See supra notes 37-38 discussing Justice Field's Slaughter-House dissent. 
However, prominent members of Congress may have disagreed with this position 
including John Bingham, principal draftsman of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
and James Wilson of Iowa, floor manager of the Civil Rights Bill and Chairman of the 
House Judiciary Committee. See CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 984 (1859). 
Wilson may also have thought that Congress had the implied authority to enforce the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause against the states, unlike Senator Bingham. See CONG. 
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perception at least that the Framers of the Constitution were more 
concerned with federal interference with individual rights and less 
concerned with state interference with the rights of their own citizens. 
Resident citizens could be protected from the actions of their own state 
governments under the state constitutions. At a minimum, it may have 
been an assumption of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment that all 
free governments would recognize a core set of fundamental privileges 
and immunities of citizens. 
The first two questions generated greater controversy. It seems that 
the prevailing understanding of the Clause was that it only provided 
antidiscrimination protection, but it may have been assumed that all of 
the states would provide certain rights possessed by citizens in all free 
governments. 52 Therefore, the practical effect of the Clause would be 
to ensure that citizens, no matter where they went in the United States 
would enjoy certain fundamental rights. For example, certain privileges 
and immunities of citizenship--the privileges and immunities of 
citizenship of the United States provided for in the Constitution, 
applicable to all citizens in the several states---were undoubtedly 
afforded substantive protection. One such privilege of citizens of the 
United States, in dispute in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 53 was the privilege 
of suing in the courts of the United States under Article III. However, 
a wider notion of the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United 
States, of general citizenship, encompassing certain privileges and 
immunities of citizens in all free governments which were traditionally 
under the regulatory control of the state governments, may have been 
envisioned under the Clause. 54 
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1117-19 (1866) .. 
52. This is the language that Justice Bushrod Washington used in his opinion in 
Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230), in interpreting the 
Privileges and Imm.unities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 and the nature of the 
privileges and immunities guaranteed therein. See infra notes 238-52 and accompanying 
text, discussing the court's opinion in Corfield. 
53. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). 
54. For example, it was argued by counsel in the case of Lemmon v. People, 20 
N.Y. 562 (1860), that there was a substantive right to property guaranteed under the 
Clause as well as certain other "general privileges and immunities." According to 
counsel, the Privileges and Imm.unities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 was designed to 
secure to the citizen, when within a State in which he is not domiciled, the 
general privileges and immunities which, in the very nature of citizenship, as 
recognized and established by the Federal Constitution, belonged to that status 
[Citizen of the United States]; so that by no partial and adverse legislation of 
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Furthermore, even if the weight of the historical evidence leads to the 
conclusion that the antidiscrimination reading of the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 is the most historically 
accurate, it does not mean that the Privileges or Immunities Clause of 
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment was also intended to afford only 
antidiscrimination protection to citizens.55 The Privileges or Immuni-
ties Clause may have been intended to afford substantive protection as 
well. 56 It may have been the intent of the framers of the Amendment 
to mandate that the states uniformly respect certain fundamental rights 
of citizens such that the states could not withdraw these rights equally 
from every citizen of a state without violating the Section 1 prohibitions. 
Thus, the protection would be similar to that afforded under other 
provisions of the Constitution which serve as substantive limitations on 
all of the states, such as the Contracts Clause57 and the Bill of Attain-
der Clause. 58 This may have been the reason that the phrase "privileg-
es or immunities of citizens of the United States" was used in Section 
1-to indicate that there were certain fundamental rights inherent in 
one's status as a citizen of the United States, which must be recognized 
by all of the state governments. 59 The state governments would still be 
free to regulate the form in which these capacities of citizenship existed 
or the mode in which they could be exercised,60 but were obligated to 
recognize these pre-political privileges and immunities of citizens. 
The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 did not 
arise from a blank slate, but rather was preceded by a well-developed 
body of law concerning the natural relations of sovereign states. The 
a State into which he might go as a stranger or sojourner can he be deprived 
of them. 
Id. at 580-81. See also infra Part IV.D, discussing potential interpretations of the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause. 
55. See Harrison, supra note 10 (presenting the case for interpreting the Privileges 
or Immunities Clause of Section I of the Fourteenth Amendment as protecting against 
discrimination, but not guaranteeing substantive protection of fundamental rights). 
56. Other commentators have argued that the Privileges or Immunities Clause was 
designed to protect certain substantive rights. For example, Charles Fairman concluded 
in his exhaustive study of the Amendment's history that it was "meant to establish some 
substantial rights" under the heading "privileges and immunities of citizens of the United 
States." Great Justice, supra note 36, at 77; see also Aynes, supra note 29, at 73 
( arguing that the Amendment was designed to enforce existing substantive rights rather 
than establish new ones); Maltz, supra note 4. 
57. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
58. Id. 
59. See Smith, supra note 12 (discussing the relationship between citizenship and 
the rights guaranteed under the Privileges or Immunities Clause of Section 1 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment). . 
60. See infra Part V.B, discussing the states' retained power of regulation under 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause. 
830 
[VOL. 34: 809, 1997] Privileges and Immunities Clause 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
Clause was viewed not only as an "individual rights" provision, but also 
as a "federalism" provision, maintaining the integrity of the federal 
system as well as the equality of the states as political entities. 
However, the Clause went beyond principles of comity in several 
ways-constituting the citizens of the several states one people and 
creating positive, conventional obligations in place of "unwritten" 
principles of reason that served as legal default rules. 
III. STATES IN A STATE OF NATURE: THE PRIVILEGES AND 
IMMUNITIES CLAUSE AND INTERNATIONAL COMITY 
The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 was 
founded upon principles of international comity among states.61 The 
comity of nations was often described as based on principles derived 
from an independent "unwritten" law termed the law of nations.62 Such 
61. This was a constitutionalization of notions of interstate comity, which was the 
voluntary recognition of certain rights of foreign citizens. For example, Justice Story 
in his work on the conflict of laws explained the principles of international comity as 
expressed by Huber: ( 1) laws have no force beyond the territorial jurisdiction of a state; 
(2) persons within a given jurisdiction, "whether their residence is permanent or tempo-
rary," are subject to the laws of the jurisdiction; and (3) nations and states "from comity 
admit" that the laws of other nations and states ought to "have the same force every 
where," as long as "they do not prejudice the power or rights of other governments, or 
of their citizens." JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 30 
(Hilliard, Gray & Co. eds., 1st ed. 1834). This form of voluntary comity was not 
derived from civil or natural law, but rather out of convenience. Id. The flaw with this 
variety of comity was that it "is, and ever must be, uncertain. That it must necessarily 
depend on a variety of circumstances, which cannot be reduced to any certain rule." Id. 
at 29. However, it must be noted that the Privileges and Immunities Clause goes beyond 
such voluntary recognition because it mandates recognition of certain rights and because 
the rights that must be recognized were rights, such as the right to hold property, not 
voluntarily recognized as rights of foreign citizens in the United States. See infra notes 
69-72 and accompanying text. The Clause, in effect, mandated that the states recognize 
citizens of other states as citizens of their own states and not deny them the rights of 
citizenship that belong to their own citizens. See also ANDREW C. MCLAUGHLIN, A 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 127-28 (1935); Peters. Onuf, The 
First Federal Constitution: The Articles of Confederation, reprinted in THE FRAMING 
AND RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 82 (Leonard w. Levy & Dennis J. Mahoney 
eds., 1987) (noting that Jonathan Witherspoon conceived of the confederation as a more 
perfect form of the international system). 
62. The idea that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 
was an attempt to make binding through compact the principles of comity among states 
derived from natural law was expressed by the Supreme Court in Bank of Augusta v. 
Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839). In that case, Mr. Webster, arguing before the 
Court, enumerated several distinct rights that were to be afforded to foreign citizens 
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principles might be employed by judges as background rules of 
"general" or "universal" law or reason.63 Positive municipal laws could 
override these principles as could positive constitutional provisions.64 
As Justice Story stated in his Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws, it 
was the comity of nations and not of courts that could be enforced, and 
the intent of the legislature expressed in positive law could override 
these principles of reason. 65 
through principles of comity and identified the law of nations as the source of principles 
of international comity. According to Webster: 
The term "comity" is taken from the civil law. Vattel has no distinct chapter 
upon that head. But the doctrine is laid down by other authorities with 
sufficient distinctness, and in effect by him. It is, in general terms, that there 
are, between nations at peace with one another, rights, both natural and 
individual, resulting from the comity or courtesy due from one friendly nation 
to another. Among these, is the right to sue in their Courts respectively; the 
right to travel in each other's dominions; the right to pursue one's vocation in 
trade; the right to do all things~ generally, which belong to the citizens proper 
of each country, and which they are not precluded from doing by some 
positive law of the state. Among these rights, one of the clearest is the right 
of a citizen of one nation to take away his property from the territory of any 
other friendly nation, without molestation or objection. This is what we call 
the comity of nations. It is the usage of nations, and has become a positive 
obligation on all nations. 
Id. at 556-57. Thus, the principles of international comity were argued to be binding 
upon the states as positive law since they were embodied in the ''usage of nations." This 
comity was voluntary where there was no common superior establishing it as law. 
According to the reporter, Mr. Webster stated that comity "is but a customary or 
voluntary law; that it is a law existing by the common understanding and consent of 
nations, and not established for the government of nations by any common superior." 
Id. at 557. However, in the United States similar principles were made binding with 
respect to citizens of the several states through the Privileges and Immunities Clause of 
Article N, Section 2. 
63. An illustration of the belief on the part of the legal community that the law of 
nations served as a set of legal default rules is to be found in the remarks of Senator 
Seward concerning rights of slaveowners. According to Seward, "the Constitution does 
not recognize property in man, but leaves that question, as between the States, to the law 
of nature and of nations. That law, as expounded by Vattel, is founded in the reason of 
things." CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 1st Sess. App. 264 (1850). 
64. See Smith, supra note 12 (discussing Pufendorfs views concerning the role of 
natural law in judicial interpretation). 
65. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 594-95 (1856) 
(corroborating Justice Story's views). According to Justice Curtis: 
[A]s has justly been said ... it is the comity of the State, not of the court. 
The judges have nothing to do with the motive of the State. Their duty is 
simply to ascertain and give effect to its will. And when it is found by them 
that its will to depart from a rule of international law has not been manifested 
by the State, they are bound to assume that its will is to give effect to it. 
Id. at 594 (citation omitted). See also Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth, 68 Ky. (5 
Bush) 68, 77 (1868) (stating that "[i]t is not the comity of the courts, but the comity of 
nations, which is administered and ascertained in the same way, and guided by the same 
reasoning, by which all other principles of municipal law are ascertained and guided."). 
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The origins of a concept of "the law of nations" may be traced to the 
Roman law. As was stated in Justinian's Institutes, the law of nations, 
or jus gentium, comprised that part of the civil law shared in common 
with most other nations. The concept of comity among the states in the 
federal system is analogous to the relation of Rome to its client states. 66 
The union among the states, however, would appear to be stronger than 
that between Rome and its client states. The jus gentium represented a 
separate body of law that was not coextensive with the civil law 
applicable to citizens of Rome. 67 
Under the federal system in the United States and, more specifically, 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article :rv, Section 2, citizens 
of foreign states were to be deemed citizens in all of the states and were 
therefore to be governed under the civil law of the several states. 
Therefore, the Privileges and Immunities Clause went beyond traditional 
66. 4 DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN, ch. 15, § 7 (Theodor Mommsen, Paul Krueger, & 
Alan Watson eds., 1985). Justinian's Institutes states: 
Id. 
[A]lthough free peoples and those bound to us by treaty are foreigners to us 
... they retain their freedom and rights over their own property in our country 
just as in their own, and the same applies to us in their country . . . . A free 
people is one which is not subject to the control. of any other people; a civitas 
foederata, one which has neither entered into friendship under an equal treaty 
or under a treaty [which] includes the provision that this people should with 
good will preserve the majestas of another people. 
67. See Smith, supra note 12 (discussing the Roman distinction between the law 
of nations and the civil law). 
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principles of international comity.68 First, comity was voluntary.69 
According to Chancellor Kent: 
68. This term "comity" was defined by Mr. Ingersoll in argument before the 
Supreme Court in Bank of Augusta v. Earle and connected to the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2: 
Comity . . . is international courtesy; never allowed between provinces, 
districts, counties, cities, or other parts of the same empire. The connexion 
between these United States is closer and more intimate than that of comity. 
Their union by federal compact expressly settles the relation of the states to 
each other, and leaves no room for tacit or constructive comity to operate .. 
. . An article of the Constitution provides for the force and proof of public 
acts of state, for the privileges and immunities of the citizens of each state in 
all the rest, for fugitives from justice and fugitives from labour; leaving little 
or nothing on this important subject to judicial construction. 
38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 569-70 (1839). 
69. In his dissent in Bank of Augusta, Justice McKinley referred to the work of 
Emmerich Vattel, an influential natural law theorist, as authority for his discussion of 
international comity. According to Justice McKinley, the voluntary nature of internation-
al comity was said by Vattel to flow from the sovereignty of the individual states and 
the liberty that each has "derived from nature." Id. at 606. Justice McKinley quoted the 
following passage from Vattel's Law of Nations: 
"Nations being free and independent of each other in the same manner as men 
are naturally free and independent, the second general law of their society is 
that each nation ought to be left in the peaceable enjoyment of that liberty it 
has derived from nature. The natural society of nations cannot subsist, if the 
rights which each has received from nature are not respected. None would 
willingly renounce its liberty: it would rather break off all commerce with 
those that should attempt to violate it. From this liberty and independence it 
follows that every nation is to judge of what its conscience demands, of what 
it can or cannot do, of what is proper or improper to be done; and consequent-
ly to examine and determine whether it can perform any office for another 
without being wanting in what it owes to itself. In all cases, then, where a 
nation has the liberty of judging·what its duty requires, another cannot oblige 
it to act in such or such a manner. For the attempting this would be doing an 
injury to the liberty of nations." 
Id. (quoting EMMERICH VATTEL, LAW OF NATIONS 53, 54). Thus, without some sort of 
binding agreement, or supreme sovereignty, the principles of comity would remain 
voluntary. 
Similar statements were made in Miller v. Hall, 1 Dall. 229 (Pa. 1788). In that case, 
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania discussed the role of the civil law and the law of 
nations in deciding whether a defendant who was a resident of Maryland could obtain 
a discharge under the insolvent law in the state of Maryland from a plaintiff who was 
a resident of Pennsylvania. The plaintiff argued that 
according to the strict idea of a municipal law, it was limited in its operation 
to the jurisdiction of the state that made it[;] . . . and to a free people 
particularly, it must appear, unreasonable that there should be legislation where 
there is no representation .... There are, however, he [Justinian] acknowl-
edged, cases in which an indirect effect is given to foreign statutes, in order 
to accomplish the rules of justice[;] ... the foreign statutes, as such, have no 
coercive authority extra territorium, but are received only by consent, so far 
as they are necessary to justice. 
Id. at 239-40. 
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Nations are equal in respect to each other, and entitled to claim equal 
consideration for their rights, whatever may be their relative dimensions or 
strength, or however greatly they may differ in government, religion, or 
manners. This perfect equality, and entire independence of all distinct states, 
is a fundamental principle of public law. It is a necessary consequence of this 
equality, that each nation has a right to govern itself as it may think proper, and 
no one nation is entitled to dictate a form of government, or religion, or a 
course of internal policy, to another. 70 
However, as sovereigns, states could enter into compacts or treaties that 
were binding among themselves. The states, or the peoples thereof, 
were parties to the Constitution of the United States, having consented 
to be bound by it. Therefore, the states could agree to be bound by 
certain principles that went beyond mere voluntary comity, 71 to protect 
the privileges and immunities of citizens of foreign states while in their 
own jurisdictions. Article IV, Section 2 represents such an agreement 
on the part of the states to recognize citizens of foreign states as citizens 
of their own states and to respect the privileges and immunities of 
citizens of foreign states while under their jurisdiction in order to further 
the peace among the states and to strengthen the Union. 72 
70. 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *21 (O.W. Holmes Jr., 
ed., 12th ed. 1873). 
71. This does not mean that the states ceased to recognize voluntary principles of 
comity. For example, in Bank of Augusta, Justice Taney described the nature of the 
union among the people of the United States and urged voluntary application of the 
principles of international comity in cases where courts were not constrained by the 
Constitution to apply these principles. Justice Taney reasoned as follows: 
The intimate union of these states, as members of the same great political 
family; the deep and vital interests which bind them so closely together; 
should lead us, in the absence of proof to the contrary, to presume a greater 
degree of comity, and friendship, and kindness towards one another, than we 
should be authorized to presume between foreign nations. And when ( as 
without doubt must occasionally happen) the interest or policy of any state 
requires it to restrict the rule, it has but to declare its will, and the legal 
presumption is at once at an end. But until this is done, upon what grounds 
could this Court refuse to administer the law of international comity between 
these states? They are sovereign states; and the history of the past, and the 
events which are daily occurring, furnish the strongest evidence that they have 
adopted towards each other the laws of comity in their fullest extent. 
Bank of Augusta, 38 U.S. at 590. Thus, the principles of the law of nations were 
recognized as legal default rules, which could be trumped by positive law enacted by the 
legislature. 
72. Elsewhere in the Constitution, the states are prohibited from further compacting 
among themselves without the approval of Congress. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. This was 
probably an attempt to ensure that there were no special privileges accorded between 
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Thus, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article rv, Section 2 
made binding through the consent of the states the voluntary principles 
of international comity found in the well-developed body of law termed 
the "law of nations."73 In addition, the Clause served to preserve the 
equality of the states by guaranteeing that the citizens of foreign states 
would enjoy the privileges and immunities of citizens on an equal 
footing with resident citizens in all of the other states comprising the 
Union.74 In an often-cited passage from The Federalist Papers Number 
states within the federal system, but that the privileges and immunities of citizenship 
would be available to all on an equal footing within the Union. 
73. In Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331 (1855), Justice Wayne presented 
the opinion of the Court concerning the relation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause 
to the sovereignty of the states. Citing Vattel, Justice Wayne reasoned: 
In such a union, the States are bound by all of those principles of justice 
which bind individuals to their contracts. They are bound by their mutual 
acquiescence in the powers of the constitution, that neither of them should be 
the judge, or should be allowed to be the final judge of the powers of the 
constitution, or of the interpretation of the laws of congress. This is not so, 
because th~ir sovereignty is impaired; but the exercise of it is diminished in 
quantity, because they have, in certain respects, put restraints upon that 
exercise, in virtue of voluntary engagements. 
Id. at 351 (citing EMMERICH VATTEL, LAW OF NATIONS ch. 1, § 10). One of these 
"voluntary engagements" was the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, 
Section 2, which forced the states to recognize foreign citizens as citizens of their own 
states, entitled to all of the privileges and immunities attaching to that status. 
7 4. The Justices in the Dred Scott decision recognized the importance of the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 as not only embodying 
principles of international comity, but also as guaranteeing the equality of the states in 
the Union. For example, Justice Nelson in his concurring opinion in Dred Scott 
discussed the principles of international comity in relation to the privileges and 
immunities of citizens, citing Justice Story as an authority on the subject. Dred Scott 
v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 460 (1856) (Justice Nelson appealed to Justice 
Story's Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws as well as works by Huberus and Kent). 
Justice Nelson applied the principles of international comity concerning the status of 
persons in foreign states to determine the status of Dred Scott. Id. at 466-67. 
Similarly, in his concurring opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford, Justice Catron 
discussed the privileges and immunities of citizens in relation to the territories controlled 
by Congress and the Clause's maintenance of the equality among the states. According 
to Justice Catron: 
The Constitution having provided that "The citizens of each State shall be 
entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States," the 
right to enjoy the territory as equals was reserved to the States, and to the 
citizens of the States, respectively. The cited clause is not that citizens of the 
United States shall have equal privileges in the Territories, but the citizen of 
each State shall come there in right of his State, and enjoy the common 
property. He secures his equality through the equality of his State, by virtue 
of that great fundamental condition of the Union-the equality of the States. 
Id. at 527. Therefore, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 may 
be seen as not only guaranteeing to citizens the privileges and immunities inherent in the 
concept of citizenship, but also as ensuring the sovereignty of the states as equals within 
the federal system. The Privileges and Immunities Clause was therefore designed to be 
as much a federalism provision governing relations among the states as it was to be an 
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Eighty, Alexander Hamilton discussed the effect of the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2, noting that the Clause 
formed "the basis of the union" and established an "equality of 
privileges and immunities to which the citizens of the Union [ would] be 
entitled."75 The people of the United States were to be recognized as 
citizens, members of each of the states' political communities, founded 
upon a social compact. In this respect, the people of the United States 
could be said to form one people, since each person was automatically 
made part of the political community of each state. Each citizen would 
be entitled to be placed upon an equal footing with every other citizen 
no matter where they might find themselves. One of the most important 
functions of the new federal judiciary would be to enforce this equali-
ty.16 
However, the privileges and immunities of citizens were not defined 
in the Constitution and were not comprehensively enumerated by the 
courts. In fact, the Supreme Court explicitly declined the task of 
exhaustively enumerating the privileges and immunities of citizens under 
the Clause.77 Notwithstanding the Court's reluctance to comprehensive-
individual rights provision, guaranteeing that the citizens of the individual states would 
be recognized as citizens within foreign jurisdictions. See Bogen, supra note 14, at 844-
45; Gonzales, supra note 14, at 499-50. 
The Dred Scott Court struck down the Missouri Compromise as a violation of this 
equality of the states. According to the Court, "the act of 1820, known as the Missouri 
compromise, violates the most leading feature of the Constitution-a feature on which 
the Union depends, and which secures to the respective States and their citizens an entire 
EQUALITY of rights, privileges, and immunities." Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 528-29. The 
Missouri Compromise violated this equality among the states by depriving the rights of 
property of the citizens of the slaveholding states. The right of these citizens to hold a 
certain species of property, namely slave property, was not respected within the territory, 
while the rights of property of citizens in the nonslaveholding states were respected. 
This was a violation of the sovereignty of the slaveholding states because it was a 
refusal to respect the rights of property that had been vested under the jurisdiction of 
these states. The sovereign power of the nonslaveholding states to vest property in the 
citizenry was respected, while that of the slaveholding states was not. 
75. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 537 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 
1961 ). Chester Antieau has argued that this passage indicates that Hamilton understood 
the Clause as guaranteeing certain fundamental rights of"citizens of the several States." 
Antieau, supra note 14, at 8. 
76. See infra note 83 and accompanying text. 
77. Thomas M. Cooley, one of the most prominent nineteenth century constitution-
al scholars, discussed the ill-defined nature of the privileges and immunities protected 
under the Clause in his comments on Justice Story's Commentaries on the Constitution 
of the United States. Citing Conner v. Elliot, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 591 (1856), Cooley 
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ly define the privileges and immunities of citizens, certain of these 
privileges and immunities were enumerated in the many cases arising 
under the Clause prior to ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Courts generally made a distinction between special privileges, which 
were not guaranteed under the Clause, and fundamental privileges, which 
were the privileges and immunities of citizens guaranteed under Article 
IV, Section 2. 78 Furthermore, courts frequently acknowledged that the 
states retained the power to regulate the fundamental privileges and 
immunities of citizens guaranteed under the Clause.79 
Besides the question of what types of rights were the "privileges" and 
"immunities" of citizens under Article IV, Section 2, courts also 
addressed the question of what kind of protection these privileges and 
immunities were guaranteed, whether antidiscrimination80 or substantive 
stated, "[t]he Supreme Court will not describe and define these privileges and immunities 
in a general classification, preferring to deal with each case as it may come up." 2 
JOSEPH S. STORY, CO:tvfMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 560 
n.4 (Thomas M. Cooley ed., 4th ed., Little, Brown, & Co. 1873). 
78. See infra Part III.D discussing the distinction between special and fundamental 
privileges under the Clause. As one commentator concluded: 
[T]here was a widespread belief in certain "fundamental" rights, to be enjoyed 
by the members of any body politic of necessity, because demanded by the 
"law of nature." . . . These rights, being conceived of as inherent in the idea 
of citizenship, were, as a matter of course, those which were commonly 
regarded as guaranteed by the Comity Clause; but any others, not being 
inherently possessed by the citizens of every political society, were to be 
considered as for the individual States to grant to or withhold from whomsoev-
er they pleased. 
HOWELL, supra note 4, at 63. 
79. See infra Part III.E discussing the states' power of regulation. See also 
HOWELL, supra note 4, at 80 ("It has never been questioned to any considerable extent 
. . . that a State may adopt proper quarantine and other police regulations with a view 
to the safeguarding of the health and welfare of its own citizens, although such 
regulations very evidently operate as restrictions upon the eajoyment of the privilege 
above named."). 
80. Thomas M. Cooley accepted the antidiscrimination interpretation of the Clause 
as granting the same privileges and immunities to nonresident citizens as were available 
to resident citizens. See 2 STORY, supra note 77, at 559-64 n.4. Distinguishing special 
privileges from the privileges and immunities of citizens, Cooley made it clear that, in 
his opinion, the privileges and immunities secured by the Clause were those that were 
afforded under a given state's laws and constitutions. According to Cooley: 
838 
[T]he privileges and immunities secured to citizens of each State in the several 
States by the provision in question, are those privileges and immunities which 
are common to the citizens in the latter State, under their constitution and 
laws, by virtue of their being citizens. Special privileges enjoyed by citizens 
in their own States are not secured in other States by this provision. It was 
not intended by the provision to give to the laws of one State any operation 
in other States. They can have no such operation, except by the permission, . 
express or implied, of those States. The special privileges which they confer 
must, therefore, be enjoyed at home unless the assent of other States to their 
enjoyment herein be given. 
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protection. The Clause may have guaranteed certain fundamental rights 
uniformly throughout the several states, or it may merely have guaran-
teed equal civil rights in each state. Finally, there was the question of 
the Clause's relationship to the regulation of commerce.81 Although the 
Clause may have been motivated in part by concerns with interstate 
commerce, the Clause had a broader purpose, to form a single union of 
all of the people of the United States. This Part explores that governing 
purpose by examining the history, text, structural context, and case law 
arising under the Clause. 
A. The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV 
of the Articles of Confederation 
It is widely recognized that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of 
Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution was derived from a correspond-
ing clause in the Articles of Confederation. 82 The Constitution, 
Id. at 560 n.4. Cooley also stated that the Clause served to remove the disabilities of 
alienage in the several states, indicating that perhaps there were certain rights envisioned 
as being afforded substantive protection under the Clause. Furthermore, it must be noted 
that this interpretation of the Clause is the same as that given by Justice Field in Paul 
v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868) who subsequently interpreted the Fourteenth 
Amendment as affording substantive protection to certain privileges and immunities of 
citizenship in the Slaughter-House Cases. 
81. Thomas M. Cooley discussed the relationship between the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause and the congressional power over regulation of commerce, which was 
explored in Ward v. State, indicating that both clauses were designed to facilitate 
commerce among the states. 2 STORY, supra note 77, at 559-64 n.4 (citing Ward v. 
State, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418 (1872) (Clifford, J.)). According to Cooley, the Court in 
Ward stated: 
[I]t will be sufficient to say that the clause plainly and unmistakably secures 
and protects the right of a citizen of one State to pass into any other State of 
the Union for the purpose of engaging in lawful commerce, trade, or business, 
without molestation, to acquire personal property, to take and hold real estate, 
to maintain actions in the courts of the State, and to be exempt from any 
higher taxes or excises than are imposed by the State upon its own citizens. 
Id. at 563 n.4 (citations omitted). However, the court in Ward did not indicate that this 
was the only purpose of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2. 
Id. at 559-64 n.4. 
82. See, e.g., Antieau, supra note 14; Bogen, supra note 14; Gonzales, supra note 
14. Charles Pinckney, the probable draftsman of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, 
stated in a 1787 letter that "[t]he 4th article, respecting the extending [ofJ the rights of 
the Citizens of each State, throughout the United States . . . is formed exactly upon the 
principles of the 4th article of the present Confederation." 3 THE RECORDS OF THE 
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 47, at 112. This provision was adopted with 
almost no debate. See id. at 437. 
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however, contained an improved mechanism for enforcement of its 
Privileges and Immunities Clause: a national judiciary that would 
preside over conflicts among citizens of different states. 83 An under-
standing of the original meaning of the corresponding clause in the 
Articles of Confederation conveys some idea of the intention of the 
Framers in including the similarly-worded clause in the Constitution. 
The Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Articles reads as follows: 
The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the 
people of the different states in this union, the free inhabitants of each of these 
states, paupers, vagabonds and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled 
to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several states; and the 
The Supreme Court addressed the relation between the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause of the Articles and that of the Constitution in Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 
(18 Pet.) 519 (1839). The argument before the Court was that the constitutional rights 
of citizens who form corporations might be violated if corporations were not also 
afforded protection under the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Id. at 547. The 
question was whether a Georgia corporation could sue in the courts of the United States 
claiming a violation under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 
2. Id. at 519. Although it was recognized that the Privileges and Immunities Clause 
of Article IV, Section 2, like its predecessor in the Articles of Confederation, created a 
"community of rights" among the citizens in the United States, placing them upon the 
same footing as resident citizens in each of the several states, the Court did not extend 
this protection to corporations. In argument before the Court, Mr. Webster discussed the 
state of the Union under both the Articles of Confederation and the present Constitution. 
[L]et us see what was the relation between the citizens of the different states 
by the articles of confederation. The government had become a confederation. 
But it was something more-much more. It was not merely an alliance 
between distinct governments for the common defence and general welfare, but 
it recognised and confirmed a community of interest, of character, and of 
privileges, between the citizens of the several states. . . . [ Article IV of the 
Articles of Confederation] placed the inhabitants of each state on equal ground 
as to the rights and privileges which they might exercise in every other state. 
So things stood at the adoption of the Constitution of the United States. The 
article of the present Constitution, in fewer words and more general and 
comprehensive terms, confirms this community of rights and privileges . . . . 
Id. at 552. 
83. See U.S. CONST. art. III. Alexander Hamilton commented on the provision of 
a national judiciary in the Constitution and its relation to enforcement of the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause in The Federalist No. 80, stating: 
[I]f it be a just principle that every government ought to possess the means of 
executing its own provisions by its own authority, it will follow, that in order 
to the inviolable maintenance of that equality of privileges and immunities to 
which the citizens of the union will be entitled, the national judiciary ought to 
preside in all cases in which one state or its citizens are opposed to another 
state or its citizens. To secure the full effect of so fundamental a provision 
against all evasion and subterfuge, it is necessary that its construction should 
be committed to that tribunal, which, having no local attachments, will be 
likely to be impartial between the different states and their citizens, and which, 
owing its official existence to the union, will never be likely to feel any bias 
inauspicious to the principles on which it is founded. 
THE FEDERALIST No. 80, supra note 75, at 537-38. 
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people of each state shall have free ingress and regress to and from any other 
state, and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and commerce, subject 
to the same duties, impositions and restrictions as the inhabitants thereof 
respectively . . . . 84 
The precursors of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV of 
the Articles of Confederation are found in the following proposed 
Articles VI and VII, drafted largely by John Dickinson of Pennsylvania 
and reported on July 12, 1776: 
Art. VI. The Inhabitants of each Colony shall henceforth always have the 
same Rights, Liberties, Privileges, Immunities and Advantages, in the other 
Colonies, which the said Inhabitants now have, in all Cases whatever, except 
in those provided for by the next following Article. 
Art. VII. The Inhabitants of each Colony shall enjoy all the Rights, 
Liberties, Privileges, Immunities, and Advantages, in Trade, Navigation, and 
Commerce, in any other Colony, and in going to and from the same and to any 
Part of the World, which the Natives of such Colony enjoy.85 
Some commentators have argued that the first of these proposed 
Articles was intended to provide substantive protection for certain 
uniform fundamental rights, while the second of these Articles was 
designed to provide antidiscrimination protection and is based on 
principles of interstate comity. 86 Under this interpretation, Article IV 
of the Articles of Confederation contains language that reflects the 
meaning of both of these proposed Articles, 87 but Article IV, Section 
2 of the Constitution dropped the interstate comity language, while 
retaining the language guaranteeing basic, fundamental, natural rights. 88 
However, it is not· at all clear from the language of the first of these 
proposed Articles that it was intended to provide substantive protection 
for fundamental rights that were to be uniform among the states. The 
proposed Article VII may merely have protected the rights of foreign 
citizens as measured by those rights accorded to native citizens, and the 
proposed Article VI may have been abandoned because it would freeze 
the noncommercial law of the states. 89 Article IV of the Articles of 
84. DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 111 (Henry Steele Commager ed., 6th ed. 
1963); 9 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 908-09 (1906). 
85. 5 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 547 (1906). 
86. See, e.g., Antieau, supra note 14, at 3. 
87. See id. 
88. See id. at 6. 
89. Bogen, supra note 14, at 818 (arguing that "Article VII ... used the colonial 
charter technique of measuring intercolonial rights by the rights of natives of the colony" 
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Confederation may be read as providing antidiscrimination protection for 
whatever basket of fundamental rights each state chose to adopt. This 
is the interpretation that Justice Story seems to have adopted in his 
Commentaries. According to Justice Story, "[t]he intention of this clause 
was to confer on them, [the citizens of each state,] if one may so say, a 
general citizenship, and to communicate all the privileges and immuni-
ties which the citizens of the same State would be entitled to under the 
like circumstances."90 Thus, the clause found in the Articles of 
Confederation corresponding to the Privileges and Immunities Clause of 
Article IV, Section 2 provides strong historical support for both the 
substantive and antidiscrimination readings of the Clause. 
B. The Privileges and Immunities Clause: Forming 
"The Basis of the Union" 
As Alexander Hamilton stated in The Federalist Papers Number 
Eighty, the Privileges and Immunities Clause formed the "basis of the 
Union."91 The Framers of the Constitution expressed time and again 
the notion that the former colonies were to exist independently of 
England as a unified body. For example, James Wilson, after reading 
the Declaration of Independence to the Constitutional Convention, 
observed "that the United Colonies were declared to be free & indepen-
dent States; and inferring that they were independent, not Individually, 
but Unitedly . ... "92 The union was, thereby, strengthened, as com-
pared to the states outside the federal system. The new Constitution 
wrought this fundamental innovation.93 
Prior to ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, a number of courts 
had an opportunity to construe the Privileges and Immunities Clause of 
Article IV, Section 2 in a variety of contexts.94 These cases provide a 
wealth of information concerning the nineteenth century understanding 
of the terms "privileges" and "immunities" as used in the Clause. A 
common theme in these cases was that the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause established a "community of rights" among the citizens of the 
United States. 
and that Article VI "prevented any alteration of noncommercial state law affecting 
residents of other states, even if nondiscriminatory against nonresidents."). 
90. 2 STORY, supra note 77, at 559 (footnotes omitted). 
91. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, supra note 75, at 518-19. 
92. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 324 (M. Farrand 
ed. 1966). . 
93. See Douglas G. Smith, An Analysis of Two Federal Structures: The Articles 
of Confederation and the Constitution, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 249 (1997) (comparing 
the Constitution and the Articles of Confederation). 
94. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
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For example, in Campbell v. Morris,95 a case later cited by members 
of Congress during the debates over the Fourteenth Amendment,96 the 
Maryland Supreme Court addressed the meaning of the terms "privileg-
es" and "immunities" as used in Article IV, Section 2. The defendant 
argued that the terms "privileges and immunities" meant the "right of 
holding property by the citizens of any state, and having the protection 
of their property and persons in the same manner as the citizens of this 
state."97 According to defense counsel, the Framers left the word 
"rights" out of Article IV, Section 2 "in order to prevent the right of 
voting, and holding offices, by the citizens of one state in another 
state. "98 In other words, the term "rights" was left out to avoid a 
construction that would provide a constitutional guarantee of political, 
not merely civil, rights under Article rv, Section 2.99 The defendant 
argued that unequal regulation of the property of foreign citizens violated 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause.100 Defense counsel described 
the privileges of citizenship the Clause guaranteed as follows: 
A citizen of another state may hold real property in any state of the union, 
subject to the laws and regulations of that state, and his property and his person 
are entitled to the protection of the laws in the same manner as the citizens of 
the state. When a citizen of another state comes into this state, he is entitled 
to all the benefits of our judiciary, and he is also subject to the process of the 
same in the same manner as the citizens of this state. Another privilege secured 
95. 3 H. & McH. 535 (Md. 1797). See also HOWELL, supra note 4, at 16 
( describing Campbell as "[t]he first reported case bearing upon the clause"); Maltz, supra 
note 4, at 336-37 (discussing Campbell). 
96. See THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES, supra note 2, at 121. 
97. Campbell, 3 H. & McH. at 537 . 
. 98. Id. at 538. 
99. It was long recognized that political rights such as the right to vote and to hold 
public office were not intended to be guaranteed under the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause. See HOWELL, supra note 4, at 62 ("From the earliest times in the judicial 
interpretation of the Comity Clause it has always been affirmed that there are certain 
kinds of public or political rights which do not come within its operation."); id. at 63-64 
("In view of the fact that the so-called 'natural rights' theory was at the time accepted 
practically without question, it is not to be wondered at that the judges in the early cases 
were so positive in their statements as to the exclusion of political privileges from the 
list of rights to be shared equally by the citizens of all the States .... "). 
100. As defense counsel argued, the act of assembly at issue in the case put "the 
foreign citizen in a worse situation, and he may be deprived of his property in a different 
manner from that by which a citizen of this state is deprived of his property." Campbell, 
3 H. & McH. at 538. 
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to the citizen by this clause is, that he may go into a different state without 
being under the necessity of talcing an oath of allegiance. 101 
Thus, the defendant interpreted the Clause to accord substantive 
protection in all of the States to certain fundamental rights. However, 
defense counsel also recognized that the state's power of regulation 
controlled the exercise of these rights. Although the state had the power 
to regulate the rights guaranteed under the Clause, it could not discrimi-
nate against foreign citizens. According to defense counsel, "[i]f the 
laws of this state put the citizens of another state in a worse situation 
than the citizens of this state, it is a violation of the social compact."102 
Thus, unequal regulation violated not only the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause, but also the "social compact" among citizens of the United 
States. 
In contrast, plaintiff's counsel argued that Article IV, Section 2 did not 
give "foreign citizens all the advantages of the citizens of any particular 
state."103 Instead, citizens were merely guaranteed the "right of 
citizenship in every state."104 The plaintiff contended that the act of 
assembly at issue in the case did not violate the "rights of citizenship," 
but merely proscribed a "particular mode of recovering debts, and a 
citizen of another state is not in a worse situation than the citizens of our 
own state."105 Thus, the plaintiff argued that this mode of regulation 
did not violate the rights of citizenship under the Clause. 
Justice Samuel Chase delivered the opinion of the court. In addressing 
the meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, Justice Chase 
stated that "[p ]rivilege and immunity are synonymous, or nearly so. 
Privilege signifies a peculiar advantage, exemption, immunity; immunity 
signifies exemption, privilege."106 Justice Chase elaborated: 
[A] particular and limited operation is to be given to these words, [privileges 
and immunities] and not a full and comprehensive one . . . . The court are of 
the opinion it means ... the peculiar advantage of acquiring and holding real 
as well as personal property, and that such property shall be protected and 
101. Id. at 548. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. at 542. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. See also HOWELL, supra note 4, at 57 ("It is the protection of substantive 
rights which is guaranteed to the citizens of the several States; and the procedural forms 
adopted for enforcing such rights may validly differ in respect to non-residents, provided 
only the difference is not such as to defeat their enjoyment of some substantive right 
accorded by a State to its own citizens."). 
106. Campbell, 3 H. & McH. at 553. 
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secured by the laws of the state, in the same manner as the property of the 
citizens of the state is protected. 107 
Justice Chase's citation of certain specific privileges and immunities may 
indicate that, in his view, the Clause guaranteed certain fundamental 
privileges and immunities of citizens uniformly among all of the states, 
in addition to ensuring that foreign citizens could exercise these rights 
in the "same manner" as native citizens.108 At the same time, he 
recognized the requirement of equality in regulations concerning the 
mode in which the privileges and immunities of citizens could be 
exercised--that the privileges and immunities of citizens had to be 
protected in the "same manner" for non-resident citizens as they were for 
resident citizens. However, as previously noted, this was not the only 
interpretation found in case law dealing with the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2. 
An interpretation of the Clause as providing only antidiscrimination 
protection was also prevalent. Justice Story in his Commentaries, 109 
as well as Abbot v. Bayley, 110 another case cited by members of 
Congress during the debates over the Fourteenth Amendment, 111 
advanced the notion that the Privileges and Immunities Clause merely 
placed citizens of one state upon an "equal footing" with citizens of 
every other state. In Abbot, the Massachusetts court stated: 
The privileges and immunities secured to the people of each State in every 
other State, can be applied only in case of removal from one State into another. 
By such removal they become citizens of the adopted State without naturaliza-
tion, and have a right to sue and be sued as citizens; and yet this privilege is 
qualified and not absolute, for they cannot enjoy the right of suffrage or of 
eligibility to office, without such term of residence as shall be prescribed by the 
constitution and laws of the State into which they shall remove. They shall 
have the privileges and immunities of citizens, that is, they shall not be deemed 
aliens, but may take and hold real estate, and may, according to the laws of 
107. Id. at 554. This part of the opinion was cited by Senator Trumbull, who read 
the remarks of Justice Chase in discussing the Civil Rights Bill. See THE RECONSTRUC-
TION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES, supra note 2, at 121. 
108. See HOWELL, supra note 4, at 19 ("The most casual examination of the 
reasoning in [ Campbel[J shows that it is based almost entirely upon the prevalent 
political theory of natural rights."). 
109. 2 STORY, supra note 77; see also supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
110. 23 Mass. (6 Pick.) 89 (1827). 
111. See THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES, supra note 2, at 121 
(remarks of Senator Trumbull). 
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such State, eventuallil enjoy the full rights of citizenship without the necessity 
of being naturalized. 12 
However, even in the Abbot opinion, there is evidence of a substantive 
reading of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. The Abbot court 
mentioned a specific privilege or immunity of citizenship, that of taking 
and holding real estate, indicating that even under its antidiscrimination 
interpretation, certain privileges and immunities of citizens may have 
been understood to exist in all of the states even if they were not 
mandated by the federal Constitution. The relevant question becomes 
whether the prevailing view held that the Clause mandated such 
uniformity. 
The proper interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause was 
disputed until the Civil War. A significant case, Lemmon v. People,113 
decided in 1860, involved the Privileges and Immunities Clause of 
Article IV, Section 2 and the slaveholder's right of property in his slave 
when traveling in foreign jurisdictions.114 The question was whether 
New York could free a citizen's slave if that individual came within its 
jurisdiction accompanied by his slave. More specifically, the issue was 
whether the right of property in slaves was protected under the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause.115 The slaveowner argued that there were 
certain general privileges and immunities inherent in the status of citizen 
of the United States that the Clause guaranteed in all of the states, 
including the right of property in a slave. 
[T]he object of this section [Article IV, Section 2] is to secure to the citizen, 
when within a State in which he is not domiciled, the general privileges and 
immunities which, in the very nature of citizenship, as recognized and 
established by the Federal Constitution, belonged to that status; so that by no 
partial and adverse legislation of a State into which he might go as a stranger 
or a sojourner can he be deprived of them. 116 
Thus, the argument stated that the Clause afforded both substantive as 
well as antidiscrimination protection for foreign citizens visiting other 
states. Plaintiff's counsel also pointed to the principles of international 
comity that he claimed were "converted by the Constitution into an 
112. Abbott, 23 Mass. (6 Pick.) at 92. 
113. 20 N.Y. 562 (1860). See Maltz, supra note 4, at 345-46 (discussing Lemmon). 
114. The conflict over the right of a slaveowner to maintain a property interest in 
his slave when traveling in a free state also invoked the Fugitive Slave Clause of Article 
IV. See infra Part 111.C.1. 
115. Lemmon, 20 N.Y. at 580. 
116. Id. at 580-81. Plaintiffs counsel again reiterated his point: "By the section 
quoted [Article IV, Section 2] the citizen of each State is secured in all the general 
privileges and immunities of a citizen of the United States whilst temporarily and 
necessarily within a State other than that of his domicil." Id. at 581. 
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absolute right of the citizen."117 Citing Article I, Section 10 of the 
Constitution, plaintiff's counsel explained that "[ c ]omity, like municipal 
law, has its foundation in compact, express or implied. The social or 
international compact between the States, as such, was fixed by the 
Federal Constitution."118 The "duty of a State toward the citizens of 
another State" was a duty that was imposed "not by comity, as a rule of 
action, but by the Federal Constitution."119 
Counsel for the defendant, the· State of New York, argued that the 
"state of slavery is contrary to natural right,"120 citing in particular 
Justinian's Institutes. As a result, the "peculiar system of laws" arising 
in states that recognized slavery was "irreconcilable with the jurispru-
dence of States where it does not exist."121 Citing among other 
sources the Roman authorities, defendant's counsel urged that the "law 
of slavery is local, and does not operate beyond the territory of the State 
where it is established."122 As a result, New York could free the 
plaintiff's slave without violating the plaintiff's rights under Article rv, 
Section 2 of the Constitution.123 Finally, counsel made a telling 
argument in stating that if slaves were property, there would be no need 
117. Id. 
118. Id. at 582. 
119. Id. 
120. Id. at 584. 
121. Id. at 585. 
122. Id. In order to support his contention that slavery was a mere local institution 
created by positive regulations, having no effect outside the jurisdiction, defendant's 
counsel cited the 1820 decision by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky in Rankin v. Lydia, 
9 Ky. (2 A.K. Marsh.) 467,470 (1820). In that case, defendant's counsel noted that the 
Court of Appeals reasoned as follows: 
"[I]n deciding this question, we disclaim the influence of the general principles 
of liberty which we all admire, and conceive it ought to be decided by the law 
as it is, and not as it ought to be. Slavery is sanctioned by the laws of this 
State, and the right to hold them under our municipal regulations, is 
unquestionable. But we view this as a right existing by positive law of a 
municipal character, without foundation in the law of nature, or the unwritten 
and common law." 
Lemmon, 20 N.Y. at 587 (quoting Rankin v. Lydia, 9 Ky. (2 A.K. Marsh.) 467, 470 
(1820)). 
123. Citing a variety of authorities, counsel for the defendant reasoned that "[w]hen 
the slave is carried, or escapes beyond its jurisdiction, he becomes free, and the State to 
which he resorts is under no obligation to restore him, except by virtue of express 
stipulation." Id. at 585. 
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for the Fugitive Slave Clause of Article IV, Section 2.124 Arguably, 
slave property would then be afforded the same protection as other forms 
of property under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, 
Section 2. 
Citing Vattel and Montesquieu, defendant's counsel argued that comity 
involved the protection of only natural rights. "The laws of nations are, 
in their origin, only natural rights of men applied to nations."125 
Slavery was not a "natural relation, but contrary to nature, and at every 
moment it subsists, it is an ever new and active violation of the law of 
nature."126 Therefore, any protection of slave property in New York 
could only exist because of the voluntary action of that state. However, 
the New York statute explicitly freed such individuals. Therefore, the 
state legislature had not chosen to accord voluntary comity with respect 
to property in slaves within its jurisdiction.127 
The court sided with counsel for the State of New York. The court 
assented to the proposition that a state's municipal regulations concern-
ing the status of individuals could have no binding extraterritorial effect, 
but maintained that courts should presume that the legislature desires that 
they be respected out of principles of voluntary comity. 128 Further-
more, the court agreed with the widely accepted view that slavery was 
contrary to principles of natural right and, therefore, could have no 
124. Id. at 589. For a more thorough discussion of the Fugitive Slave Clause, see 
infra Part 111.C. l. 
125. Id. at 592. 
126. Id. at 597. Defense counsel William M. Evarts stated: "The law of nations, 
built upon the law of nature, has adopted this same view of the status of slavery, as 
resting on force against right, and finding no support outside of the jurisdiction of the 
municipal law which establishes it." Id. He further elaborated on this point: 
The rule of the law of nations which permits the transit of strangers and 
their property through a friendly State does not require our laws to uphold the 
relation of slave owner and slave between strangers. 
By the law of nations, men are not the subject of property. 
By the law of nations, the municipal law which makes men the subject of 
property, is limited with the power to enforce itself, that is by its territorial 
jurisdiction. 
By the law of nations, then, the strangers stand upon our soil in their natural 
relations as men, their artificial relation being absolutely terminated. 
Id. at 598 (citing The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 120, 121 (1825)). 
127. Citing, among others, Justice Story and the Dred Scott Court, defense counsel 
recognized that 
[t]he comity, it is to be observed, under inquiry, is ... of the State and not of 
the Court, which latter has no authority to exercise comity in behalf of the 
State, but only a judicial power of determining whether the main policy and 
actual legislation of the State exhibit the comity inquired of . . . . 
Id. at 596. 
128. Id. at 602. 
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binding extraterritorial effect outside of slaveholding states.129 Note, 
however, that in this case, the State of New York explicitly declared by 
statute that it did not accord voluntary comity to the status of slavery. 
Thus, this positive regulation overrode any principles of international 
comity that might have applied in the case.130 
The court also addressed the effect of the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause of Article IV, Section 2. According to the court, the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause of Article IV of the Articles of Confederation 
secured a "community of intercourse" among the states.131 Although 
the Constitution made the states into "a single nation" for "all external 
purposes and for certain enumerated domestic objects," the court 
acknowledged that the states remained sovereign under the Constitution 
with respect to certain other subjects outside the sphere of the enumerat-
129. Id. at 605. The court cited the well known English case, Sommersetv. Stewart, 
for the proposition that "a state of slavery could not exist except by force of positive 
law." Id. According to the court, this rule of law in England was transported to 
America with the colonists. 
The laws of England respecting personal rights were in general the laws of the 
Colonies, and they continued the same system after the Revolution by 
provisions in their Constitutions, adopting the common law subject to 
alterations by their own statutes. The literature of the Colonies was that of the 
mother country. 
Id. The court also stated, citing Montesquieu, that "slavery is repugnant to natural 
justice and right, has no support in any principle of international law, and is antagonistic 
to the genius and spirit of republican government." Id. at 617. The court cited Justice 
Story's opinion in Prigg v. Pennsylvania to the same effect. Id. at 622-23. For a more 
thorough discussion of Prigg, see infra notes 183-208 and accompanying text. 
130. Id. at 602-03. According to the court: 
[I]t follows that where the Legislature of the State, in which a right or 
privilege is claimed on the ground of comity, has by its laws spoken upon the 
subject of the alleged right, the tribunals are not at liberty to search for the 
rule of decision among the doctrines of international comity, but are bound to 
adopt the directions laid down by the political government of their own State. 
Id. As a result, the court looked only to the law of New York on the question of 
whether a slave became free upon setting foot upon the soil of New York. The court 
also stated: 
Comity . . . never can be exercised in violation of our own laws; and in 
deciding whether comity requires any act, we look to our own laws for 
authority. There can be no application of the principles of comity, when the 
State absolutely refuses to recognize or give effect to the foreign law, or the 
relation it establishes, as being inconsistent with her own laws, and contrary 
to her policy. 
Id. at 629. 
131. Id. at 607. 
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ed powers delegated to the national govemment.132 The Privileges and 
Immunities Clause merely guaranteed that foreign citizens would have 
the same rights as native citizens, except for those rights that depended 
on the domicil of the individual.133 In this case, citizens of New York 
were also barred from bringing slaves within the state, and therefore, 
under this interpretation, there was no violation of the prohibitions of the 
Clause.134 
Judge Clerke authored a lengthy dissent in the case. He based his 
argument on a "principle of the unwritten law of nations" that citizens 
have a right of passage through foreign territories without having those 
territories acquire a right over their person or property.135 Judge 
Clerke argued that this principle applied as well to property in slaves 
under the Constitution of the United States because that document 
recognized such property.136 Because the constitutional compact 
recognized property in slaves, this principle of the law of nations was 
even more applicable to the states.137 
132. Id. at 608. Among the powers that were retained by the states, according to 
the court, was the power to regulate "[t]he social status of the people, and their personal 
and relative rights as respects each other, [and] the definition and arrangements of 
property .... " Id. 
133. Id. According to the court, the Clause was "intended to guard against a State 
discriminating in favor of its own citizens." Id. at 627. 
134. Id. at 610. 
135. Id. at 636. 
136. Id. at 637. Judge Clerke queried: 
[C]an any one State insist, under the federal compact, in reference to the rights 
of the citizens of any other State, that there is no such thing as the right of 
such citizens, in their own States, to the service and labor of any person. This 
is property; and whether the person is held to service and labor for a limited 
period, or for life, it matters not; it is still property--recognized as an existing 
institution by the people who framed the present Constitution, and binding 
upon their posterity forever, unless that Constitution should be modified or 
dissolved by common consent. 
Id. Judge Clerke also cited the Dred Scott case and the opinion of Chief Justice Taney 
for the proposition that the Constitution recognized property in slaves. Id. at 640. 
137. Id. at 641. According to Judge Clerke, "the relations of the different States of 
this Union towards each other are of a much closer and more positive nature than those 
between foreign nations towards each other." Id. at 642. Judge Clerke's summation of 
his argument is particularly instructive in understanding the way in which principles of 
the law of nations became binding as conventional obligations under the Constitution: 
The right to the labor and service of persons held in slavery, is incontestably 
recognized as property in the Constitution of the United States. The right 
yielded by what is termed comity under the law of nations, ripens, in necessary 
accordance with the declared purpose and tenor of the Constitution of the 
United States, into a conventional obligation, essential to its contemplated and 
thorough operation as an instrument of federative and national government. 
Id. at 643. 
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Thus, both the majority and dissent in Lemmon interpreted the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 as protecting 
certain natural law rights of citizenship throughout the United States. 
The two sides disputed only whether the right of property in a slave was 
such a natural law right of the citizen, or whether it was merely a 
municipal regulation-a special privilege or immunity-having no 
binding extraterritorial effect. 
The court in another important antebellum case dealing with the status 
of free blacks, Crandall v. State, 138 similarly focused its attention on 
the meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Crandall involved 
a Connecticut statute that forbid the teaching of "coloured persons not 
inhabitants" of the state without the approval of the legislature.139 In 
rendering its decision, the court evaluated whether this act violated the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2. Although the 
case was reversed on a technicality, 140 the arguments of counsel in the 
case provide insight concerning the meaning attributed to the Clause in 
antebellum America. 
First, the court determined whether such "coloured persons" were 
citizens for purposes of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Citing, 
among others, Chancellor Kent's Commentaries as authority, the attorney 
for the State of Connecticut argued that free blacks were not citizens 
because they were under certain disabilities in various states. 141 
Furthermore, admitting that education might be a fundamental privilege 
guaranteed by Article IV, Section 2, he argued that even if they were 
citizens under the Clause, the State of Connecticut was still free to 
regulate the schools for the public good. 142 Thus, counsel urged the 
138. 10 Conn. 339 (1834); see Maltz, supra note 4, at 339-40 (discussing Crandall). 
139. Crandall, 10 Conn. at 339. 
140. Id. at 370-71. The Connecticut act in question prohibited unlicensed schools 
that taught "coloured persons." However, the information did not allege that the school 
in question was unlicensed. Id. 
· · 141. Id. at 339-47, 359. Counsel also noted that the first naturalization act passed 
by Congress in 1790 reserved naturalization for "free white" persons, indicating that 
blacks were not citizens. Id. at 358. 
142. Id. at 347. According to counsel: 
The legislature may regulate schools. I am free to say, that education is a 
fundamental privilege; but this law does not prohibit schools. It places them 
under the care of the civil authority and select-men; and why is not this a very 
suitable regulation? I am not sure but the legislature might make a law like 
this, extending to the white inhabitants of other states who- are unquestionably 
citizens, placing all schools for them under suitable boards of examination, for 
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court to find that the state of Connecticut passed the act within the 
proper scope of its regulatory power with respect to the fundamental 
privilege of education. 
On the other side, plaintiff's counsel argued first that free blacks were 
citizens and that the common law made no distinction in status based 
upon color alone.143 Furthermore, counsel contended that education 
was a fundamental privilege and, consequently, that free blacks had the 
right to come into the State of Connecticut and be educated ( although 
not necessarily at taxpayer expense ).144 Plaintiff's counsel then urged 
that the Connecticut act was not a permissible regulation of the privilege 
of educating oneself because the power exercised by the legislature was 
one of "exclusion on the ground of alienage."145 In other words, the 
Connecticut act was not a "general and equal law," according to 
counsel.146 Thus, in Crandall, the court dealt with the familiar 
question of the nature of the protection afforded under the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause--substantive or antidiscrimination protection. 
the public good; and I can see no objection to the board created by this act. 
Id. (emphasis in original). Counsel also cited Judge Washington's decision in Corjield 
v. Coryell, stating that the fundamental privileges and immunities could be regulated 
under Article IV, Section 2 by the states for the "general good of the whole." Id. at 364. 
There was later much dispute in Congress over whether the right to attend common 
schools was a fundamental privilege or immunity of citizens. See McConnell, supra 
note 15, at 1023-29. However, although the case is strong that the right to educate 
oneself was a fundamental privilege or immunity, the case for recognizing the right to 
attend common schools is weaker. One could perhaps argue that if such schools are 
supported through taxation that one has a right to attend the school. 
143. Crandall, 10 Conn. at 348. Counsel argued: 
Here, the free man of colour may take his position, and upon the immutable 
principles of justice and truth demand his political rights from that government 
which he is bound to aid and to defend: he is not a citizen to obey, and an 
alien to demand protection. Nor is he of an intermediate class. His relations 
to society are the same as others; his absolute and relative rights, his rights of 
person and to things, his acquisitions of property by contract and by 
inheritance,-and even the soil, which no alien inherits-are the same. So 
every requisition of the law, in its civil and criminal provisions, reaches him. 
His legal capabilities and his legal obligations are the same. Every favour or 
right conferred on the citizens, by general legislation, reaches him; every 
requisition demands his obedience. 
Id. at 349-50 ( emphasis in original). Counsel also argued that the fact that free blacks 
did not possess the right to vote did not mean that they were not citizens because there 
was no "necessary connexion" between voting and citizenship. Id. at 351. Political 
rights such as the right to vote and to hold office were not thought to be inherent rights 
of citizenship in nineteenth century America. For a more comprehensive discussion of 
the status of "citizen" in antebellum America and the fundamental privileges and 
immunities accompanying that status, see Smith, supra note 12. 
144. Crandall, 10 Conn. at 350-51. 
145. Id. at 352. 
146. Id. at 353. 
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Furthermore, the court also addressed the question of the proper scope 
of state regulation under the Clause. 
The Supreme Court interpreted the Clause several times prior to 
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. For example, the arguments 
before the Supreme Court in Gibbons v. Ogden noted the relation 
between the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 
and commerce.147 In that case, involving the congressional power to 
regulate commerce, it was argued that the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause as well as the Commerce Clause reflected the notion of comity 
among the states.148 In discussing the commercial barriers among the 
states under the Articles of Confederation, it was argued that the 
Constitution remedied problems arising among the states under the 
Articles. The Constitution remedied 
these evils . . . [b ]y express prohibitions on the states, in those particulars in 
which the evils had been most sensibly felt, preventing them from levying any 
impost or duty of tonnage without the consent of Congress . . . . [ and by] 
vesting Congress with a general power to regulate commerce with foreign 
nations and among the states. 149 
Furthermore, it was argued that the "law of nations" provided the 
source of at least the right of intercourse with a state, as explicitly 
mentioned in the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Articles of 
Confederation: 
The constitution does not profess to give, in terms, the right of ingress and 
egress for commercial and any other purposes, or the right of transporting 
articles for trade from one state to another. It only protects the personal rights 
of the citizens of one state, when within the jurisdiction of another, by securing 
to them "all the privileges and immunities of a citizen" of that other, which 
they hold subject to the laws of the state as its own citizens; and it protects 
their property against any duty to be imposed on its introduction. The right, 
then, of intercourse with a state, by the subjects of a foreign power, or by the 
citizens of another state, still rests on the original right, as derived from the law 
of nations. 150 
Therefore, because the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, 
Section 2 embodied principles originally expressed in the law of nations, 
the right of engaging in commerce was seen as flowing not only from 
147. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
148. Id. at 68-69. 
149. Id. at 69. 
150. Id. 
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the principles of the law of nations, but also from the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause. This indicated that the purpose of the Clause was 
to effect greater commercial union among the citizens of all of the states, 
besides protecting the rights of citizens in foreign states and the equality 
of the states.151 Furthermore, by referring to the "personal rights of 
citizens," it seems that counsel had in mind a certain set of rights, 
encompassing personal rights other than commercial privileges, which 
all of the states would be obligated to recognize. 152 Thus, the Clause 
afforded protection broader in scope than merely a guarantee of 
commercial privileges and immunities. 
In Thurlow ,~ Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 153 the Court again 
addressed the relationship between commerce and the privileges and 
151. This Clause was designed to carry out, among other things, the "commercial 
purposes" of the Union. As Mr. Ogden argued before the Supreme Court in Bank of 
Augusta v. Earle: 
The great object of the Constitution was to erect a government for commercial 
purposes, for mutual intercourse, and mutual dealing. The prosperity of every 
State could alone be promoted and secured by establishing these on principles 
of reciprocity; and on the security and protection of the citizens of each State, 
in all the States united by the government. 
38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 526 (1839). 
152. Other provisions of the Constitution dealing with commercial issues were also 
thought to be designed to ensure greater unity among the states. For example, the 
prohibition against emitting bills of credit was a further attempt to unify the United 
States commercially. In Briscoe v. Bank of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, it was 
argued before the Court that 
[t]he separation of all these powers of coining, issuing bills, making legal 
tenders, fixing standards, and the bestowal of them on the Union, to the total 
exclusion of the States, was indispensably necessary to accomplish the great 
ends for which the Constitution was formed. Its leading object was to make 
the people one people, for many purposes, and especially as to the currency. 
One, as far as the high immunities and privileges of free citizens are 
concerned. One, in the rights of holding, purchasing, and transferring 
property. One, in the privilege of changing domicil and residence at pleasure. 
One, in the modes and means of transacting business and commerce. 
36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 257, 289-90 (1837). In fact, a uniform currency was argued to be 
essential to assuring that the citizens of each state were accorded all privileges and 
immunities of citizens in the several states: 
Such a currency was altogether proper and indispensable under a system 
which, for the first time in the history of free governments, established it as 
a fundamental principle that "the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all 
privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States." It was impossible 
to carry out this principle without it. 
Id. at 291. The understanding of the Union formed under the Constitution given in this 
argument may entail certain rights of citizens that were relatively uniform among the 
states and which were guaranteed to all citizens under Article IV, Section 2. Through 
construction of a single political community, or body politic, from the people of the 
several states, certain privileges and immunities of these individuals as members of this 
political community were guaranteed. 
153. 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847). 
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immunities of citizens. The case involved a tax upon items entering a 
state, which was not applied to those items already in the state. It was 
urged before the Court that "the subjection of the productions of one 
State, when introduced for the purpose of sale and consumption within 
the territories of another to the internal laws and regulations of the latter 
State, finds an analogy in the case of the citizens of one State going into 
the jurisdiction of another."154 Therefore, the provisions of Article IV, 
Section 2 with respect to the privileges and immunities of citizens could 
be applied to invalidate the discriminatory tax.155 Chief Justice Taney 
delivered the opinion of the Court and in dicta argued as he subsequently 
would in Dred Scott v. Sandford that the states could not exercise a 
power that would have extraterritorial force and "compel other States to 
acknowledge as citizens those whom it might not be willing to 
receive. "156 
The Taney majority in Dred Scott accepted this view in arguing that 
freed blacks could not have been considered citizens at the time of 
ratification of the Constitution because they would have been entitled to 
the privileges and immunities of citizenship under Article IV, Section 2. 
Such a result, Chief Justice Taney argued, neither reflected the reality in 
the United States before the Civil War nor the intent of the Framers of 
the Constitution. In Dred Scott, Chief Justice Taney reasoned: 
154. Id. at 570. 
155. Id. at 570-71. Mr. Burke argued for the state that: 
The constitution provides, that "the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all 
the privileges and immunities of the citizens of the several States." Citizens of one 
State, going into the jurisdiction of another State, can claim no exemption from its 
laws under this clause .... If they remain in the State, they become subject to the 
taxing power, and all the burdens and restraints which its laws impose upon its own 
citizens. 
Id. 
156. Id. at 585. Chief Justice Taney based his argument on the fact that Congress 
had been given the exclusive power of naturalization. He analogized this power of 
naturalization to the commerce power, reasoning that the states could not be allowed to 
exercise any power having extraterritorial effect through the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause where there was a corresponding congressional power over the subject matter. 
Taney concluded: 
Id. 
[I]t would seem to be hardly consistent with this provision to allow any one 
State, after the adoption of the Constitution, to exercise a power, which, if it 
operated at all, must operate beyond the territory of the State, and compel 
other States to acknowledge as citizens thos~ whom it might not be willing to 
receive. 
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It cannot be supposed that they [State sovereignties] intended to secure to them 
[blacks] rights, and privileges, and rank, in the new political body throughout 
the Union, which every one of them denied within the limits of its own 
dominion. More especially, it cannot be believed that the large slaveholding 
States regarded them as included in the word "citizens," or would have 
consented to a constitution which might compel them to receive them in that 
character from another State. For if they were so received, and entitled to the 
privileges and immunities of citizens, it would exempt them from the operation 
of the special laws and from the police regulations which they considered to be 
necessary for their own safety. It would give to persons of the negro race, who 
were recognized as citizens in any one State of the Union, the right to enter 
every other State whenever they pleased, singly or in companies, without pass 
or passport, and without obstruction, to sojourn there as long as they pleased, 
to go where they pleased at every hour of the day or night without molestation, 
unless they committed some violation of law for which a white man would be 
punished; and it would give them the full liberty of speech in public and in 
private upon all subjects upon which its own citizens might speak; to hold 
public meetings upon political affairs, and to keep and carry arms wherever 
they went. And all of this would be done in the face of the subject race of the 
same color, both free and slaves, and inevitably producing discontent and 
insubordination among them, and endangering the peace and safety of the 
State. 157 
Thus, Chief Justice Taney enumerated certain rights under the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause to which free blacks would be entitled were they 
considered citizens of the United States. His analysis indicates that it 
may have been the· general understanding that certain rights would be 
respected by all free governments and, therefore, that certain rights 
would be civil rights of the citizen in any state in which he might find 
himself.158 
The nature of the rights enumerated by Chief Justice Taney is also 
noteworthy. Taney stated that free blacks would possess not only the 
right to enter any state and remain without molestation, but also the right 
to "full liberty of speech in public and in private," the right to "hold 
public meetings," and the right to "keep and carry arms" wherever they 
went. Therefore, Chief Justice Taney did not limit the privileges and 
immunities protected under the Clause to certain rights of "trade and 
commerce," such as those at issue in Gibbons v. Ogden and Thurlow v. 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, but enumerated certain other personal 
rights that would be protected under the Clause, some of which were 
analogous to provisions in the Bill of Rights. 159 
157. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 416-17 (1856). 
158. For an argument supporting this interpretation of the Clause, see infra Part 
IV.D. 
159. See U.S. CONST. amends. I (guaranteeing "freedom of speech" and "the right 
of the people peaceably to assemble") and II (guaranteeing "the right of the people to 
keep and bear Arms'l 
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The foregoing discussion of antebellum case law demonstrates that 
courts examining the Privileges and Immunities Clause clearly noted that 
it formed the "basis of the union" and made the United States "one 
nation" by both entitling citizens to certain national rights in every state, 
as well as placing them upon an equal footing with resident citizens in 
the state in which they found themselves with respect to rights tradition-
ally within the regulatory control of the state governments. The rights 
conferred under the Clause were limited to civil rights and did not 
include political rights. 160 
However, the Clause clearly encompassed a broader set of rights than 
those relating only to trade and commerce. Further, the Taney opinion 
in Dred Scott indicates that there may have been certain rights thought 
to be afforded citizens in all free governments, which would therefore 
be the privileges and immunities of citizens in all of the states. The 
question remained, though, concerning the nature of the protection the 
Clause extended--whether it guaranteed substantive protection, or 
merely antidiscrimination protection, and whether the privileges and 
immunities of citizens were intended to be guaranteed uniformly among 
the states under the Clause. 161 
160. Mr. Webster argued before the Supreme Court in Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 
38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839), that the Clause did not extend political rights to citizens 
of each state in the several states and that the Clause acted "independently" of any 
voluntary comity-in other words, the fact that this Clause was placed in the 
Constitution made the protection mandatory rather than voluntary among the states. Id. 
at 552. Webster explained: 
[T]his article in the Constitution does not confer on the citizens of each 
State political rights in every other State, is admitted. A citizen of Pennsylva-
nia cannot go into Virginia and vote at an election in that State; though, when 
he has acquired a residence in Virginia, and is otherwise qualified as required 
by her constitution, he becomes, without formal adoption as a citizen of 
Virginia, a citizen of that State politically. But for the purposes of trade, 
commerce, buying and selling, it is evidently not in the power of any State to 
impose any hinderance or embarrassment, or lay any excise, toll, duty, or 
exclusion, upon citizens of other States, to place them, coming there, upon a 
different footing from her own citizens. 
Id. Furthermore, Webster noted: "This is American, constitutional law, independent of 
all comity whatever." Id. at 553. 
161. See infra Part IV, which addresses this interpretational problem in greater 
detail. 
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C. A Structural Analysis of Article IV: The Fugitive Slave Clause 
and Full Faith and Credit Clause 
Other provisions of Article IV, in addition to the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause, were intended to extend principles of international 
comity among the states. Principles of comity formed the basis of both 
the Fugitive Slave Clause162 and the Full Faith and Credit Clause163 
as well. The Full Faith and Credit Clause ensured that the judgments of 
state courts would be respected in foreign states. The Fugitive Slave 
Clause ensured the recognition of the property of citizens in slaves 
outside slaveholding states. 
1. Cases Arising Under the Fugitive Slave Clause 
Neither reason nor natural law provided the foundation for property in 
slaves. Rather, property in slaves was considered merely convention-
al.164 Thus, if it weren't for the presence of the Fugitive Slave Clause 
162. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 ("No person held to Service or Labour in one 
State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law 
or Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered 
up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due."). 
163. U.S. CONST. art IV, § 1 ("Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State 
to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State."). 
164. For example, Justice McClean, dissenting in the Dred Scott decision, compiled 
an extensive list of authorities stating that slavery was contrary to the principles of 
natural law and as such could only be a local institution founded upon mere municipal 
regulations. 
As to the locality of slavery. The civil law throughout the Continent of 
Europe, it is believed, without an exception, is, that slavery can exist only 
within the territory where it is established; and that, if a slave escapes, or is 
carried beyond such territory, his master cannot reclaim him, unless by virtue 
of some express stipulations. 
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 534 (1856) (citations omitted). Justice 
McClean concluded: 
The state of slavery is of such a nature that it is incapable of being 
introduced on any reasons, moral or political, but only by positive law, which 
preserves its force long after the reasons, occasion, and time itself, from 
whence it was created, is erased from the memory; it is of a nature that 
nothing can be suffered to support it but positive law. 
Id. at 535 ( citation omitted). Justice McClean concluded not only that slavery was 
contrary to principles of natural law, but also that it had no foundation in the common 
law. Justice McClean noted, quoting Rankin v. Lydia: 
"Slavery is sanctioned by the laws of [the] State, and the right to hold slaves 
under our municipay [sic] regulations is unquestionable. But we view this as 
a right existing by positive law of a municipal character, without foundation 
in the law of nature, or the unwritten and common law." 
Id. at 536 (quoting Rankin v. Lydia, 9 Ky. (2 A.K. Marsh.) 470 (1820)). See also JOHN 
NORTON POMEROY, AN INTRODUCTION TO MUNICIPAL LAW§ 667 (1864) ("Slavery, in 
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in the Constitution, the slaveholders' rights of property in their slaves 
might not be respected when they ventured outside their home states into 
states that did not recognize property in human beings.165 Indeed, this 
was the case before ratification of the Constitution.166 An analogy 
might be drawn between the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article 
Iv, Section 2 and the Fugitive Slave Clause in that, under at least one 
interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, both clauses 
protect the rights of citizens to hold property in foreign states.167 The 
compact among the states embodied in Article IV required that the rights 
of property that had vested in a citizen's home state be respected in all 
of the foreign states. 
In general, protection of property in slaves in the free states was not 
consistent with principles of the law of nations. 168 However, laws 
the United States is entirely a local institution of those States in which it is established, 
and rests alone on positive legislation."). 
165. As was argued before the Court in The Amistad: 
[I]t was deemed necessary in the Constitution to insert an express stipulation 
in regard to fugitives from service. The law of comity would have obliged 
each State to protect and restore property belonging to a citizen of another, 
without such stipulation; but it would not have required the restoration of 
fugitive slaves from a sister State, unless they had been expressly mentioned. 
40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 518, 559 (1841). 
166. This dilemma was pointed out by defendant's counsel before the Supreme 
Court in the case of Prigg v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania: 
During the confederation, the southern States had sustained great inconvenienc-
es and loss by the change that had been effected by the abolition laws of the 
northern States. The conventional or customary law, was no longer observed. 
There was no provision upon the subject in the articles of confederation. In 
many of the northern States no aid whatsoever would be allowed to the owners 
of fugitives slaves, and sometimes, indeed, they met with open resistance. 
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 564 (1842). Similarly, Justice Wayne discussed this problem in 
his opinion in Prigg: 
Experience had shown that under the confederacy the reclamation of fugitive 
slaves was embarrassed and uncertain, and that they were yielded to by the 
States only from comity. It was intended that it should be no longer so ... 
. It was foreseen, that unless the delivery of fugitive slaves was made a part 
of the Constitution, and the right of the States to discharge them from service 
was taken away, that some of the States would become the refuge of runaways 
Id. at 645. For a more thorough discussion of the Court's decision in Prigg, see infra 
notes 183-208 and accompanying text. 
167. See supra notes 113-37 discussing Lemmon. 
168. For example, in People v. Lemmon, 20 N.Y. 562 (1860), Judge Paine reasoned 
that besides there being no constitutional right to transit with slaves, there also was no 
right based upon the principles of the law of nations. According to Judge Paine: 
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regulating one's status in ways other than slave versus free were to be 
respected in foreign jurisdictions. Justice Story stated in his Commentar-
ies on the Conflict of Laws: 
All laws, which have for their principal object the regulation of the capacity, 
state, and condition of persons, have been treated by foreign jurists generally 
as personal laws . . . . [T]hey are for the most part held by foreign jurists to be 
of absolute obligation everywhere, when they have once attached upon the 
person by the law of his domicile. 169 
Therefore, normally one's status would remain the same outside the 
jurisdiction of the state in which the status attached, even when "the law 
of the domicile and that of the situation (situs) are in conflict with each 
other."170 However, slavery was different, according to Justice Story: 
There is a uniformity of opinion among foreign jurists and foreign tribunals in 
giving no effect to the state of slavery of a party, whatever it might have been 
in the country of his birth or of that in which he had been previously domiciled, 
unless it is also recognized by the laws of the country of his actual domicile, 
and where he is found, and it is sought to be enforced. 171 
Therefore, the Fugitive Slave Clause was designed to trump the 
common law of the free states to ensure that slaveholders retained 
property in their slaves outside their state of domicile. The consensus 
Writers of the highest authority on the law of nations agree that strangers have 
a right to pass with their property through the territories of a nation . . . . And 
this right, which exists by nature between States wholly foreign to each other, 
undoubtedly exists, at least as a natural right, between the States which 
compose our Union. But we are to look further than this, and to see what the 
law of nations is when the property which a stranger wishes to take with him 
is a slave. 
Id. at 133 n.3 ( citations omitted). Judge Paine argued that there could be no property 
in slaves, and therefore that under the law of nations, there could be no right to take 
slaves through foreign states and retain property in those slaves. · 
[T]hey [ writers on the law of nations] all agree that by the law of nature alone 
no one can have a property in slaves. And they also hold that, even where 
slavery is established by the local law, a man cannot have that full and 
absolute property in a person which he may have in an inanimate thing .... 
It can scarcely, therefore, be said, that when writers on the law of nations 
maintain that strangers have a right to pass through a country with their 
merchandise or property, they thereby maintain their right to pass with their 
slaves. 
STORY, supra note 61, at 134 n.3 (citation omitted). For a more comprehensive 
discussion of Lemmon, see supra notes 113-37 and accompanying text. 
169. STORY, supra note 61, at 49. However, there were writers who took exception 
to this general rule. "John Voet ... is one of the few jurists who insist that personal 
statutes of all sorts respecting capacity or incapacity, majority or minority, legitimacy 
or illegitimacy, have no extra-territorial operation, either directly or consequentially." Id. 
at 56-57. 
170. Id. at 54-55. 
171. Id. at 118-19. 
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was that slavery's status as a creature of mere municipal regulation 
warranted no extraterritorial effect.172 The protection of slave property 
in the free states necessitated some form of positive law, overriding the 
principles of private international law. According to Justice Story: 
Independent of the provisions of the Constitution of the United States, for the 
protection of the rights of masters in regard to domestic fugitive slaves, there 
is no doubt that the same principle pervades the common law of the non-
slaveholding States in America; that is to sav, foreign slaves would no longer 
be deemed such after their removal thither. m · 
The rights of masters over their slave property in free states was a matter 
of great dispute prior to the Civil War. This controversy concerning the 
meaning of the Fugitive Slave Clause sheds light on the antebellum 
understanding of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. 
Cases arising under the Fugitive Slave Clause in the courts of the 
United States between ratification of the Constitution and ratification of 
the Fourteenth Amendment exhibit a reliance upon the philosophy of 
international comity underlying Article IV.174 A number of cases dealt 
172. According to Justice Story, this conclusion was dictated by three principles of 
the law of nations laid down by Huberus and adopted by Story in his Commentaries on 
the Conflict of Laws. Id. at 27. Similarly, Justice Marshall concluded: 
That . . . [slavery] is contrary to the law of nature, will scarcely be denied. 
That every man has a natural right to the fruits of his own labor, is generally 
admitted; and that no other person can rightfully deprive him of those fruits, 
and appropriate them against his will, seems to be the necessary result of this 
admission. 
The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 118-20 (1825). 
Members of Congress also noted the local nature of slavery. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 
35th Cong., 1st Sess. App. 332, 335 (1858) (Rep. Walton); id. at App. 79 (Sens. 
Fessenden and Mason); id. at 87-90 (Sen. Clark); CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. 
App. 938-39 (1856) (Rep. Brenton); id. at 201 (Sen. Trumbull); id. at 1164 (Rep. 
Cragin). 
173. STORY, supra note 61, at 119. 
174. The connection between the notion of comity and the Fugitive Slave Clause 
is evident in Miller v. McQuerry, 17 F. Cas. 335 (C.C.D. Ohio 1853) (No. 9,583) 
wherein the Ohio circuit court stated: 
The surrender of fugitive slaves was a matter deeply interesting to the slave 
states. Under the confederation there was no provision for their surrender. On 
the principles of comity amongst the states the fugitives were delivered up; at 
other times they were protected and defended. This state of things produced 
uneasiness and discontent in the slave states. A remedy of this evil, as it was 
called, was provided in the constitution. 
Id. at 337. This remedy in the Constitution, to which the court refers, was the Fugitive 
Slave Clause, which was needed to ensure that the rights of property in slaves would be 
protected in non-slaveholding states. The Privileges and Immunities Clause of the 
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with the problem of property in slaves outside of slave states under the 
Constitution.175 For example, in Johnson v. Tompkins,176 the court 
upheld the right of a master to property in a slave's custody and services 
and recognized the security given to the right to reclaim fugitive slaves 
under the Constitution.177 The court observed that although this right 
of property was contrary to principles of natural law, it was embodied 
in the fundamental law of the United States and, thus, was legally 
binding. According to the court, "the law of the land recognises the 
right of one man to hold another in bondage, and that right must be 
protected from violation, although its existence is abhorrent to all our 
Articles of Confederation might not have afforded this protection because there was 
some dispute concerning whether slaves remained property upon entering a free state. 
Property in slaves was generally recognized as being contrary to the law of nature, and 
it had been argued that, as a result, once slaves left the jurisdiction having positive laws 
that were contrary to the laws of nature, the property in slaves need not be protected as 
a privilege or immunity of citizens. Id. at 338. The court in Miller v. McQuerry 
recognized the analogy between the Privileges and Immunities Clause and the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause of Article IV, Section 2 and went so far as to declare that Congress 
possessed the power to enforce the provisions of the Privileges and Immunities Clause 
through appropriate legislation. According to the court: 
Id. 
The constitution provides, "that full faith shall be given to public acts, records, 
and judicial proceedings," of one state in every other. If an individual claims 
this provision as a right, and a state court shall deny it, on a writ of error to 
the supreme court of the Union, such judgment would be reversed. And the 
provision is that "the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges 
and immunities of ci~izens in the several states." Congress unquestionably 
may provide in what manner a right claimed under this clause, and denied by 
a state, may be enforced. And if a case can be raised under it, without any 
further statutory provisions, so as to present the point to the supreme court, the 
decision of a state court, denying the right, would be reversed. 
175. See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856); Prigg v. 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842); Groves v. Slaughter, 40 
U.S. (15 Pet.) 449 (1841); Lemmon v. People, 20 N.Y. 562 (1860); Miller v. McQuerry, 
17 F. Cas. 335 (C.C.D. Ohio 1853) (No. 9,583); Johnson v. Tompkins, 13 F. Cas. 840 
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1833) (No. 7,416); Rankin v. Lydia, 9 Ky. (2 A.K. Marsh.) 467 (1820). 
Paul Finkelman has noted the importance of these cases in the development of the 
contemporary understanding concerning principles of international comity as applied to 
the states prior to ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. According to Finkelman: 
The question of comity for slavery helped define the issues and problems that 
ultimately led to the Civil War. These issues also helped define the goals of 
the war and shaped its consequences. Much of the wording of the Fourteenth 
Amendment appears to be a direct response to the issues raised by the cases 
involving comity and interstate relations before the war. Perhaps the most 
important legacy of Aves, Dred Scott, Lemmon, and the other antebellum 
comity cases is this amendment. 
FINKELMAN, supra note 14, at 342. 
176. 13 F. Cas. 840 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1833) (No. 7,416). 
177. Id. at 840. The court reasoned that "[t]he ownership of ... [the slave] being 
thus clearly made out, he must be deemed to be the property of Mr. Johnson, over which 
he has the same control as over his land or his goods." Id. at 843. 
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ideas of natural right and justice."178 Many of the antebellum cases 
addressing this issue reiterated this principle. 
In Rankin v. Lydia,179 the Kentucky Court of Appeals addressed the 
conflict over the status of slaves brought into the Northwest Territory 
after the Ordinance of 1787 outlawed slavery. Judge Mills recognized 
that the right to property in slaves was "a right existing by positive law 
of a municipal character, without foundation in the law of nature, or the 
unwritten and common law."18° Citing Vattel, Judge Mills distin-
guished between property of an individual in transit and that of an 
individual domiciled in a state and, therefore, a resident of the state. 
Mills argued that the property of an individual in transit was not subject 
to municipal regulation, as opposed to the property of a resident. 181 
Therefore, the law of the domicile, which did not recognize slavery, 
governed, and freed the slave.182 
Although a number of state cases addressed the right to property in 
slaves under the Fugitive Slave Clause, the Supreme Court did not 
conclusively deal with the meaning of the Clause until 1842. The 
Supreme Court finally addressed the proper interpretation of the Fugitive 
178. Id. The court stressed the inviolability of property as protected under the 
Constitution and the dangers of disregarding the protection afforded property by the 
Constitution: "If this spirit pervades the country; if public opinion is suffered to prostrate 
the laws which protect one species of property, those who lead the crusade against 
slavery may, at no distant day, find a new one directed against their lands, their stores 
and their debts .... " Id. at 844. Thus, the court recognized a substantive right to 
property, which it enforced against abridgement by the state governments. What 
provision of the Constitution the court appealed to in rendering its decision is unclear. 
However, it would seem that the court was reaching beyond the Fugitive Slave Clause 
in order to guarantee a substantive right of property in slaves against state abridgement. 
179. 9 Ky. (2 A.K. Marsh.) 467 (1820). 
180. Id. at 470. 
181. A similar argument was subsequently made by Justice Baldwin in Groves v. 
Slaughter, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 449 (1841). Justice Baldwin appealed to the congressional 
power to regulate interstate commerce to argue that regulation of slave property was 
outside the power of the state governments. According to Justice Baldwin, "transit of 
property, whether of slaves or bales of goods, is lawful commerce among the several 
states, which none can prohibit or regulate, which the constitution protects, and Congress 
may, and ought to preserve from violation." Id. at 516. 
182. This analysis was rejected in Julia v. McKinney, 3 Mo. 193 (1833) wherein a 
Missouri court appealed to the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 
2 as guaranteeing a substantive right to transit with one's property in the several states. 
According to the court, under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, it was "the 
undoubted right of every citizen of the United States to pass freely through every other 
State with his property of every description, including negro slaves, without being in any 
way subject to forfeit his property." Id. at 194. 
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Slave Clause in Prigg v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.183 An 
examination of the arguments made on both sides in Prigg, as well as 
the decision of the Court, is useful in grasping the prevalent antebellum 
understanding of the Fugitive Slave Clause and its relation to the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause.184 In Prigg, a citizen of the state 
of Maryland was indicted for kidnapping a black woman under a 
Pennsylvania law that made it a crime to forcibly "carry away or seduce, 
any negro or mulatto" present in the state of Pennsylvania with the 
intention of making them a slave.185 In argument before the Court, 
counsel for the State of Pennsylvania made an analogy between the 
Fugitive Slave Clause and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of 
Article IV, Section 2. Counsel for the defendant argued that one of the 
defendant's privileges and immunities as a citizen was to exercise the 
rights of property in his slaves in all of the states. The state's counsel 
admitted that 
[ a ]mong the people of this free country, there is nothing which should be 
guarded with more watchful jealousy, than the charter of their liberties; which 
being the fundamental law of the land, in its judicial construction, every one is 
immediately interested, from the highest dignitary to the meanest subject of the 
commonwealth. Any irreverential touch given to this ark of public safety 
should be rebuked, and every violence chastised; its sanctity should be no less 
than that of the domestic altar; its guardians should be Argus-eyed; and as the 
price of its purchase was blood, its privileges and immunities should be 
maintained, even if this price must be paid again. 186 
In this excerpt, counsel expressed to the Court the idea of the state as 
founded upon a charter or compact conferring certain "fundamental" 
privileges and immunities of citizenship.187 
However, the state's counsel argued that the Fugitive Slave Clause did 
not remove the states' general power to regulate the subject of fugitive 
slaves nor vest an exclusive power of regulation in the national 
183. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842); see Maltz, supra note 11, at 253-54 (noting the 
similarity between Justice Taney's approach to the Fugitive Slave Clause in Prigg and 
congressional Republicans' interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of 
Article N, Section 2 prior to ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment); Maltz, supra 
note 4, at 312-13 (discussing the Prigg decision). 
184. Prigg is particularly relevant since Republicans such as James R. Wilson, 
Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, relied on the case for the proposition that 
Congress possessed the power to enforce all of the provisions of Article IV, including 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause as well as the Fugitive Slave Clause. See Aynes, 
supra note 15, at 650-51 (noting Wilson's citation of Prigg and the importance of the 
Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 as a precursor of the Civil Rights Act of 1866). 
185. Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 550. 
186. Id. at 571-72. 
187. For a discussion of the relation between social compact theory and the 
privileges and immunities of citizenship, see Smith, supra note 12. 
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government. According to counsel, the Clause merely obligated the state 
to offer up fugitive slaves. As such, it only infringed upon the state's 
power to regulate the subject of fugitive slaves in one particular.188 
Therefore, it was argued that under the Fugitive Slave Clause, if not 
under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article Iv, Section 2, the 
states retained the power to regulate the slave trade. Furthermore, the 
state's counsel argued that Congress had no power under the Clause to 
pass legislation compelling state action. This was consistent with the 
prevailing view of the Privileges and Immunities Clause-that Congress 
had no power to compel the states through federal legislation to obey 
their obligations under the Clause. 
Justice Story delivered the opinion of the Court, acknowledging that 
the purpose of the Fugitive Slave Clause was to protect the rights of 
property of slaveholders in their slaves throughout the Union. 189 Such 
explicit recognition was necessary because property in human beings was 
widely considered to be merely conventional and not founded in natural 
188. Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 592-93. According to counsel, the Fugitive Slave 
Clause 
certainly gives no authority to the general government, in terms; none, even 
by implication. It simply enjoins a duty on the states, and prohibits them from 
passing laws or regulations liberating fugitive slav~s. It recognises the general 
right to legislate on this subject, for it restricts its exercise in a particular 
manner .... 
Id. This argument is extremely interesting, for it presages Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which gave to Congress the power to compel the state governments through 
legislation to refrain from abridging the privileges and immunities of citizens of the 
United States. Like some members of Congress during the debates over the Fourteenth 
Amendment, counsel argued that such a congressional power to compel the states to do 
or refrain from doing something would annihilate the sovereignty of the states. See id. 
Id. 
189. Id. at 611. According to Justice Story: 
Historically, it is well known, that the object of this clause was to secure to 
the citizens of the slaveholding states the complete right and title of ownership 
in their slaves, as property, in every state in the Union into which they might 
escape from the state where they were held in servitude. The full recognition 
of this right and title was indispensable to the security of this species of 
property in all the slaveholding states; and, indeed, was so vital to the 
preservation of their domestic interests and institutions, that it cannot be 
doubted that it constituted a fundamental article, without the adoption of which 
the Union could not have been formed. Its true design was to guard against 
the doctrines and principles prevalent in the non-slaveholding states, by 
preventing them from intermeddling with, or obstructing, or abolishing the 
rights of the owners of slaves. 
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law.190 This view was expressed by Chancellor Kent, who stated in 
his Commentaries on American Law that, 
Sir William Blackstone ... examines ... [the] causes of slavery by the civil 
law, and shows them all to rest on unsound foundations; and he insists that a 
state of slavery is repugnant to reason and the principles of natural law. The 
civil law. . . admitted it to be contrary to natural right, though it was 
conformable to the usage of nations.191 
Therefore, under the law of nations, founded upon principles of natural 
law, 192 states were not obligated to recognize aliens' property in slaves. 
According to Kent, as soon as a slave set foot within the jurisdiction 
where the municipal laws did not recognize property in slaves, that slave 
became free. 193 
Justice Story recognized this argument in his opinion. However, he 
concluded that the Fugitive Slave Clause trumped the principles of the 
law of nations, being a positive law by which all the states were bound. 
Justice Story reasoned: 
By the general law of nations, no nation is bound to recognise the state of 
slavery, as to foreign slaves found within its territorial dominions, when it is in 
opposition to its own policy and institutions, in favour of the subjects of other 
nations where slavery is recognised. If it does it, it is as a matter of comity, 
and not as a matter of international right. The state of slavery is deemed to be 
a mere municipal regulation, founded upon and limited to the range of the 
territorial laws. This was fully recognised in Somerset's Case, ... which was 
decided before the American revolution. It is manifest from this consideration, 
that if the Constitution had not contained this clause, every non-slave-holding 
190. See supra notes 168-73 and accompanying text. As Justice Curtis later stated 
in his dissent in Dred Scott v. Sandford: 
Slavery, being contrary to natural right, is created only by municipal law. 
This is not only plain in itself, and agreed by all writers on the subject, but is 
inferable from the Constitution, and has been explicitly declared by this court 
[referring to Prigg v. Pennsylvania]. The Constitution refers to slaves as 
"persons held to service in one State, under the laws thereof." Nothing can 
more clearly describe a status created by municipal law. 
60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 624 (1856). 
191. 2 KENT, supra note 70, at *248 (footnotes omitted). 
192. See Smith, supra note 12 (discussing the relationship between natural law and 
the law of nations in nineteenth century legal thought). 
193. 2 KENT, supra note 70, at *248-49. According to Kent: 
The instant the slave touches the soil, he becomes free, so as to be entitled to 
be protected in the enjoyment of his person and property, though he may still 
continue bound to service as a servant. ... [B]y the common law, it was said, 
one man could not have a property in another, for men were not the subject 
of property. In the case of Somerset, in 1772, who was a negro slave, carried 
by his master from America to England, and there confined, in order to be sent 
to the West Indies, he was discharged by the K. B. upon habeas corpus, after 
a very elaborate discussion, and upon the ground that slavery did not and 
could not exist in England, under the English law. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
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state in the Union would have been at liberty to have declared free all runaway 
slaves coming within its limits, and to have given them entire immunity and 
protection against the claims of their masters; a course which would have 
created the most bitter animosities, and engendered perpetual strife between the 
different states. 194 
Hence, slavery in America was viewed as being in conflict with 
principles of natural law and founded solely upon positive law. Were 
it not for the Fugitive Slave Clause, the institution of slavery would have 
been analogous to the charters of incorporation considered in cases such 
as Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 195 which had no extraterritorial effect 
except by the voluntary recognition of foreign states. 
The Fugitive Slave Clause put the subject of property in slaves beyond 
the reach of the state governments. The right to property in slaves is 
therefore analogous to the fundamental privileges and immunities of 
citizens of the United States.196 Although the states were free to 
regulate the exercise of the right, they could not withhold or "control the 
incidents" of the right. Justice Story saw the distinction between 
regulation and abridgement not as a degree along a continuum, but as a 
bright line discernible by the courts. 197 
Elsewhere, Justice Story reiterated his opinion that the Constitution 
made recognition of property in slaves obligatory upon the state 
194. Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 611-12 (citation omitted). 
195. 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839); See infra notes Part III.D.1 and accompanying 
text, discussing corporations and special privileges under the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause of Article IV, Section 2. 
196. See infra Part III.D.2 and accompanying text, discussing the nature of the 
fundamental privileges and immunities of citizens guaranteed under Article IV, Section 
2. 
Id. 
197. Prigg, 41 U.S. at 612-13. According to Justice Story: 
The [fugitive slave] clause manifestly contemplates the existence of a positive, 
unqualified right on the part of the owner of the slave, which no state law or 
regulation can in any way qualify, regulate, control, or restrain. The slave is 
not to be discharged from service or labour, in consequence of any state law 
or regulation. Now, certainly, without indulging in any nicety of criticism 
upon words, it may fairly and reasonably be said, that any state law or state 
regulation, which interrupts, limits, delays, or postpones the right of the owner 
to the immediate possession of the slave, and the immediate command of his 
service and labour, operates, pro tanto, a discharge of the slave therefrom. 
The question can never be, how much the slave is discharged from; but 
whether he is discharged from any, by the natural or necessary operation of 
state laws or state regulations. The question is not one of quantity or degree, 
but of withholding, or controlling the incidents of a positive and absolute right. 
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governments, which had consented to be bound by Article IV. The 
Constitution in this respect went beyond mere voluntary principles of 
comity: 
Before the adoption of the Constitution, no state had any power whatsoever 
over the subject, except within its own territorial limits, and could not bind the 
sovereignty or the legislation of other states. Whenever the right was 
acknowledged or the duty enforced in any state, it was as a matter of comity 
and favour, and not as a matter of strict moral, political or international 
obligation or duty. Under the Constitution it is recognised as an absolute, 
positive, right and duty, pervading the whole Union with an equal and supreme 
force, uncontrolled and uncontrollable by state sovereignty or state legislation. 
It is, therefore, in a just sense a new and positive right, independent of comity, 
confined to no territorial limits, and bounded by no state institutions or poli-
cy. 19s 
From this, Story reasoned that the regulation of fugitive slaves should be 
subject to national legislation.199 This new positive right was not 
created by the courts, but arguably could only exist through the act of 
consent of all the people in ratifying the Constitution. 
Furthermore, Justice Story maintained that this right of property in 
slaves was a positive right not founded upon principles of natural law. 
Such a right is therefore, perhaps, distinguishable from the privileges and 
immunities of citizenship guaranteed under Article IV, Section 2. Justice 
Story's argument regarding the Fugitive Slave Clause allows by analogy 
an argument that the national government was to have power to enforce 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 against the 
states to protect a uniform set of privileges and immunities inherent in 
citizens of the United States.200 However, it remained within the 
power and sovereign capacity of a state to regulate the fundamental 
privileges and immunities of the citizens within the state's jurisdiction. 
The fundamental privileges and immunities were the rights of citizens 
under the civil law and encompassed the citizens' rights in their persons 
and property. The Constitut~on left jurisdiction over the persons and 
198. Id. at 623. 
199. Id. Accordingly, Story concluded: 
It would be a strange anomaly, and forced construction, to suppose, that the 
national government meant to rely for the due fulfillment of its own proper 
duties and the rights, which it intended to secure, upon state legislation, and 
not upon that of the Union. A fortiori, it would be more objectionable to 
suppose that a power, which was to be the same throughout the Union, should 
be confided to state sovereignty, which could not rightfully act beyond its own 
territorial limits. 
Id.; see also Maltz, supra note 4, at 331 (noting Justice Story's conclusion that the 
federal government had the exclusive power to regulate the recapture of fugitive slaves). 
200. This was a question that produced controversy among congressional 
republicans responsible for drafting the Fourteenth Amendment. See supra Part II.D. 
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property of citizens to the individual states to regulate in that the 
Constitution conferred powers upon the general government that were 
national in character, while the states retained their powers of "police" 
over the persons and property within their jurisdictions. 
Chief Justice Taney's concurring opinion similarly illustrates the 
strong analogy between the Fugitive Slave Clause and the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2.201 In affirming the states' 
retained right to regulate citizens' rights of property within their 
respective jurisdictions, Chief Justice Taney stated: 
Again. The Constitution of the United States declares that the citizens of 
each state shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the 
several states. And although these privileges and immunities, for greater safety, 
are placed under the guardianship of the general government; still the states 
may by their laws and in their tribunals protect and enforce them. They have 
not only the power, but it is a duty enjoined upon them by this provision in the 
Constitution. 
The individual right now in question [the right to reclaim fugitive slaves], 
stands on the same grounds, and is given by similar words, and ought to be 
governed by the same principles. The obligation to protect rights of this 
description is imposed upon the several states as a duty which they are bound 
to perform; and the prohibition extends to those laws only which violate the 
right intended to be secured. 
I cannot understand the rule of construction by which a positive and express 
stipulation for the security of certain individual rights of property in the several 
states, is held to imply a prohibition to the states to pass any laws to guard and 
protect them. 202 • 
Justice Taney's argument thus makes a strong analogy between the 
nationalized right of property in slaves and the privileges and immunities 
of citizenship. States may still pass regulatory laws governing the 
exercise of these rights, but they may not pass laws intended to destroy 
these rights. The general government was charged under the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause and the Fugitive Slave Clause, in Taney's 
opinion, to protect the rights guaranteed against state action. The right 
of property in slaves is an absolute right guaranteed under the United 
States Constitution by the federal government similar to the privileges 
and immunities of citizens of the United States. 
Justice Thompson clarified the distinction between guaranteeing a right 
and the regulation of the right in his concurring opinion. According to 
Justice Thompson, regulation of the "mode and manner in which" a right 
201. Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 628-29. 
202. Id. at 629. 
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is to be "asserted and carried into execution" is probably better left to 
the Congress, in the case of the Fugitive Slave Clause, in order to assure 
· uniformity.203 However, Justice Thompson saw nothing in the Clause 
that would preclude state regulation.204 He argued for a concurrent 
power of Congress and the states to regulate the manner in which 
fugitive slaves were to be delivered back into the custody of their 
masters.205 
Chief Justice Wayne's concurring opinion reiterated the themes of the 
other Justices' opinions. According to Chief Justice Wayne, the power 
of regulating the manner in which fugitive slaves were delivered up 
should lie with Congress, since only some of the states recognized 
property in slaves, and it would be to the prejudice of the slaveholding 
states to allow the states to individually regulate in this area.206 Justice 
203. Id. at 634. 
204. Id. Justice Thompson distinguished between a guarantee of a right and the 
mode of regulating a right in interpreting the Fugitive Slave Clause. According to 
Justice Thompson: . 
This provision naturally divides itself into two distinct considerations. First, 
the right affirmed; and secondly, the mode and manner in which that right is 
to be asserted and carried into execution. 
The right is secured by the Constitution, and requires no law to fortify or 
strengthen it. It affirms, in the most unequivocal manner, the right of the 
master to the service of his slave, according to the laws of the state under 
which he is so held. And it prohibits the states from discharging the slave 
from such service by any law or regulation therein. 
The second branch of the provision, in my judgment, requires legislative 
regulations pointing out the mode and manner in which the right is to be 
asserted. It contemplates the delivery of the person of the slave to the owner; 
and does not leave the owner to his ordinary remedy at law, to recover 
damages on a refusal to deliver up the property of the owner. 
Id. A similar division may be made under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of 
Article N, Section 2. The first inquiry concerns the nature of the privileges and 
immunities of citizens guaranteed under the Clause. The second concerns the mode or 
manner in which these rights could be asserted. It is likely that the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause guaranteed a uniform result among the states with respect to the first 
inquiry, but allowed for a diversity of approaches under the second. See infra Part IV.D. 
205. Justice Daniel, in his concurrence, also argued that the power was concurrent 
and not exclusive in the federal government. According to Justice Daniel: 
[T]he majority of my brethren proceeding beyond these positions, assume the 
ground that the clause of the Constitution above quoted, as an affirmative 
power granted by the Constitution, is essentially an exclusive power in the 
federal government; and consequently that any and every exercise of authority 
by the states at any time, though undeniably in aid of the guarantee thereby 
given, is absolutely null and void. I am prepared to affirm, that even in 
instances wherein Congress may have legislated, legislation by a state which 
is strictly ancillary, would not be unconstitutional or improper. 
Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 651-52. 
206. Id. at 641 ("To permit some of the states to say to the others, how the property 
included in the provision was to be secured by legislation, without the assent of the 
latter, would certainly be, to destroy the equality and force of the guarantee, and the 
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Wayne's opmton illustrates the concept of a community of rights 
embodied under Article IV of the Constitution. These rights include the 
privilege of holding property. Thus, protecting property in slaves merely 
upholds one such privilege of citizenship in express terms. However, as 
previously noted, because property in slaves was seen as contrary to 
natural right and as merely based on conventional or positive law-a 
mere municipal regulation-non-slaveholding states would be free to 
make their own regulations on the subject and free slaves without 
abridging the privileges and immunities of citizens. 
According to Justice Wayne, the Fugitive Slave Clause was designed 
to protect the equality of states that chose to maintain the system of 
slavery as an institution, in addition to protecting individual rights.207 
This argument is analogous to that made by the Dred Scott majority with 
equality of the states by which it was made."). 
207. Id. at 644-45 (emphasis added). In Justice Wayne's opinion: 
[T]he provision was not intended only to secure the property of individuals, 
but that through their rights, that the institutions of the states should be 
preserved, so long as any one of the states chose to continue slavery as a part 
of its policy. 
The subject has usually been argued as if the rights of individuals only were 
intended to be secured, and as if the legislation by the states would only act 
upon such rights. 
The framers of the Constitution did not act upon such narrow grounds. 
They were engaged in forming a government for all of the states; by 
concessions of sovereign rights from all, without impairing the actual 
sovereignty of any one, except within the sphere of what was conceded. One 
great object was, that all kinds of property, as well that which was common 
in all of the states, as that which was peculiar to any of them, should be 
protected in all of the states, as well from any interference with it by the 
United States, as by the states .... The ... [free states] were bound, when 
forming a general government with the other states, under which there was to 
be a community of rights and privileges for all citizens in the several states, 
to protect that property of their citizens which was essential to the preservation 
of their state constitutions. If this had not been done, all of the property of the 
citizens would have been protected in every state, except that which was the 
most valuable in a number of them. In such a case, the states would have 
become members of the Union upon unequal terms. Besides, the property of 
an individual is not the less his, because it is in another state than that in 
which he lives. It continues to be his, and forms a part of the wealth of his 
state. The provision, then, in respect to fugitive slaves, only comprehended 
within the general rule a species of property not within it before. 
Id. ( emphasis added). This excerpt also indicates the analogy to be made between the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause and the Fugitive Slave Clause. Both clauses were 
intended to protect fundamental property rights of citizens in all the states. 
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respect to the Privileges and Immunities Clause.208 The design of the 
Fugitive Slave Clause mandated that the ability to hold property in 
slaves came within the heading of "privileges and immunities of 
citizens." Therefore, the Privileges and Immunities Clause may be seen 
not only as creating a community of rights among the people of the 
United States, but also, in certain instances, as contributing to the 
establishment of the federal structure and protecting the equality of the 
several states, by extraterritorially enforcing the rights of property vested 
by the states individually. 
2. The Full Faith and Credit Clause 
Like the Fugitive Slave Clause and the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause, notions of international comity formed the basis of the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause of Article IV, Section 1. Justice Story discussed the 
Clause in his Commentaries as going beyond the "general comity of 
nations."209 According to Justice Story, "[t]he framers of both instru-
ments must be presumed to have known, that by the general comity of 
nations, and the long-established rules of the common law, both in 
England and America, foreign judgments were prima facie evidence of 
their own correctness."210 However, Story concluded that 
[a] motive of a higher kind must naturally have directed them to the provision. 
It must have been, "to form a more perfect union," and to give to each State a 
higher security and confidence in the others, by attributing a superior sanctity 
and conclusiveness to the public acts and judicial proceedings of all. 211 
Therefore, the Full Faith and Credit Clause, as well as the other clauses 
in Article IV, were designed to move beyond principles of international 
comity in order to construct "a more perfect Union" and to make what 
once were voluntary principles founded upon natural reason binding 
upon the states as sovereign entities. 
208. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
209. 2 STORY, supra note 77, at 183-84. Story also mentioned the Clause in his 
Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws, stressing the equality-based nature of the 
protection afforded under the Clause. Story states therein: 
By the Constitution of the United States it is declared that full faith and credit 
shall be given in each State to the public acts, records, and judicial proceed-
ings of every other State. And Congress, in pursuance of the power given 
them by the Constitution in a succeeding clause, have declared that the 
judgments of State courts shall have the same faith and credit in other States 
as they have in the State where they are rendered .... They are therefore put 
upon the same footing as domestic judgments. 
STORY, supra note 61, at 754. 
210. 2 STORY, supra note 77, at 183. 
211. Id. at 184. 
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D. The Distinction Between Fundamental and Special Privileges 
An important distinction arose in the jurisprudence under the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 prior to 
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment-the distinction between 
fundamental privileges and immunities, which were guaranteed under the 
Clause to all citizens, and special privileges and immunities, which were 
not. By the time the Supreme Court rendered its decision in the 
Slaughter-House Cases, it was well-established that "citizens of one 
State do not carry with them into other States any special privileges or 
immunities, conferred by the laws of their own States .... "212 Else-
where,213 I have argued, based on an analysis of social compact 
theories influential in nineteenth century American legal thought, that the 
fundamental privileges and immunities protected under Article IV, 
Section 2 were those powers of citizens existing anterior to the 
establishment of government and that special privileges and immunities 
could exist only after formation of the government. This Part traces this 
distinction between fundamental and special privileges in the context of 
the case law arising under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of 
Article IV, Section 2 prior to ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The distinction is an important one in terms of delineating the rights 
guaranteed under the Amendment as well as the scope of permissible 
state regulation under Section 1. 
First examined is the nature of the "special privileges" not guaranteed 
under the Clause. These privileges were local or municipal regulations 
that could have no extraterritorial force. In particular, the privileges and 
immunities granted to corporations were among the special privileges 
and immunities not guaranteed under the Clause.214 Corporations were 
212. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 100 (1873). 
213. See Smith, supra note 12. . 
214. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 586 (1839); Ducat v. City of 
Chicago, 48 Ill. 172, 174 (1868), aff'd, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 410 (1871) (stating that 
"corporations are not citizens within the meaning of section 2 of article 4, of the 
Constitution of the United States"). People v. Imlay held: 
An incorporated company is not a citizen, within the meaning . . . [ of the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause]. Such a company is a creation of the state 
which incorporates it, which has no power to legislate for other states, or to 
give to the artificial bodies which it creates powers to act in other states. Such 
companies act in other states than those which incorporate them, only by the 
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tion under Article III. Thus, much like the right to property in 
slaves,217 the privileges and immunities granted under corporate 
charters were viewed as merely special privileges and immuni-
ties-municipal regulations that had no binding extraterritorial effect. 
This Part also addresses the nature of the fundamental privileges and 
immunities of citizens guaranteed under the Clause. These were the 
privileges and immunities of citizens thought to be inherent in the 
concept of citizenship in all free governments. In particular, Justice 
Washington's opinion in Corfield v. Coryell,218 cited by Senator 
Trumbull during the debates over the proposed Fourteenth Amend-
ment,219 partially enumerated some of these fundamental privileges and 
immunities guaranteed under Article Iv, Section 2. 
pretended that such permission or residence clothed them with the character 
or with a single right pertaining to a British subject. 
Id. at 342. Justice Daniel therefore analogized the status of corporations as artificial 
persons to that of aliens. Any privileges and immunities that were enjoyed by aliens 
were enjoyed at the discretion of the government, since aliens were not parties to the 
social compact and could claim no legal right to the privileges and immunities of 
citizenship. Similarly, corporations, because they could exist only after the creation of 
the government, were not considered parties to the social compact and therefore had no 
legal right to enjoyment of the privileges and immunities of citizenship. Id. at 343. 
Justice Campbell, also dissenting, reasoned as follows: 
A corporation is not a citizen. It may be an artificial person, a moral person, 
a juridical person, a legal entity, a faculty, an intangible, invisible being; but 
Chief Justice Marshall employed no ·metaphysical refinement, nor subtlety, nor 
sophism, but spoke the common sense, "the universal understanding," as he 
calls it, of the people, when he declared the unanimous judgment of this court, 
"that it certainly is not a citizen." 
Nor were corporations within the contemplation of the framers of the 
Constitution when they delegated a jurisdiction over controversies between the 
citizens of different States . . . . [T]o administer the rights and privileges of 
citizens of the different States, held under a constitutional guaranty, when 
brought into collision or controversy-rights and immunities derived from the 
constitutional compact, and forming one of its fundamental conditions, was the 
object of this jurisdiction [under Article III]. 
Id. at 351. 
217. See supra Part III. C.1. 
218. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230). 
219. See THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES, supra note 2, at 122 
(remarks of Senator Trumbull). 
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1. Corporations and Special Privileges 
The Supreme Court in Bank of Augusta v. Earle stated that corpora-
tions did not qualify as "citizens" under the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause of Article IV, Section 2.220 Justice Story in his Commentaries 
also stated that a corporation could not possess the status of "citizen" for 
purposes of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 
2.221 However, for purposes of diversity jurisdiction under Article III, 
a corporation was considered to be analogous to a citizen. In Bank of 
the United States vs. Deveaux, the Supreme Court reached this re-
220. 38 U.S. 519, 586 (1839). Chief Justice Taney gave the opinion of the Court, 
stating the arguments on both sides. He reaffirmed the Court's previous decision 
concerning jurisdiction under Article III. The identity of individuals composing a 
corporation could be used in determining jurisdiction, but not for purposes of conferring 
privileges and immunities under Article IV, Section 2. 
It is true, that . . . this Court decided that in a question of jurisdiction they 
might look to the character of the persons composing a corporation; and if it 
appeared that they were citizens of another state, and the fact was set forth by 
proper averments, the corporation might sue in its corporate name in the 
Courts of the United States. But in that case the Court confined its decision, 
in express terms, to a question of jurisdiction; to a right to sue; and evidently 
went even so far with some hesitation. We fully assent to the propriety of that 
decision .... 
Id. The Court further reasoned that although the privileges and immunities of 
corporations need not be recognized by the states under Article IV, Section 2, the states 
could voluntarily recognize these privileges and immunities, consistent with principles 
of voluntary international comity. 
The comity ... extended to other nations is no impeachment of sovereignty. 
It is the voluntary act of the nation by which it is offered; and is inadmissible 
when contrary to its policy, or prejudicial to its interests. But it contributes 
so largely to promote justice between individuals, and to produce a friendly 
intercourse between the sovereignties to which they belong; that Courts of 
justice have continually acted upon it, as a part of the voluntary law of 
nations. 
Id. at 589. Therefore, if the principles of comity are voluntary the courts are constrained 
and must look to the legislature for guidance as to which foreign rights or laws are to 
be respected in the courts. However, under Article IV, Section 2, the states must 
recognize as residents citizens of the several states. With respect to corporations, which 
do not possess the status of citizens, the principles of comity are merely voluntary. 
221. After Bank of Augusta v. Earle, a number of state courts had also come to the 
same conclusion. See, e.g., Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth, 68 Ky. (5 Bush) 68 
(1868) (states may tax out-of-state corporations); Tatem v. Wright, 23 N.J.L. 429, 446 
(Sup. Ct. 1852); People v. Imlay, 20 Barb. 68, 79 (S.C.N.Y. 1855) (act did not prevent 
corporations from doing business in the state); Fire Dep't v. Noble, 3 E.D. Smith 440, 
452 (N.Y.C.C.P. 1854); Slaughter v. Commonwealth, 54 Va. (13 Gratt.) 767, 773 (1856) 
(states may require licensing of out-of-state corporations); but see Magill v. Brown, 16 
F. Cas. 408 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1833) (No. 8,952) (stating that the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause guaranteed out-of-state corporations the same right to hold property as in-state 
corporations). 
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sult.222 According to Justice Story, the Court held that "[a] corpora-
tion, as such, is not a citizen of a State in the sense of the Constitution. 
But if all the members of the corporation are citizens, their character will 
confer jurisdiction, for then it is substantially a suit by citizens suing in 
their corporate name. "223 Thus, both courts and commentators agreed 
that corporate charters were special privileges, not guaranteed under the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause. 
During the debates in Congress over the Fourteenth Amendment, one 
case in particular, Paul v. Virginia,224 indicated the nature of the 
privileges and immunities to be guaranteed under Section 1 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. In this case, the Supreme Court decided that 
a law compelling insurance companies not incorporated within a state to 
be licensed did not violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause of 
Article IV, Section 2. The Court held that the privileges and immunities 
secured to citizens under the Constitution were those privileges and 
immunities common to citizens of the several states and did not include 
special privileges enjoyed by citizens in their own states. Thus, both the 
special privileges and immunities accorded to corporations, which were 
creatures of state law, as well as other special privileges and immunities 
of citizens, had no extraterritorial effect under the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause. Under the Clause, foreign citizens were merely 
placed upon the same footing as resident citizens with respect to the 
privileges and immunities of citizens. In Paul, counsel argued: 
A corporation created by the laws of one of the States, and composed of 
citizens of that State, is a citizen of that State within the meaning of the 
Constitution. Legislation imposing special and discriminating restrictions 
upon the carrying on of lawful business in one State by citizens of other States 
was expressly forbidden by an article of the Confederation . . . . 225 
However, consistent with prior case law, on the other side counsel 
contended that a corporation was not a "citizen" within the meaning of 
the term as used in the Constitution: 
[N]o one, we presume, ever supposed that the artificial being created by an act 
of incorporation could be a citizen of a State in the sense in which that word 
222. 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809). 
223. 2 STORY, supra note 77, at 479 (footnotes omitted). 
224. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868). For a discussion of Paul, see HOWELL, supra 
note 4, at 9-10, 98-100. 
225. Paul, 75 U.S. at 170. 
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is used in the Constitution of the United States, and the averment was rejected 
because the matter averred was simply impossible .... This court has several 
times decided that a corporation is not a citizen within the meaning of the 
Constitution. 226 
Refusing to stray from well-established legal principles, the Court 
adopted the latter argument that corporations were not afforded the rights 
otherwise guaranteed under the Clause because, existing only after the 
institution of society and establishment of government, corporations 
could not be parties to the social compact from which the privileges and 
immunities of citizenship were derived.227 Distinguishing on these 
grounds between the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, 
Section 2 and diversity jurisdiction under Article III, Justice Field 
delivered the opinion of the Court declaring that "[t]he term citizens as 
there used [in the Privileges and Immunities Clause] applies only to 
natural persons, members of the body politic, owing allegiance to the 
State, not to artificial persons created by the legislature, and possessing 
only the attributes which the legislature has prescribed."228 Justice 
226. Id. at 175. Furthermore, counsel made the analogy of special privileges and 
immunities to political rights, which also were not conferred under the Clause. These 
rights of participation in government might also be said to be rights that could exist only 
after the institution of the government, similar to the special privileges and immunities 
afforded to both corporations and citizens. They are not the "common rights" that are 
inherent in individuals or which are naturally deduced from the social compact. 
If the assumption that a corporation was a citizen in the contemplation of the 
Constitution of the United States were correct, yet it would not follow, that a 
citizen of a State residing in one State, would be entitled to the privileges and 
immunities of citizens of each of the other States. Politically, it is very certain 
he would not, and it is not seen very clearly how he could in all other things. 
There is no question, that a citizen of any particular State, who removes into 
any other State of the Union and resides there long enough to become a 
citizen, is entitled to all the privileges and immunities of the latter State, 
without being required to be naturalized. He would become a citizen by the 
mere operation of the Constitution of the United States. By such removal he 
might lose some of his privileges, wilst he gained others; after he became a 
citizen of a State he could not sue a citizen of the same State in the courts of 
the United States. To illustrate,-a citizen of New York may sue a citizen of 
Virginia in the United States courts. 
Id. at 176. 
227. Smith, supra note 12 (discussing the relation between social compact theories 
and special privileges and immunities). 
228. Paul, 75 U.S. at 177. Justice Field continued, citing Bank of Augusta v. Earle 
for the proposition that corporations could not be considered citizens for purposes of the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2. He concluded that 
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in no case which has come under our observation, either in the State or 
Federal courts, has a corporation been considered a citizen within the meaning 
of that provision of the Constitution, which declares that the citizens of each 
State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the 
several States. 
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Field continued his opinion by discussing the effect of the Clause as 
placing "the citizens of each State upon the same footing with citizens 
of other States, so far as the advantages resulting from citizenship in 
those States are concemed."229 
However, Justice Field also mentioned certain substantive rights that 
the Clause guaranteed including "the acquisition and enjoyment of 
property," "pursuit of happiness," and "equal protection" of the laws. 
Citing Lemmon,23° Field concluded: 
It was undoubtedly the object of the clause in question to place the citizens 
of each State upon the same footing with citizens of other States, so far as the 
advantages resulting from citizenship in those States are concerned. It relieves 
them from the disabilities of alienage in other States; it inhibits discriminating 
legislation against them by other States; it gives them the right of free ingress 
into other States, and egress from them; it insures to them in other States the 
same freedom possessed by the citizens of those States in the acquisition and 
enjoyment of property and in the pursuit of happiness; and it secures to them 
in other States the equal protection of their laws. It has been justly said that no 
provision in the Constitution tended so strongly to constitute the citizens of the 
United States one people as this.231 
The Privileges and Immunities Clause served to confer those privileges 
and immunities of citizenship guaranteed in the state in which an 
individual found himself, and not any special privileges and immunities 
that were conferred in his home state. Such a provision was necessary 
to remove the disabilities of alienage--0therwise, "the Republic would 
have constituted little more than a league of States; it would not have 
constituted the Union which now exists."232 Field explained that 
the privileges and immunities secured to citizens of each State in the several 
States, by the provision in question, are those privileges and immunities which 
are common to the citizens in the latter States under their constitution and laws 
by virtue of their being citizens. Special privileges enjoyed by citizens in their 
own States are not secured in other States by this provision. It was not 
Id. at 178. Field observed that the decision of the Court that corporations were citizens 
for purposes of Article III "was confined in express terms to a question of jurisdiction 
[and] that the principle had never been carried further, and that it had never been 
supposed to extend to contracts made by a corporation, especially in another sovereignty 
from that of its creation .... " Id. at 179. 
229. Id. at 180. 
230. 20 N.Y. 562 (1860). For a more comprehensive discussion of Lemmon and the 
court's interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause in that case, see supra 
notes 113-37 and accompanying text. 
231. Paul, 75 U.S. at 180. 
232. Id. 
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intended by the provision to give to the laws of one State any operation in other 
States. They can have no such operation, except by the permission, express or 
implied, of those States. The special privileges which they confer must, 
therefore, be enjoyed at home, unless the assent of other States to their 
enjoyment therein be given.233 
If the Clause were interpreted to protect special privileges and immuni-
ties, such as the grant of a corporate charter, the states would possess the 
power to extend the effect of their laws extraterritorially to the other 
states in the Union. According to Justice Field, this would be "destruc-
tive of the independence and the harmony of the States."234 As a 
result, "[t]he principal business of every State would, in fact, be 
controlled by corporations created by other States."235 Thus, Justice 
Field adhered to the principle of the law of nations that a state's laws 
could have no extraterritorial effect, at least with respect to special 
privileges and immunities granted to citizens.236 
However, notice that Justice Field only mentioned "special" privileges 
in declaring that they were not available to citizens outside their home 
states. This leaves open the possibility that fundamental privileges could 
be guaranteed extraterritorially under the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause. Another possibility is that all of the fundamental privileges and 
immunities of citizenship were recognized in every state, and, therefore, 
the issue of whether they were guaranteed substantive protection under 
the Clause would never arise.237 
Thus, the Court in Paul v. Virginia noted the distinction between 
special privileges, which were mere local laws or positive regulations not 
binding outside the jurisdiction of the state, and fundamental privileges 
and immunities of citizenship, which were the privileges and immunities 
233. Id. at 180-81. Among the special privileges conferred by the states, Justice 
Field included the "grant of corporate existence," reasoning that 
a grant of corporate existence is a grant of special privileges to the corporators, 
enabling them to act for certain designated purposes as a single individual, arid 
exempting them (unless otherwise specially provided) from individual liability. 
The corporation being the mere creation of local law, can have no legal 
existence beyond the limits of the sovereignty where created .... [ As a result, 
the] recognition of its existence even by other States, and the enforcement of 
its contracts made therein, depend purely upon the comity of those States-a 
comity which is never extended where the existence of the corporation or the 
exercise of its powers are prejudicial to their interests or repugnant to their 
policy. 
Id. at 181. 
234. Id. 
235. Id. at 182. 
236. See Smith, supra note 12 (discussing the principles of the law of nations 
underlying Article IV). · 
237. See infra Part IV.D for a more thorough discussion of this interpretation of the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause. 
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to which Article IV, Section 2 referred-privileges and immunities of 
citizens. One such special privilege, granted by a mere positive law 
having no extraterritorial effect under the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause of Article IV, Section 2, was the privilege conferred by a 
corporate charter to carry on business using the corporate form. Because 
the charter was a mere positive local regulation, it had no binding effect 
outside the jurisdiction of the state granting the charter, and, therefore, 
might only be respected voluntarily by foreign states following principles 
of comity. The rights guaranteed under charters of incorporation were, 
thus, analogous to the property right a master had in his slave--a right 
not founded in natural law and, therefore, not binding extraterritorially 
absent some expression in positive law to the contrary. 
2. Fundamental Privileges 
The antebellum cases addressing the Privileges and Immunities Clause 
made it abundantly clear that the rights guaranteed under the Clause did 
not include special privileges. A long line of cases, the most frequently-
cited of which was Car.field v. Coryell,238 held that the Clause guaran-
teed only those privileges and immunities of citizenship that were 
fundamental. However, even prior to this decision, courts in the United 
States recognized that the Clause protected certain fundamental rights of 
citizenship.239 Car.field is an appropriate starting point for determining 
238. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230). Among these fundamental 
rights of citizens were the right to contract, to hold property, to sue, to testify in court, 
and perhaps several rights guaranteed under the Bill of Rights such as the right to bear 
arms and the right to free speech. For example, a number of courts acknowledged that 
the right to sue was one of the fundamental privileges and immunities guaranteed under 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause. See, e.g., id.; The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 
(16 Wall.) 36 (1873). 
239. For example, the Supreme Court stated that the privileges and immunities of 
citizens were "natural, inherent and unalienable rights of man." VanHome's Lessee v. 
Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 310 (1795). Judge Chase stated that the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause "secures and protects personal rights," Campbell v. Morris, 3 H. & 
McH. 535, 554 (1797), and entitles "the citizens of each State ... to all the privileges 
and immunities of citizens of the several states," id. at 553 ( emphasis added), including 
the right "to acquire and hold real property in any of the states." Id. at 554. Judge 
Cabell of the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals stated that under the Clause, "although 
a citizen of one state may hold land in another, yet he cannot interfere in those rights, 
which, from the very nature of society and of government, belong exclusively to citizens 
of that state. Such are the rights of election and of representation .... " Murray v. 
M'Carty, 2 Munf. 393,398 (1811). Chancellor Ridgely of the Delaware Chancery Court 
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what rights the Privileges and Immunities Clause was understood to 
guarantee considering that Justice Washington's interpretation of the 
Clause was widely recognized as being definitive, and given that 
Republicans in Congress,240 as well as both the majority and dissenters 
in the Slaughter-House Cases,241 cited Corfield as authority in inter-
preting the terms "privileges" and "immunities" as used in the Constitu-
tion. 
Corfield v. Coryell involved a forfeiture of property under a New 
Jersey act that prohibited "any person who is not at the time an actual 
inhabitant and resident in this state . . . [ from gathering] clams, oysters, 
or shells, in any of the rivers, bays, or waters in this state . . . ."242 
The plaintiff in the case whose property was seized argued that the right 
of fishing in the bed of public waters of a state is common to all the 
citizens of the state and, alternatively, that the oyster beds were common 
property between Delaware and New Jersey and that New Jersey could 
not assert an exclusive right to them.243 
In contrast, the defendants argued that New Jersey as a sovereign state 
was entitled to the rights and prerogatives of a sovereign, and that the 
com:p:1.on property of citizens of a state may be regulated and controlled 
for the "common benefit. "244 The defense made the distinction 
between "privileges and immunities," which were private proprietary 
rights and capacities, and rights to the common property of the state, 
contending that "[a]s to the second section of the fourth article of the 
stated that "the words 'privileges and immunities' comprehend all rights, and all the 
methods of protecting those rights, which belong to a person in a state of civil society 
... and the general good require." Douglass v. Stephens, 1 Del. Ch. 465, 469 (1821). 
In the same case, Chief Justice Johns stated that "[t]he privileges and immunities to be 
secured to all citizens of the United States ... which includes the whole United States, 
and must be understood to mean, such privileges as should be common, or the same in 
every State .... " Id. at 476-77. This statement of Justice Johns reflects the notion of 
a jus gentium as distinguished from the jus civile of each state. The jus gentium 
represents that part of the civil law that is common among nations, or the law of nations. 
See Smith, supra note 12. If these privileges and immunities were found in each state, 
even if the Clause were intended to afford anti discrimination protection, it would be the 
case that citizens would be able to exercise these rights within all of the states on an 
equal footing with resident citizens. 
240. See THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES, supra note 2, at 122 
(remarks of Senator Trumbull). 
241. Justice Miller termed Corfield"[t]he first and the leading case" on the meaning 
of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2. Slaughter-House 
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 75-76. Similarly, Justices Field, id. at 97, and Bradley, id. 
at 116-17 (noting that Corfield 's "often-quoted" language was "very instructive"), cited 
Corfield as being authoritative in their dissents. 
242. Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 546. 
243. Id. at 548. 
244. Id. at 549. 
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constitution, it applies only to the privileges and immunities of 
citizenship, not to rights in the common property of the state."245 
In deciding whether the New Jersey act was constitutional, the court 
made a detailed examination of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of 
Article IV, Section 2. In an often-cited passage, Justice Bushrod 
Washington described the nature of_ the privileges and immunities of 
citizens referenced in Article IV, Section 2 as being fundamental: 
The inquiry is, what are the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several 
states? We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions to those privileges 
and immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental; which belong, of right, 
to the citizens of all free governments; and which have, at all times, been 
enjoyed by the citizens of the several States which compose this Union, from 
the time of their becoming free, independent, and sovereign. What these 
fundamental principles are, it would perhaps be more tedious than difficult to 
enumerate. They may, however, be all comprehended under the following 
heads: Protection by the government; the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the 
right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain 
happiness and safety; subject nevertheless to such restraints as the government 
may justly prescribe for the general good of the whole. The right of a citizen 
of one state to pass through, or to reside in any other state, for purposes of 
trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise; to claim the benefit of the 
writ of habeas corpus; to institute and maintain actions of any kind in the courts 
of the state; to take, hold and dispose of property, either real or personal; and 
an exemption from higher taxes or impositions than are paid by the other 
citizens of the state; may be mentioned as some of the particular privileges and 
immunities of citizens, which are clearly embraced by the general description 
of privileges deemed fundamental: to which may be added, the elective 
franchise, as regulated and established by the laws or constitution of the state 
in which it is to be exercised. These, and many others which might be 
mentioned, are, strictly speaking, privileges and immunities, and the enjoyment 
of them by the citizens of each state, in every other state, was manifestly 
calculated (to use the expressions of the preamble of the corresponding 
provision in the old articles of confederation) "the better to secure and 
perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse· among the people of the different 
states of the Union."246 
The court's enumeration of"particular privileges"encompassed instances 
of capacities with respect to property recognized by the majority of the 
245. Id. 
246. Id. at 551-52. Senator Trumbull later quoted Justice Washington in order to 
indicate the nature of the privileges and immunities guaranteed in the Civil Rights Bill, 
a precursor of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. THE RECONSTRUCTION 
AMENDMENTS' DEBATES, supra note 2, at 122. However, Trumbull argued that the Civil 
Rights Bill did not cover the elective franchise. Id. 
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state governments.247 Property, here, must be understood in the 
Lockean sense of the term. One may have property in one's life, labor, 
or goods. Thus, the court listed the privilege of the writ of habeas 
corpus and the freedom to travel in foreign states as among those 
privileges and immunities deemed fundamental. These fundamental 
privileges and immunities belong to "citizens of all free governments." 
This is an expression of the concept of the jus gentium applied to the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2. Those 
privileges and immunities that are fundamental are civil capacities that 
have been recognized as :flowing from principles of natural reason by a 
majority of the governments characterized as "free."248 
However, not every right that citizens might be able to exercise under 
the government of a particular state necessarily falls within the phrase 
"privileges and immunities of citizens." Only those privileges and 
immunities deemed fundamental, or inherent in citizenship as such, are 
encompassed in the guarantee of Article IV, Section 2.249 The power 
of regulation remains with the state governments. Through the consent 
of the governed, the state governments have been given a power of 
regulation over the property of citizens, which they must exercise only 
for the "common benefit." Exercise of this power is therefore not 
inconsistent with the inviolability of the privileges and immunities of 
citizens because this power has been given through the consent of the 
citizens via the compact (or law) establishing the government.250 In 
the case of the regulation of common property of the state in which the 
citizens have been vested as tenants in common, the state governments 
owe no duties whatsoever to citizens of foreign states. Citizens of 
foreign states have no more right to participate in the common property 
247. See HOWELL, supra note 4, at 33 ("In both Corfield v. Coryell and Ward v. 
Maryland there are dicta to the effect that the right to acquire and possess property of 
every description is one secured to the citizens of the several States by virtue of the 
Comity Clause.") (citations omitted). 
248. See.Smith, supra note 12 (discussing the deductive and inductive methods for 
determining the principles of the law of nature). 
249. According to the court: 
[W]e cannot accede to the proposition which was insisted on by the counsel, 
that, under this provision of the constitution, the citizens of the several states 
are permitted to participate in all the rights which belong exclusively to the 
citizens of any other particular state, merely upon the ground that they are 
enjoyed by those citizens; much less, that in regulating the use of the common 
property of the citizens of such state, the legislature is bound to extend to the 
citizens of all the other states the same advantages as are secured to their own 
citizens., 
Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 552. 
250. See Smith, supra note 12 ( discussing social compact theory and the background 
of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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of the state than they do to participate in any citizen's private property 
in the state. 
In particular, the court found that the right to fish the river bed at 
issue in the case was the property of the citizens of New Jersey as 
tenants in common, subject to the regulation of the state government for 
the common good, and not a privilege or immunity of citizenship.251 
Because the citizens of the state of New Jersey held the river beds as 
private property and as tenants in common, others had no right to use 
and enjoy this property. Just as a foreign citizen from another state of 
the Union would have no right under the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause of Article IV, Section 2 to the property of John Smith living in 
New Jersey, so this individual had no right to the property the citizens 
of New Jersey held as tenants in common. However, this individual 
would have a right to exercise the capacities with respect to property, 
privileges and immunities, that are recognized by all free governments 
and to hold, for example, his own property without its removal either by 
the state of New Jersey or by individuals within the jurisdiction and 
sovereign power of the state. 
E. Regulation of the Privileges and Immunities of 
Citizens Under Article IV, Section 2 
Although the states were obligated to confer all of the privileges and 
immunities of citizenship enjoyed by resident citizens to non-resident 
citizens, they retained the power to regulate these rights of citizenship 
as long as they did so in a nondiscriminatory manner. As Justice 
Washington stated in his opinion in Car.field, the privileges and 
immunities of citizens were "subject nevertheless to such restraints as the 
251. Co,jield, 6 F. Cas. at 552. According to the court: 
A several fishery ... is the property of all; to be enjoyed by them in 
subordination to the laws which regulate its use. They may be considered as 
tenants in common of this property; and they are so exclusively entitled to the 
use of it, that it cannot be enjoyed by others without the tacit consent, or the 
express permission of the sovereign who has the power to regulate its use. 
Id. See also McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391,396 (1876) (noting that the right to fish 
in waters that were the common property of Virginia was "not a privilege or immunity 
of general but of special citizenship"); HOWELL, supra note 4, at 69 ("Besides what have 
been termed by the courts political privileges, it has been settled that the citizens of the 
several States are not entitled by virtue of the Comity Clause to enjoy upon equal terms 
with the citizens of any State the use of property in which that State is vested with a 
proprietary interest and which it holds for the general benefit of its own citizens."). 
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government may justly prescribe for the general good of the whole."252 
The privileges and immunities of the citizens of the several states, 
retained by the citizens, may have been more or less uniform throughout 
the United States.253 However, the manner in which these rights were 
regulated by the state governments certainly was not. The state 
governments could pass positive regulations or municipal laws prescrib-
ing the mode or manner in which one could exercise the rights of 
citizenship.254 These regulations were merely local laws with no 
252. Co,jield, 6 F. Cas. at 552. 
253. This may have been the motivation behind the Clause-to ensure that certain 
important rights of the citizen would be uniform among the several states. As the court 
stated in Ducat v. Chicago: 
[The individual citizen] has rights which are so important, as to make it 
desirable that they should be uniform throughout this broad and expanded 
Union, which, in order to promote mutual friendship and free social, or 
business intercourse among the people of the several States, were placed, by 
this clause of article 4, under the protection of the federal government. 
48 Ill. 172, 180 (1868). Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Towles the court stated that the 
privileges and immunities of a naturalized citizen of the United States and a citizen of 
any of the states were identical, implying that there was a uniform set of privileges and 
immunities of citizens as such, which was to be guaranteed under the Clause. 
It is obvious, that the privileges and immunities of the naturalized citizen and 
of the citizen of each state, are exactly the same, under the constitution of the 
U. S. art. 4, § 2, and the naturalized citizen, and the native citizen of North 
Carolina, would be both equally entitled to them, whatever they are, in the 
state of Virginia. 
32 Va. (5 Leigh) 743, 749 (1835). 
254. The case of Costin v. Washington, 6 F. Cas. 612 (C.C.D.C. 1821) (No. 3,266) 
illustrates the potentially limited nature of the rights of free men, citizens, and the role 
of the government in regulating these rights. The case involved an act that regulated the 
terms and conditions "upon which free negroes and mulattoes may reside in the city of 
Washington, and for other purposes." Id. at 612. Free blacks were required to appear 
before the mayor and , 
subscribe a statement of their trades, or means of subsistence, and of their 
family . . . to produce a satisfactory certificate from three respectable white 
inhabitants ... as to his living peaceably, his means of subsistence, and his 
character[,] . . . "to enter into bond with one good respectable white citizen, 
assurety in the penalty of twenty dollars, conditioned for the good, sober, and 
orderly conduct of such person or persons of color, and his or her family .. 
" 
Id. In Costin, counsel argued: 
It is said that the constitution gives equal rights to all the citizens of the 
United States, in the several states. But that clause of the constitution does not 
prohibit any state from denying to some of its citizens some of the political 
rights enjoyed by others. In all the states certain qualifications are necessary 
to the right of suffrage; the right to serve on juries, and the right to hold 
certain offices; and in most of the states the absence of the African color is 
among those qualifications. Every state has the right to pass laws to preserve 
the peace and the morals of society . . . . 
Id. at 613. Counsel therefore urged that the state could still regulate the life, liberty, and 
property of citizens for the public welfare. 
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extraterritorial effect that need not be respected outside the jurisdiction 
of the state, but which could be voluntarily respected by foreign states 
based purely upon voluntary principles of international comity. 
Case law prior to ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment made it 
abundantly clear that state governments were to retain their power of 
regulation under the Privileges and Immunities Clause as long as they 
exercised it for the "common benefit." In Dred Scott v. Sandford, Chief 
Justice Taney argued that if free blacks were considered citizens for 
purposes of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, they would be entitled 
to certain fundamental rights of citizenship and would be exempt from 
all police regulations except those that applied to all citizens alike.255 
Therefore, it would seem that under the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause, discriminatory regulation was prohibited. Justice Field's 
assessment of the operation of the Clause may have been the most 
accurate, however. Justice Field asserted in the Slaughter-House Cases 
that the Clause prohibited discriminatory regulation against foreign 
citizens when venturing into states in which they were not resident 
citizens. He argued that the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment was designed, in part, to apply this principle to 
all citizens and to prevent discriminatory regulation within every state 
with respect to resident citizens as well.256 
Courts during the antebellum period recognized that although state 
governments were not free to abridge the privileges and immunities of 
citizens guaranteed under Article IV, Section 2, they could regulate the 
Judge Cranch agreed with this argument, acknowledging that although citizens were 
entitled to the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several states under Article 
IV, Section 2, the states still maintained the power to make regulations for the public 
good. According to Judge Cranch: 
A citizen of one state, coming into another state, can claim only those 
privileges and immunities which belong to citizens of the latter state, in like 
circumstances. But the present case is like that of a state legislating in regard 
to its own citizens, and I can see no reason why it may not require security for 
good behavior from free persons of color, as well as from vagrants, and 
persons of ill-fame. . 
Id. at 613-14. Therefore, Judge Cranch seemed to indicate that the state governments 
were free to regulate the privileges and immunities of citizenship, even in a discriminato-
ry manner, as long as they did so pursuant to the public welfare. 
255. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856); see infra notes 277-79 and accompanying text. 
256. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text. 
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manner in which they were exercised.257 Attorneys arguing before the 
Supreme Court also recognized this power of regulation that remained 
with the state govemments.258 Under Article IV, Section 2, these 
principles of comity were no longer voluntary among the several states 
but were made binding by compact. The state governments, however, 
maintained the power to regulate the manner in which these privileges 
and immunities of citizenship were exercised. For example, in Conner 
v. Elliott,259 the Supreme Court held that the states had a right to 
regulate marriage contracts and that a right to community of acquets or 
gains between married persons, where the marriage was contracted 
within the state, was not one of the personal rights of citizens under 
Article IV, Section 2. The Court decided to determine if certain rights 
were "privileges and immunities" of citizens on a case by case basis 
257. For example, in Hutchinson v. Thompson, the court held that the clause in the 
ordinance of 1787 for the government of the Northwestern Territory that declared that 
the navigable rivers in the territory should be "common highways ... without any tax, 
impost, or duty .... " and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 
2 did not prohibit the states formed in the territory from legislating concerning the rivers, 
but that any regulations must apply equally to their own citizens and citizens of other 
states. 9 Ohio 52, 62 (1839). The states were thereby prohibited from imposing 
discriminating restrictions, duties, and imposts upon citizens of other states. The court 
reasoned that such interference on the part of the federal government would invade the 
jurisdiction of state governments, which were free to regulate such affairs with respect 
to their own citizens. Id. at 63-64. According to the court: 
It was the intention of the ordinance, first, to restrain a state from obstructing 
the navigation of a river to the injury of the inhabitants of another state, into 
or from which it passed; and in the second place, to prohibit all discriminating 
duties on citizens of other states, on any river, whether it run through several 
states, or was contained in the limits of the single state which attempted to 
impose such duties. This was effecting precisely what was effected by the 
constitution of the United states, which was in agitation at that very time, and 
was adopted two years afterwards. That gives to the citizens of each state, all 
the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several states, and in addition, 
clothes Congress with the power of regulating the commerce among the states. 
The principles of the new constitution, (as it was uncertain whether it would 
be adopted,) were carried into the ordinance. But to suppose that it was 
intended to restrain the state from passing laws affecting the navigation of 
rivers, which lay exclusively within its own limits, by authorizing the building 
of bridges, dams, or aqueducts, can not be admitted, because it would, to say 
the least, be a palpable departure from those principles. 
Id. at 65. 
258. For example, in Bank of Augusta v. Earle Mr. Webster argued before the Court 
that: 
The right of a foreigner to sue in the Courts of any country may be regulated 
by particular laws or ordinances of that country . . . . But if, under pretence 
of such regulation, any nation shall impose unreasonable restrictions or 
penalties on the citizens of any other nation, the power of judging that matter 
for itself lies with that other nation. 
38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 557 (1839). 
259. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 591 (1855). 
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rather than setting out a general classification.260 However, the Court 
stated that the Clause conferred privileges that "belong to citizen-
ship."261 The Court recognized a fundamental distinction between 
rights that were essential to the concept of citizenship and the incidents 
of these essential rights. The incidents of the rights, or the regulations 
governing the exercise of these rights, could be prescribed by the state 
governments according to the Court. However, the state governments 
were obligated to respect the essential rights of citizens-the rights 
inherent in the concept of citizenship.262 Thus, regulations prescribing 
260. Id. at 593. The Supreme Court stated that it would be "safer, and more in 
accordance with the duty of a judicial tribunal" to examine which rights were guaranteed 
under the Clause on a case by case basis and that this was "especially" true when the 
Court was dealing with so broad a provision. 
Id. 
261. The Court reasoned: 
[A]ccording to the express words and clear meaning of this clause, no 
privileges are secured by it, except those which belong to citizenship. Rights, 
attached by the law to contracts, by reason of the place where such contracts 
are made or executed, wholly irrespective of the citizenship of the parties to 
those contracts, cannot be deemed "privileges of a citizen," within the meaning 
of the constitution . . . . They are incidents, ingrafted by the law of the State 
on the contract of marriage. 
262. This distinction between the fundamental rights of the citizen and the 
regulation of those rights arose in the case of Crandall v. State, IO Conn. 339, 349-53 
(1834). In that case, William Ellsworth made the following argument before the court: 
The law under consideration forbids a citizen of another state from coming 
here, to pursue education, as all others may do, because he has not a legal 
settlement in the state . . . . This power of regulating because of alienage is 
virtually a power of exclusion, and in this case is, in effect, and was designed 
so to be ... the legislature may superintend and regulate private schools ... 
, [ as it might superintend and regulate] all the pursuits of its citizens, but . . 
. this must be done by a general and equal law. Mere birth in another state 
cannot be seized upon, as a ground of distinction, discrimination and 
deprivation . . . . The law must be alike and general, or there is an end of 
equal privileges and immunities. 
If 4th art. sec. 2, means anything, [it secures] to a citizen of New York, a 
right to come here, and remain here, if he offends against no general law; he 
cannot be whipped out, nor carried out of the state because he has no legal 
settlement: he may present the shield of the constitution, and as Paul claimed 
the immunity of a Roman citizen, he may claim the immunity of an American 
citizen .... Neither present nor future poverty can strike out of the constitu-
tion the word "citizen," and a "citizen" has a universal right, title, and 
immunity, to a residence, and other fundamental rights. 
REPORT OF THE ARGUMENTS OF COUNSEL IN THE CASE OF PRUDENCE CRANDALL, PLFF. 
IN ERROR, VS. STATE OF CONNECTICUT, BEFORE THE SUPRE:ME COURT OF ERRORS, AT 
THEIR SESSION AT BROOK.LYNN, JULY TERM, 1834, at 14 (1834), reprinted in GRAHAM, 
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the mode or manner in which fundamental privileges and immunities of 
citizens could be exercised had no binding extraterritorial effect, much 
like the rights granted under charters of incorporation or the 
slaveholder's right of property in his slave, discussed previously. 
Regulations were analogous to special privileges and immunities of 
citizens, which were not guaranteed under the Clause. 
IV. ANTIDISCRIMINATION OR SUBSTANTIVE PROTECTION? 
From the foregoing discussion, it is evident that there are at least two 
possible interpretations of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of 
Article IV, Section 2. The first is that the Clause guarantees that 
nonresident citizens will have merely the same privileges and immunitfos 
that are guaranteed to resident citizens. The privileges and immunities 
of citizenship are the fundamental rights of person and property that 
exist anterior to the formation of the government and that, perhaps, are 
embodied in the positive law of the states' constitutions. However, 
under this reading of the Clause, the privileges and immunities 
guaranteed in every state might be different. As the Supreme Court in 
United States v. Cruikshank noted in construing Section 1 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, "the rights of citizenship under one of these 
governments will be different from those that he will have under the 
other."263 Under this interpretation, the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause merely ensures that citizens changing their residence or traveling 
to foreign states will have the same rights of person and property as 
resident citizens. 
The second view concerning the meaning of the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause is that it guarantees a uniform set of substantive 
privileges and immunities to citizens of the United States no matter what 
rights a particular state constitution might contain.264 Chester James 
Antieau advanced this view, arguing that the purpose of the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause was to secure a uniform set of fundamental rights 
supra note 11. For a more thorough discussion of Crandall, see supra notes 138-46 and 
accompanying text. 
263. 92 U.S. 542, 549 (1875) (citation omitted). 
264. Senator Poland of Vermont seems to have made this argument, equating the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment with the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2. According to Poland: 
The clause of the first proposed amendment, that "no State shall make or 
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens 
of the United States," secures nothing beyond what was intended by the 
original provision in the Constitution, that "the citizens of each State shall be 
entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States." 
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2961 (1866). 
890 
[VOL. 34: 809, 1997] Privileges and Immunities Clause 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
to citizens of the United States.265 In addition, Michael Kent Curtis 
has argued that this was the view of the Republicans in Congress 
responsible for framing the Fourteenth Amendment.266 This view is, 
perhaps, more consistent with the protection of slaves as property in 
states where slavery was outlawed. Although property in human beings 
seemed to be recognized under the Fugitive Slave Clause, appeal was 
also made to the Privileges and Immunities Clause as guaranteeing a 
substantive right to property of all kinds.267 Some of the state consti-
tutions expressly prohibited slavery, and yet the courts upheld 
slaveholders' rights of property in their slaves when traveling to foreign 
states. Further, under this interpretation of the Clause, equality in 
regulation of these rights might also have been one of the substantive 
rights afforded protection as a common right of citizens. Therefore, this 
interpretation might afford substantive protection for certain fundamental 
rights, as well as antidiscrimination protection in the regulation of those 
fundamental rights. 
Case law arising under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article 
rv, Section 2 as well as in other areas, the opinions of legal commenta-
tors, and statements by members of Congress during the Reconstruction 
debates, all offer clues concerning the nature of the protection thought 
to be afforded under the Clause. Both interpretations may be historically 
accurate to a certain extent and may be accommodated by keeping in 
265. Antieau, supra note 14, at 5. Antieau asserts that Article IV was intended to 
be enforceable by Congress when read together with the Necessary and Proper Clause. 
Id. at 1-2. However, the Necessary and Proper Clause states that "Congress shall have 
the Power ... [t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into 
Execution the foregoing Powers and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the 
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 8. The Privileges and Immunities Clause makes no mention of any 
congressional enforcement power. Therefore, it would seem that the Necessary and 
Proper Clause cannot authorize Congress to enforce the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause. However, the United States is given the power to "guarantee to every State in 
this Union a Republican Form of Government .... " Id. art. IV, § 4. Therefore, it may 
be the case that Congress was intended to possess a power to enforce the guarantee of 
certain fundamental rights under the Guarantee Clause. Michael Conant has similarly 
asserted that the Privileges and Immunities Clause was originally intended to secure 
certain privileges and immunities of Englishmen, inherited by the colonists. See Conant, 
supra note 36. 
266. See CURTIS, supra note 10, at 114. See also KETTNER, supra note 14, at 258 
(supporting the substantive reading of the Clause); Kaczorowski, supra note 11 (same). 
267. See supra Part III. C.1, discussing the nineteenth century interpretation of the 
Fugitive Slave Clause. 
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mind the conceptual framework developed during the nineteenth century 
addressing the rights guaranteed under the Clause. 
A. Case Law 
It is particularly noteworthy that antebellum cases discussing the 
"privileges and immunities" of citizens outside the context of Article IV, 
Section 2 seem to indicate that there was a well-defined understanding 
of what constituted the set of privileges and immunities to which citizens 
of all free governments were entitled.268 For example, in Sheridan v. 
Furber,269 a case involving an alleged assault and battery of a master 
of a ship and the first mate against the carpenter of the ship, the court 
268. As previously noted, cases addressing the Privileges and Immunities Clause 
itself also give clues to its meaning. The case of The Cynosure, 6 F. Cas. 1102 (D. 
Mass. 1844) (No. 3,529), addressed the rights of free men of color under the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2. Under a statute of Louisiana, "colored 
seamen" belonging to vessels of the United States were prohibited from being brought 
into the ports of Louisiana. Id. at 1102. Although the statute was held to be 
inconsistent with federal regulations of commerce under the Commerce Clause, the case 
is interesting for the court's discussion in dicta of the Privileges and Immunities Clause 
of Article IV, Section 2. The court stated that had the free man been a citizen of the 
states, the statute would have been unconstitutional in its application, abridging the 
citizen's right to privileges and immunities under the United States Constitution. 
Another case that arose under the Louisiana statute was Commonwealth v. Aves, 35 
Mass. (18 Pick.) 193 (1836). See CASE OF THE SLAVE-CHILD MED: A REPORT OF THE 
ARGUMENTS OF COUNSEL AND OF THE OPINION OF THE COURT IN THE CASE OF 
COMMONWEALTH vs. AVES 5 (Boston: Isaac Knapp ed., 1836). It was argued before the 
court in this case by Ellis Gray Loring that under the statute "colored citizens of the 
North, seamen or others, are forbidden by law from entering many of the Southern ports 
in this Union, on peril of being 'confined in jail"' and that the statute was "in direct 
violation" of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Constitution. Id. at 14-15. 
Loring argued that slavery was not founded upon principles of natural law, but rather 
was merely conventional. He reasoned that slavery "is contrary to good morals;-a 
violation of the law of nature, and of the revealed will of God. · It therefore falls within 
the first exception to the exercise of national comity." Id. at 20; see also FINKELMAN, 
supra n0te 14, at 109 n.28 ( discussing other ways in which the privileges and immunities 
of free black citizens were denied by Southern states); Earl M. Maltz, The Unlikely Hero 
of Dred Scott: Benjamin Robbins Curtis and the Constitutional Law of Slavery, 17 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1995, 2007 (1996) (discussing the Negro Seamen's Acts in the 
Southern states); id. at 1998-2000 (discussing Justice Curtis's opinion in Aves); Maltz, 
supra note 4, at 340-41 (discussing the Negro Seamen's Acts). The court in Aves found 
this reasoning persuasive, and Justice Shaw, delivering the opinion of the court, declared 
that slavery was "contrary to natural right, to the principles of justice, humanity and 
sound policy." Aves, 18 Pick. at 215. Shaw reasoned that if the right to personal 
property in slaves were based upon the natural law then "if slavery exists anywhere, and 
if by the laws of any place a property can be acquired in slaves," then "the law of 
slavery must extend to every place where such slaves may be carried." Id. at 216. 
Shaw rejected this argument with respect to slavery, stating that comity could "apply 
only to those commodities which are everywhere, and by all nations, treated and deemed 
subject of property." Id. 
269. 21 F. Cas. 1266 (S.D.N.Y. 1834) (No. 12,761). 
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expressed a notion of the "privileges and immunities" of citizens that 
involved certain fundamental rights that were guaranteed under all free 
governments. Even though the alleged assault occurred on a ship 
outside the territory of the United States, the court used the phrase 
"privileges and immunities of citizens" to describe the rights that citizens 
possessed even though they might relinquish some of them in the 
disciplined environment of a ship at sea. 
[W]ith regard to a ship-master, the persons over whom his authority is to be 
exerted are entitled to the privileges and immunities of citizens in all respects 
other than in their qualified subjection to the discipline on ship-board; and every 
provision of law which sanctions the deprivation of their rights as freemen, 
evinces, at the same time, a jealous solicitude in their behalf, by imposing on 
the master a heavy responsibility in the employment of his power. 27 
Similarly, Polydore v. Prince271 involved an alleged assault and 
battery on the high seas. The question in this case was whether a 
foreign slave who suffered the alleged assault could sue in the courts of 
the United States or whether "this personal incapacity upon the received 
principles of the jus gentium, or at least on the principles of national 
comity, follows him into whatever country he may voluntarily go or be 
carried by his master."272 The defendants in the case argued that, 
although slavery was contrary to "natural right," it was "an institution 
admitted and acknowledged by the law of nations" and therefore the 
incapacity of slavery followed the slave "as the shadow follows the 
body" while traveling abroad in the United States. As a result, defense 
counsel argued that the slave could not sue in the courts of the United 
States for the alleged assault.273 The defendants pointed to the "Code 
Napolean" as authority for the proposition that one's status followed one 
outside the jurisdiction under which it attached. The defendants also 
described the caste systems erected in Europe and the distinctions in the 
"privileges and immunities" separating the different levels. 
Among these personal statutes, for which this ubiquity is claimed, are those 
which formerly over the whole of Europe, and still over a large part of it, 
divide the people into different castes, as nobles and plebeians, clergy and laity. 
270. Id. at 1268. 
271. 19 F. Cas. 950 (D. Maine 1837) (No. 11,257). 
272. Id. at 951. 
273. Id. 
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The favored classes were entitled to many personal ~rivileges and immunities 
particularly beneficial and honorable to themselves. 2 4 
However, the court did not adopt the defendants' arguments, stating 
that "the peculiar personal status, as to his capacities or incapacities, 
which an individual derives from the law of his domicil, and which are 
imparted only by that law, is suspended when he gets beyond the sphere 
in which that law is in force."275 The status of slave could only be 
conferred through positive municipal regulation, and it did not flow from 
principles of natural right. Thus, this status need not be recognized 
outside the jurisdiction in which it was conferred. As a result, the slave 
in this case was automatically entitled to certain "rights and capacities 
of a free man" upon entering the jurisdiction of the United States.276 
The substantive rights of citizens were also discussed by certain 
members of the Supreme Court deciding the Dred Scott case.277 For 
example, in arguing that the Framers of the Constitution did not 
understand the term "citizen" to include free blacks, Chief Justice Taney 
made the following pragmatic argument: 
274. Id. at 951-52. 
275. Id. at 953. The court distinguished between natural relations of foreigners and 
those established through "mere positive institution": 
Id. 
Natural relations of foreigners, and such as are established by our own 
domestic institutions, we recognize in foreigners who are temporarily resident 
among us; but the rights and obligations which flow from them must, as a 
general rule at least, be determined by our own law, and be enforced by such 
means only as the local law allows. But those merely artificial distinctions, 
those capacities and disqualifications of mere positive institution, established 
by different communities among their members, which are not founded in 
nature but which relate to their own domestic economy, their municipal 
institutions, and their peculiar social organization, cannot be admitted to follow 
them into other nations in whose laws such distinctions are unknown, without 
disturbing the whole order of society, and introducing into communities 
privileged castes of persons, each governed to a considerable extent by 
different laws and affected by personal privileges peculiar to themselves, and 
totally at variance with the habits, social order, and the laws of the community 
among whom they reside. 
276. 19 F. Cas. 950 (D. Maine 1837) (No. 11,257). According to the court: 
The law which declares a slave free on his introduction into this country, by 
necessary consequences, if it be not an identical proposition, declares him to 
be possessed of the civil qualities of a freeman, and confers on him the faculty 
of vindicating his rights, and claiming redress for wrongs in the ordinary 
course of justice . . . . 
Id. For a more detailed discussion of the "civil qualities of a freeman," see Smith, supra 
note 12. 
277. See Smith, supra note 12 ( discussing the Dred Scott case and the understanding 
of both the majority and dissenting members of the Court concerning the rights of 
citizens). 
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[I]f persons of the African race are citizens of a State, and of the United States, 
they would be entitled to all of these privileges and immunities in every State, 
and the States could not restrict them; for they would hold these privileges and 
immunities under the paramount authority of the Federal Government, and its 
courts would be bound to maintain and enforce them, the Constitution and the 
laws of the State to the contrary notwithstanding. And if the States could limit 
or restrict them, or place the party in an inferior grade, this clause of the 
Constitution would be unmeaning, and could have no operation; and would give 
no rights to the citizens when in another State. He would have none but what 
the State itself chose to allow him. This is evidently not the construction or 
meaning of the clause in question . . . . And these rights are of a character that 
would lead to consequences which make it absolutely certain that the African 
race were not included under the name of citizens of a State, and were not in 
contemplation of the framers of the Constitution when these privileges and 
immunities were provided for the protection of the citizen in other States.278 
This passage might be read as stating that the citizens of one state 
were merely placed on the same footing with the citizens of every state 
insofar as they were entitled to the fundamental privileges and immuni-
ties of any state in which they found themselves. Each state might have 
a different set of fundamental privileges and immunities based, perhaps, 
on provisions in the state constitutions. However, Chief Justice Taney 
explicitly enumerated certain of the privileges and immunities free blacks 
would be entitled to enjoy were they citizens.279 This would seem to 
indicate that there was a uniform set of core fundamental privileges and 
immunities to which citizens were entitled in every state. 
Furthermore, Justice Curtis also discussed the privileges and immuni-
ties of what he called "general citizenship" under Article IV, Section 2. 
Curtis's statements indicate that there might have been a uniform set of 
privileges and immunities that he thought were guaranteed under the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause: . 
Nowhere else in the Constitution is there anything concerning a general 
citizenship; but here, privileges and immunities to be enjoyed throughout the 
United States, under and by force of the national compact, are granted and 
secured. In selecting those who are to enjoy these national rights of citizenship, 
how are they described? As citizens of each State. It is to them these national 
rights are secured. The qualification for them is not to be looked for in any 
provision of the Constitution or laws of the United States. They are to be 
citizens of the several States, and, as such, the privileges and immunities of 
278. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393,423 (1856). 
279. See supra notes 157-59 and accompanying text. 
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general citizenshi~, derived and guarantied [sic] by the Constitution, are to be 
enjoyed by them. 80 
Based on antebellum case law, the Privileges and Immunities Clause 
probably guaranteed substantive protection for certain "national" rights 
of citizenship, such as the privilege of suing in the courts of the United 
States. The qµestion is whether it also guaranteed substantive protection 
for privileges and immunities traditionally within the regulatory control 
of the state governments, such as the right to contract and the right to 
testify. The tentative answer to this question based on an examination 
of antebellum case law is that the Clause did provide a substantive 
guarantee of such rights. 
B. Commentators 
The view that the Privileges and Immunities Clause guaranteed 
substantive protection to a core set of fundamental rights was held by 
certain commentators prior to ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
For example, William Rawle, in The Constitution of the United States 
of America, stated that "[t]here [were] certain incidents to the character 
of a citizen of the United States, with which the separate states cannot 
interfere."281 Similarly, Chancellor Kent in his Commentaries, stated 
that in C01field v. Coryell it was declared that "the privileges and 
immunities conceded by the Constitution of the United States to citizens 
of the several States were to be confined to those which were, in their 
nature, fundamental, and belonged of right to the citizens of all free 
Governments."282 Therefore, nineteenth century commentators tended 
to follow the results reached by courts, indicating that the privileges and 
immunities of citizens were intended to be uniform among the states and 
to be afforded substantive protection under the Clause. In particular, 
Justice Washington's interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause as guaranteeing certain fundamental rights, which he attempted 
to enumerate, was often cited as authoritative. These rights were those 
common-law rights of citizens, many of which were traditionally under 
the regulatory control of the state governments such as the right to 
contract and to sue.283 
280. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 580. 
281. WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA 81 (1st ed. 1825). 
282. 2 KENT, supra note 70, at *71-72. 
283. See supra note 246 and accompanying text, quoting Justice Washington's 
enumeration of rights guaranteed under the Privileges and Immunities Clause; see also 
HOWELL, supra note 4, at 48 ("That the citizens of every State are entitled by virtue of 
the Comity Clause to institute and maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the 
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C. Congressional Republicans 
This view of the Clause as having substantive content was also held 
by many of the Republicans in Congress who were responsible for 
framing the Fourteenth Amendment.284 For example, James Wilson of 
Iowa, co-author of the Thirteenth Amendment, manager of the Civil 
Rights Bill in the House and Chairman of the Judiciary Committee of 
the House, stated that slavery "denies to the citizens of each State the 
privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States"285 and that 
[ f]reedom of religious opinion, freedom of speech and press, and the right of 
assemblage for the purpose of petition belong to every American citizen, high 
or low, rich or poor, wherever he may be within the jurisdiction of the United 
States. With these rights no State may interfere without breach of the bond 
which holds the Union together.286 
several States has been declared from the very beginning by the decisions discussing the 
general scope and operation of the clause."). 
284. This conclusion was reached by Michael Kent Curtis in his historical study of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. CURTIS, supra note 10, at 114 ("The debates show ... that 
Bingham and others who framed the Fourteenth Amendment relied on a reading of the 
privileges and immunities clause of article IV, section 2 by which it protected a body 
of national privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, including those in 
the Bill of Rights."). 
285. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1202 (1864). 
286. Id. Representative John A. Kasson stated: 
You cannot go into a State of the North in which you do not find refugees 
from southern States who have been driven from the States in the south where 
they had a right to live as citizens, because of the tyranny which this 
institution exercised over public feeling . . . and even over the laws of those 
States. 
CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 193 (1864). According to Kasson, slavery "denies 
the constitutional rights of our citizens in the South, suppresses freedom of speech and 
of the press, throws types into the rivers when they do not print its will, and violates 
more clauses of the Constitution than were violated even by the rebels when they com-
menced this war .... " Id. Senator John Sherman of Ohio stated: 
There never was any doubt about the construction of this clause [the privileges 
and immunities clause] of the Constitution-that is, that a man who was 
recognized as a citizen of one state had a right to go anywhere within the 
United States, at and exercise the immunities of a citizen of the United States. 
TENBROEK, supra note 11, at 185 n.14. Representative John Broomall of Pennsylvania 
stated that the rights guaranteed under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article 
IV included "[t]he right of speech, the right of transit, the right of domicil, the right to 
sue, the writ of habeas corpus, and the right of petition." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 
1st Sess. 1263 (1866). Representative Martin Thayer of Pennsylvania stated that the 
Civil Rights Bill was necessary to guarantee "these fundamental rights and immunities 
which are common to the humblest citizen of every free State . . . . " Id. at 1151. 
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Wilson reasoned that "[b ]efore our Constitution was formed, the great 
fundamental rights ... belonged to every person who became a member 
of our great national family. No one surrendered a jot or tittle of these 
rights by consenting to the formation of the Govemment."287 
Senator Lyman Trumbull of Illinois, the principal draftsman of the 
Thirteenth Amendment and Civil Rights Act and the Chairman of the 
Judiciary Committee of the Senate, stated that individuals going into 
other states were "entitled to the great fundamental rights of life, liberty 
and the pursuit of happiness, and the right to travel, to go where [they 
please]."288 After President Johnson's veto of the Civil Rights Bill, 
Trumbull stated: 
To be a citizen of the United States carries with it some rights .... They are 
those inherent, fundamental rights which belong to free citizens or free men in 
all countries, such as the rights enumerated in this bill, and they belong to them 
in all the States of the Union. The right of American citizenship means 
something. 289 
Similarly, Representative William Lawrence of Ohio stated that there 
were "some inherent and inalienable rights, pertaining to every citizen 
which cannot be abolished or abridged by state constitutions or laws." 
According to Lawrence: 
Every citizen . . . has the absolute right to live, the right to personal security, 
personal liberty, and the right to acquire and enjoy property. These are rights 
of citizenship. As necessary incidents of these absolute rights, there are others, 
as the right to make and enforce contracts, to purchase, hold, and enjoy 
property, and to share the benefit of laws for the security of person and 
property. 290 
Therefore, although members of Congress thought it necessary to clarify 
the effect of the Constitution in guaranteeing the privileges and 
immunities of citizenship by passing the Fourteenth Amendment,' it 
seems they may have thought the correct interpretation of the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 encompassed substantive 
protection for the privileges and immunities of citizens. 
D. Resolution 
The difference between these competing views of the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause might practically be minimal. All of the state 
287. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1115-19 (1866). 
288. Id. at 475. 
289. Id. at 1757. Trumbull referred to these rights of citizenship as "natural rights." 
Id. 
290. Id. at 1833. 
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governments guaranteed the fundamental rights of property and person 
in their state constitutions.291 Furthermore, these privileges and 
immunities were embodied in the English common law and adopted by 
the colonists in America. The Framers of the Constitution and the 
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment thought that these rights flowed 
from the principles of natural law and that therefore they would be 
embodied in the fundamental law of all "free governments." All free 
governments would respect these rights of citizens. Furthermore, these 
fundamental rights, embodied in the positive law of the states as well as 
documents such as the Declaration of Rights of 177 4, which had been 
consented to by all of the people, may have received substantive 
protection through the guarantee of a "Republican Form of Government" 
in Article rv, Section 4.292 The Privileges and Immunities Clause may 
have been designed to forbid discrimination in whatever rights were 
granted, and the rights that happened to be granted were practically 
identical in the several states because of the common heritage of the 
states. 
The most accurate interpretation of the Clause encompasses both of 
these views to a certain extent. Citizens of the United States were 
guaranteed certain fundamental rights corresponding to the natural law 
rights of person and property that were recognized as belonging of right 
to citizens in all free governments. Although elsewhere I have tried to 
construct a model to accurately characterize tht:, nature of these powers 
or capacities,293 the "privileges" and "immunities" of citizens, the 
courts·ofthe day declined this task and stated that they would determine 
whether a given right was a privilege or immunity of citizenship on a 
291. One contemporary commentator argued that because of this fact, Section 1 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment did not present any great innovation: 
All else in this section [Section 1] has already been guaranteed in the second 
and fourth section of the fourth article; and in the thirteen amendments. The 
new feature declared is that the general principles which had been construed 
to apply only to the national government, are thus imposed upon the States. 
Most of the States, in general terms, had adopted the same bill of rights in 
their own state constitutions. 
GEORGE w. PASCHAL, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 290 (1876). See also 
JOBN N. POMEROY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES 151 (1868) (noting that the Amendment would not "interfere with any of the 
rights, privileges, and functions which properly belong to the individual states"). · 
292. See Smith, supra note 12 ( discussing the role the Guarantee Clause may have 
played in protecting a uniform set of substantive rights throughout the several states). 
293. Id. 
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case by case basis.294 By looking to that body of law that all nations 
that could be called "free" had adopted as their own municipal law, 
judges could endeavor to determine what were the privileges and 
immunities of citizenship that were founded upon principles of natural 
law. By relying on the wisdom of the nations of the world as well as 
past generations, judges could discover moral principles founded in 
reason and determine what rights were to be classified as privileges and 
immunities of citizenship. 
The privileges and immunities of citizenship were the fundamental 
rights of citizenship that flowed from the social compact existing anterior 
to the establishment of the government, and, therefore, no government 
possessed the power to abridge these rights. They were founded upon 
principles of natural law, but were expressed in the positive law of 
custom, the common law inherited from England and expressly adopted 
under state constitutions and the Declaration of Rights of 1774, the 
organic law of the United States, and most importantly, the state 
constitutions. As Justice Field stated in his Slaughter-House dissent, the 
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States 
do not derive their existence from its [a State's] legislation, and cannot be 
destroyed by its power. The [fourteenth] amendment does not attempt to confer 
any new privileges or immunities upon citizens, or to enumerate or define those 
already existing. It assumes that there are such privileges and immunities 
which belong of right to citizens as such, and o~dains that they shall not be 
abridged bY: State legislation. 295 . · 
Thus, it is likely that the rights guaranteed under the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause were intended to be accorded substantive protection. 
The terms "privileges" and "immunities" were terms of art encompassing 
certain powers or capacities that were founded upon the social compact 
theories of the natural law theorists.296 
Although the antidiscrimination aspect of the Privileges and Immuni-
ties Clause is commonly accepted,297 and, although the guarantee under 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause may not have extended to the 
294. See, e.g., Conner v. Elliott, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 591, 593 (1856). 
295. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 95-96 (1873). Justice Field 
also stated that the Fourteenth Amendment "was intended to give practical effect to the 
declaration of 1776 of inalienable rights, rights which are the gift of the Creator, which 
the law does not confer, but only recognizes." Id. at 105. 
296. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
297. This reading of the Privileges and Immunities Clause was prevalent by the 
beginning of the twentieth century. See HOWELL, supra note 4, at 105 ("[T]here exists 
only one privilege or immunity of which it can be said that it may be demanded as of 
right by the citizens of every State in the Union. That one is equality of treatment, 
freedom from discriminating legislation."); but see id. (stating that this interpretation of 
the Clause was "far from being clearly recognized or stated by the courts"). 
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rights of a citizen against his own government, the weight of the 
evidence indicates that the privileges and immunities to be guaranteed 
were substantive rights out of reach of the state governments as well as 
the federal government. The only way in which these rights could be 
altered was through the consent of the people. However, this consent 
would not be forthcoming as long as the people acted rationally because 
these rights were founded upon principles of natural reason-no one 
would enter into the social compact without some assurance that these 
rights would be guaranteed. Under the original Constitution and Article 
IV as well as under the Fourteenth Amendment, states retained their 
sovereignty and, therefore, their power to regulate the rights of person 
and property of individuals within their jurisdiction. Thus, they could 
govern the exercise of the privileges and immunities of citizenship as 
long as they did not impair the value of these privileges and immunities 
to the citizens, unless they did so pursuant to their regulatory power, 
exercised for the common good. Consequently, through differences in 
regulation, there might be differences from state to state in the mode or 
manner by which citizens exercised their privileges and immunities, but 
in all states citizens would have a constitutional guarantee of certain 
fundamental privileges and immunities. The state governments could not 
abridge these rights through improper regulations. 
The view presented in this Article is that both the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of Article Iv, Section 2 and the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment were 
designed to afford substantive protection to a well-defined closed set of 
capacities of citizens and that antidiscrimination protection was merely 
derivative in nature. Each citizen is entitled to the privileges and 
immunities of citizenship; therefore, no inequality may result. Just as all 
persons are entitled to freedom of speech under the First Amendment 
and there can be no inequalities in free speech rights because each 
individual shares in. the same substantive guarantee, so individuals 
guaranteed substantive protection of privileges and immunities also 
receive antidiscrimination protection. One of the privileges and 
immunities of citizenship was the immunity from unequal regulation of 
the fundamental privileges and immunities of citizens unless such 
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regulations were passed pursuant to the common good.298 Not only 
was each individual entitled to bring suits, for example, but each 
individual must be subject to the same statute of limitations unless the 
public good necessitated otherwise. As we have seen, there may have 
been a mandate of "limited absolute equality"299 with respect to a 
citizen's entitlement to the fundamental privileges and immunities of 
citizenship, but inequalities in regulation were permissible as long as 
these inequalities constituted a legitimate exercise of the state 
government's police power. With respect to special privileges and 
immunities, there was no substantive or antidiscrimination guarantee, 
since these were not privileges and immunities of citizens guaranteed 
under Article IV, Section 2. 
V. THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE AND THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
An analysis of the Privileges and Immunities Clause leads to an 
explanation of the distinction made between civil and political rights by 
congressional Republicans debating Section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, as well as the belief on the part of congressional Republi-
cans that the states would remain free to regulate the privileges and 
immunities of citizens guaranteed under the Amendment. The fact that 
special privileges---local or municipal regulations---were not guaranteed 
under the Privileges and Immunities Clause in foreign states explains 
many of the beliefs on the part of Republicans concerning the meaning 
of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of Section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 30° First, it was understood that political rights would not 
298. This was the interpretation of the Clause given by Justice Bradley in his dissent 
in the Slaughter-House Cases. Bradley argued that equality was "one of the privileges 
and immunities of every citizen" under Article IV of the Constitution. The Slaughter-
House Cases, 83 U.S. at 118 (Bradley, J., dissenting). 
299. Earl Maltz has been the foremost proponent of this theory. See, e.g., EARL M. 
MALTZ, CML RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION AND CONGRESS, 1863-1869, at 68 (1990); 
Maltz, supra note 11. · . 
300. The notion that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Section 1 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment only guaranteed certain "fundamental" privileges and immunities 
of citizenship is not a new idea and is widely supported by statements made by members 
of Congress during the debates over the Amendment. For example, during the debates 
over the Civil Rights Act Senator Trumbull stated: 
To be a citizen of the United States carries with it some rights; and what are 
they? They are those inherent, fundamental rights which belong to free 
citizens or free men in all countries, s,.ich as the rights enumerated in this bill, 
and they belong to them in all the States of the Union. 
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1757 (1866). However, this Article has attempted 
to offer an explanation of what the term "fundamental" meant in the context of the 
jurisprudence of Article IV, Section 2. By developing a definition of this term and 
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be guaranteed µnder the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.301 These were rights of participation in the 
government such as voting and serving on juries. Such rights could not 
be fundamental privileges and immunities of citizens because they could 
exist only after establishment of the government.302 The same is true 
in general of all such special privileges. Second, it was thought that the 
states remained free to regulate the fundamental privileges and immuni-
ties of citizens even after the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, for 
example, by passing laws regulating criminal and civil conduct, without 
investing in Congress the power to prescribe uniform criminal or civil 
codes for all of the states.303 The sovereignty of the states was to 
distinguishing fundamental from special privileges and immunities, one may determine 
what exactly the Privileges or Immunities Clause was designed to protect instead of 
merely looking for particular exemplars of what were deemed "fundamental" privileges 
and immunities of citizenship at the time of ratification of the Amendment. 
301. See Timothy S. Bishop, Comment, The Privileges or Immunities Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment: The Original Intent, 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 142, 145 (1984); see 
also CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866) (According to Michigan Senator 
Jacob Howard, "[t]he right of suffrage is not, in law, one of the privileges or immunities 
... secured by the Constitution."). 
302. Several members of Congress equated fundamental privileges and immunities 
protected under Article IV, Section 2 with the rights of citizenship. For example, 
Representative Martin Thayer of Pennsylvania, in discussing the Civil Rights Bill, stated: 
"The sole purpose of the bill is to secure to [blacks] the fundamental rights of 
citizenship; those rights which constitute the essence of freedom, and which are common 
to the citizens of all civilized States; those rights which secure life, liberty, and property, 
and which make all men equal before the law .... " CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 1152 (1866). Similarly, Lyman Trumbull stated with respect to the Bill that it 
[provides that blacks are to be considered citizens and that] they will be 
entitled to the rights of citizens. And what are they? The great fundamental 
rights set forth in this bill: the right to acquire property, the right to go and 
come at pleasure, the right to enforce rights in the courts, to make contracts, 
and to inherit and dispose of property. These are the very rights that are set 
forth in this bill as appertaining to every freeman. 
Id. at 475. 
303. For example, Senator Bingham objected to the original version of the Civil 
Rights Bill because of its guarantee of equal "civil rights," protesting that "'[C]ivil 
[R]ights' ... embrace every right that pertains to the citizen ... [it would] strike down 
... every State constitution which makes a discrimination on account of race or color 
in any of the civil rights of the citizen .... " THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' 
DEBATES, supra note 2, at 186 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1291 
(1866)). The distinction between the phrases "civil rights" and "privileges and 
immunities" is therefore evident. As Raoul Berger has noted, these phrases were not 
synonymous or used interchangeably. Raoul Berger, Incorporation of the Bill of Rights: 
Akhil Amar's Wishing Well, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 27 (1993). An explanation for the 
distinction may be found in the theory presented in this Article. The phrase "civil 
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remain intact under the Amendment. 304 This belief can be explained 
by noting that the fundamental privileges and immunities of citizens 
differ from special privileges or municipal regulations. The latter were 
not guaranteed under either the Privileges and Immunities Clause of 
Article IV, Section 2 or under the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Finally, antidiscrimination protection under the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment may have 
been at the level of regulation of the privileges and immunities of 
citizens. The Clause may have guaranteed substantive as well as 
antidiscrimination protection in terms of the fundamental privileges and 
immunities that citizens were entitled to enjoy in all of the states, as well 
as the privilege or immunity of being subject only to equal regulation of 
these fundamental privileges and immunities of citizens. Thus, one of 
the privileges and immunities of citizens was enjoyment of equal civil 
rights" could be construed as referring to the positive regulations or modes in which the 
privileges and immunities of citizenship were exercised. Mandating an equality of civil 
rights would indeed reform the civil and criminal codes of the states and call for a 
uniformity in legislation among the states. However, the phrase "privileges and 
immunities" could be construed as referring only to those capacities of citizenship 
existing anterior to the establishment of the government that are regulated through 
municipal regulations passed by legislatures. Thus, the theory presented in this Article 
accounts for the distinction in terminology made by members of Congress. 
304. Several statements by members of Congress indicate their concern that the 
sovereignty of the state governments not be impaired by the new Amendment. For 
example, Roscoe Conkling, a member of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, stated 
"the proposition to prohibit States from denying civil or political rights to any class of 
persons, encounters a great objection on the threshold. It trenches upon the principle of 
existing local sovereignty." THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES, supra note 
2, at 111 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 358 (1866)). Similarly, 
Columbus Delano stated, "there are certain rights of citizenship that are exclusively 
within the control of the States .... " Id. at 178 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 
1st Sess. 157 (1866)). Senator Trumbull remarked that the Civil Rights Bill "in no 
manner interferes with the municipal regulations of any State which protects all alike in 
their rights of person and property. It could have no operation in Massachusetts, New 
York, Illinois, or most of the States of the Union." Id. at 200 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1761 (1866)). Finally, Robert Hale declared that "all powers 
having reference to the relation of the individual to the municipal government, the 
powers of local jurisdiction and legislation, are in general reserved to the states . . . . " 
Id. at 153 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1063 (1866)). See also FLACK, 
supra note 10, at 68 ( concluding that, "Radical leaders were as aware as any one of the 
attachment of the great majority of the people to the doctrine of States Rights ... the 
right of the states to regulate their own internal affairs .... "); Alfred H. Kelly, 
Comments on Harold M Hyman's Paper, in NEW FRONTIERS OF AMERICAN RECON-
STRUCTION 55 (Harold Hyman ed., 1966) (concluding that the "commitment to 
traditional state-federal relations meant that the radical Negro reform program could be 
only a very limited one"). Later, Justice Bradley, one of the Slaughter-House dissenters, 
emphasized in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883), that Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment "does not authorize Congress to create a code of municipal law 
for the regulation of private rights." 
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rights. This interpretation of Section 1 as protecting only fundamental 
privileges and immunities of citizens is not only consistent with the 
original meaning of Section 1, but also was the interpretation adopted by 
the Supreme Court dissenters in the Slaughter-House Cases,305 who 
were defeated by a narrow margin. 
A. The Distinction Between Civil and Political Rights 
It is well established that Republicans intended to guarantee basic civic 
rights, but not political rights, under Section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.306 The text itself guarantees privileges and immunities 
305. The Slaughter-House dissenters referred to the Lockean triumvirate of life, 
liberty, and property as embodied in the Declaration of Independence as referring to the 
fundamental rights of citizens "of every free government." For example, Justice Bradley 
stated in his dissent in referring to the Declaration: 
Here again we have the great threefold division of the rights of freemen, 
asserted as the rights of man. Rights to life, liberty ... and property. These 
are the fundamental rights which can only be taken away by due process of 
law, and which can only be ... modified, by lawful regulations necessary or 
proper for the mutual good of all; and these rights, I contend, belong to the 
citizens of every free government. 
The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 116 (1872). Thus, Justice Bradley 
reiterated Justice Washington's belief that the fundamental privileges and immunities of 
citizens were those to which citizens of all free governments were entitled and that these 
were the privileges and immunities referred to in Section I of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Justice Field made similar remarks. According to Justice Field, "[t]he 
privileges and immunities designated [in Section I of the Fourteenth Amendment] are 
those which of right belong to the citizens of al/free governments." Id. at 97. Thus, the 
"privileges or immunities of citizens" referred to in Section I of the Fourteenth 
Amendment as well as those derived from Article IV, Section 2 were those privileges 
and immunities that were fundamental---that existed anterior to the formation of 
government, whether belonging equally to all men or flowing from the social compact 
among the members of society, its citizens. 
This was the conclusion of the first court to hear a case arising under the Privileges 
or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In United States v. Hall, the 
federal court queried, "[ w ]hat are the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United 
States here referred to? They are undoubtedly those which may be denominated 
fundamental; which belong of right to the citizens . . . of the several states which 
compose this union from the time of their becoming free, independent and sovereign." 
26 F. Cas. 79, 81 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1871) (No. 15,282). 
306. See CURTIS, supra note 10, at 29. The distinction between political and civil 
rights was well established in nineteenth century legal thought. For example, Chief 
Justice Taney made such a distinction in his opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford, where 
he stated that "[u]ndoubtedly, a person may be a citizen, that is, a member of the 
community who form the sovereignty, although he exercises no share of the political 
power, and is incapacitated from holding particular offices." 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 
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of citizens and not political rights, such as the right to vote or hold 
office.307 Many Republicans had stated during the debates over the 
proposed Civil Rights Bill, a precursor of Section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, that political rights would not be guaranteed under the 
Bill.308 After reading the passage from Car.field v. Coryell, which 
422 (1856). Justice Curtis made the same distinction in his dissent. Id. at 581. 
However, complicating the analysis concerning rights addressed under Section 1 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment was the fact that the phrase "political rights" was sometimes 
used as a synonym for "civil rights." The original version of Section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment secured "to all citizens ... the same political rights and privileges." See 
WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO 
JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 51-52 (1988) (suggesting that the "political rights" language was 
dropped because it might be construed as guaranteeing to free blacks political rights such 
as the right to vote and hold office, the right to serve on juries, and the right to serve 
in the militia); Earl M. Maltz, The Fourteenth Amendment as Political Compro-
mise-Section One in the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 933, 965 
(1984). 
307. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 1. In United States v. Hall, the court stressed this 
point: 
What are the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States here 
referred to? They are undoubtedly those which may be denominated 
fundamental; which belong of right to the citizens of all free states, and which 
have at all times been enjoyed by the citizens of the several States which 
compose this Union from the time of their becoming free, independent, and 
sovereign. 
26 F. Cas. at 81. 
308. For example, Representative Martin Thayer of Pennsylvania stated that "no 
lawyer who is acquainted with the use of terms and the rules which regulate the 
construction of laws" could interpret the Bill to extend the suffrage laws. CONG. GLOBE, 
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1151 (1866). Representative Thayer analyzed the language of the 
Bill: 
In the first place, the words themselves are "civil rights and immunities," not 
political privileges; and nobody can successfully contend that a bill guaranty-
ing [sic] simply civil rights and immunities is a bill under which you could 
extend the right of suffrage, which is a political privilege and not a civil right. 
Then, again, the matter is put beyond all doubt by the subsequent particular 
definition of the general language which has been just used; and when those 
civil rights which are first referred to in general terms in the bill are 
subsequently enumerated, that enumeration precludes any possibility that the 
general words which have been used can be extended beyond the particulars 
which have been enumerated. 
Id. Similarly, Representative James Wilson cited the definition of civil rights in 
Bouvier's Law Dictionary as "those [rights] which have no relation to the establishment, 
support or management of government." Id. at 1117. See also id. at 1117, 1367 
(Wilson), 1263 (Broomall), 1757 (Trumbull). However, there was some confusion in 
terminology. Some members of Congress thought that the phrase "civil rights" might 
encompass political rights as well. For example, Willard Saulsbury of Delaware was 
disturbed that the phrase "civil rights and immunities" in the Bill was a "generic term 
which in its most comprehensive signification includes every species of right that man 
can enjoy other than" natural rights and that "the right of voting ... [i]s ... a civil right 
.... " Id. at 477. See also id. at 1157 (Rep. Thornton); id. at 1291 (Rep. Bingham); 
id. at 476 (exchange between Sen. Trumbull and Sen. McDougall). 
906 
[VOL. 34: 809, 1997] Privileges and Immunities Clause 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
enumerated the fundamental privileges and immunities of citizens under 
Article IV, Section 2, Senator Trumbull stated that the Civil Rights Bill 
did not provide for the elective franchise.309 As Congressman Russell 
Thayer noted, the words in the Civil Rights Bill were "'civil rights and 
immunities', not political privileges."310 The fact that the Fifteenth 
Amendment was ratified to extend the vote to free black citizens is 
confirmation of this interpretation.311 
Furthermore, during the debates over the proposed Fourteenth 
Amendment, several members of Congress indicated that it was not their 
intention to confer political rights under Section 1. For example, many 
Republicans noted that the Fourteenth Amendment did not confer the 
right to vote upon free blacks.312 Representative Wilson stated that 
309. THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES, supra note 2, at 122. Several 
members of Congress lamented the fact that the Fourteenth Amendment and Civil Rights 
Act did not confer the elective franchise. For example, Senator Samuel Pomeroy stated 
that without suffrage, free blacks would have "no security," CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 
1st Sess. 1182 ( 1866), and Senator Sumner stated that if the Amendment "is inadequate 
to protect persons in . . . the right to vote, it is inadequate to protect them in anything." 
CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1008 (1869). 
310. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1151 (1866). 
311. During the debate over the Fifteenth Amendment, it was noted that the 
Fourteenth Amendment did not confer the right to vote. Senator Aaron H. Cragin 
recounted: 
I remember the struggle that we had here in the passage of the fourteenth 
amendment; . . . I remember that it was announced upon this floor by more 
than one gentleman, that that amendment did not confer the right of voting 
upon anybody . . . . There is no doubt upon the question. It was the 
understanding of Congress and of the people of this country that that 
amendment did not confer and did not seek to confer any right to vote upon 
any citizen of the United States .... [T]hat it conferred the right to vote was 
distinctly disclaimed on this floor in the caucus which has been alluded to here 
to-night; and, for one, I am not willing to have it go out from this Senate that 
we passed that amendment understanding that it conferred any right to vote. 
CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1003-04 (1869). 
312. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2539-40 (1866) (Farnsworth); id. at 2462 
(Garfield); id. at 405 (Rep. Shellabarger); id. at 406-07 (Rep. Eliot). As Senator 
Trumbull stated, "the granting of civil rights does not . . . carry with it . . . political 
privileges. A man may be a citizen in this country without a right to vote . . . . The 
right to vote ... depends upon the legislation of the various States .... " THE 
RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES, supra note 2, at 197. Senator Howard 
stated: 
[T]he first section of the proposed amendment does not give to either of these 
classes the right of voting. The right of suffrage is not, in law, one of the 
privileges and immunities thus secured by the Constitution. It is merely the 
creature of law. It has always been regarded in this country as the result of 
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suffrage was "a political right which has been left under the control of 
the several States, subject to the action of Congress only when it 
becomes necessary to enforce the guarantee of a republican form of 
government."313 Senator Bingham, upon introducing the Fourteenth 
Amendment on the floor of the House, stated that "the exercise of the 
elective franchise, though it be one of the privileges of a citizen of the 
Republic, is exclusively under the control of the states."314 Bingham 
also stated that "[i]t is a guarantied [sic] right of every State in this 
Union to regulate for itself the elective franchise within its limits, subject 
to no condition whatever except that it shall not . . . transform the State 
government from one republican in form .... "315 Finally, Senator 
Howard stated that Section 1 of the Amendment did "not give to either 
of these classes [whites or blacks] the right of voting."316 
Members of Congress noted that it was well established under the case 
law of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 that 
the phrase "Privileges ~nd Immunities of Citizens" did not refer to 
political rights, but rather merely extended civil rights to foreign citizens. 
For example, William Lawrence stated during the debates that the 
privileges referred to under Article IV were "such as are fundamental 
civil rights, not political rights, nor those dependent on local law . . . 
positive local law, not regarded as one of those fundamental rights lying at the 
basis of all society and without which a people cannot exist except as slaves, 
subject to a despotism. 
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866). See also Maltz, supra note 306, at 
942. . 
313. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1117 (1866). 
314. Id. at 2542. This was not the only time that Senator Bingham made a 
distinction between political and civil rights. In the debate over admission of Oregon 
as a state, Bingham distinguished political rights, which he indicated were conventional, 
from natural or inherent rights. According to Bingham, the "distinctive" political rights 
of citizens of the United States included: 
The great right to choose (under the laws of the States) severally, as I 
remarked before, either directly by ballot or indirectly through their duly-
constituted agents, all the officers of the Federal Government, legislative, 
executive, and judicial, and through these to make all constitutional laws for 
their own government, and to interpret and enforce them; the right, also, to 
hold and exercise, upon election thereto, the several offices of honor, of 
power, and of trust, under the Constitution and Government of the United 
States. 
CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 983 (1859).· Bingham continued, stating that "[t]his 
Government rests upon the absolute equality of natural rights amongst men. There is 
not, and cannot be, any equality in the enjoyment of political or conventional rights, 
because that is impossible." Id. at 985. Bingham also stated that "[p]olitical rights are 
conventional, not natural; limited, not universal; and are, in fact, exercised only by the 
majority of qualified electors of any State and by the minority only nominally." Id. 
315. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 450 (1867). 
316. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866). 
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317 Lawrence's classification of political rights with rights "depen-
dent upon local law" is instructive. Political rights, like municipal 
regulations, may exist only after the establishment of government. One 
can only participate in government by voting or holding office after a 
government is formed. Fundamental civil rights, privileges and 
immunities of citizenship, on the other .hand, were thought to exist 
anterior to the establishment of government, being comprised of inherent 
and inalienable rights of persons as well as those rights :flowing from the 
social compact among the members of society, its citizens.318 There-
fore, political rights are wholly analogous to municipal regulations 
governing the exercise of the fundamental privileges and immunities of 
the citizenry. Neither were afforded protection under Article IV, Section 
2, and neither were intended to be afforded protection under Section 1 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, the distinctions between funda-
mental and special privileges and, concomitantly, between political and 
civil rights, under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, 
Section 2, were carried over to the Privileges or Immunities Clause of 
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
In summary, there are two important aspects of the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 reflected in statements made 
by members of Congress. The first is that the private. proprietary. rights 
of citizens in their person and property must be respected when those 
citizens venture into the jurisdiction of another state. In this way, the 
fundamental rights of citizens to be secure in their person and property 
are ensured. The second aspect of the Clau~e is that the citizens of one 
state are entitled to the privileges and immunities of citizens residing in 
the jurisdiction in which they find themselves. The rights of person and 
property are qualified, as always, by the government's power, which it 
has received from the consent of the citizens, to pass regulatory laws for 
the public good. These regulations, however, must be designed to secure 
the public welfare. 
317. Id. at 1836. 
318. See Smith, supra note 12 (discussing application of social compact theory in 
interpreting Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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B. Regulation of the Privileges and Immunities of Citizens 
The notion that the states retained the power to regulate the privileges 
and immunities of citizens--those privileges and immunities that were 
in their nature fundamental-was expressed time and again during 
debates over the Fourteenth Amendment.319 Republicans were con-
cerned that the states retain their power of regulation and that the 
Fourteenth Amendment not mandate a uniform civil or criminal code for 
the states.320 As Senator Bingham, the principal draftsman of Section 
319. Several commentators have noted the importance of maintenance of the federal 
system and state sovereignty in the eyes of the 39th Congress, which passed the 
Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., BERGER, supra note 17, at 50. For example, Raoul 
Berger quotes Horace Flack's The Adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment to support his 
interpretation of the Amendment under which the states would retain significant power 
to regulate the fundamental rights of citizens: "The 'radical leaders,' Horace Flack wrote, 
'were as aware as any one of the attachment of a great majority of the people to the 
doctrine of States Rights . . . the right of the States to regulate their own internal 
affairs."' Id. (quoting FLACK, supra note 10, at 68). In Berger's opinion, "[o]ne of 
[Michael Kent] Curtis' major flaws is his refusal to face up to Bingham's repeated 
recognition that control. of internal matters was left to the States." Id. at 131. See also 
Maltz, supra note 11, at 230 (stating that "[t]he concept of federalism played a critical 
role in limiting Republican efforts on behalf of the freedmen"). 
320. See CURTIS, supra note 10, at 68-69. Curtis notes in particular the objections 
of Congressman Robert S. Hale of New York, id. at 69 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 38th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 2979 (1864)), and Congressman Giles W. Hotchkiss, id. at 71 (citing 
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1095 (1866)). Senator Garrett Davis of Kentucky 
contended that the Civil Rights Act might "authorize Congress to pass a civil and 
criminal code for every State in the Union." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1414 
(1866). Willard Saulsbury argued that the act placed limitations on the "police power" 
of the states. Id. at 478. Andrew J. Rogers indicated that Section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment would "interfere with the internal police and regulations of the States . . . 
. " Id. at app. 134. Senator Edgar Cowan, playing devil's advocate, had argued that the 
mandate for equality in regulation under the Civil Rights Act would confer 
upon married women, upon minors, upon idiots, upon lunatics, and upon 
everybody native born in all the States, the right to make and enforce 
contracts, because there is no qualification in the bill, and the very object of 
the bill is to override the qualifications that are upon those rights in the States 
Id. at 1782. Congressman Wilson stated during the debate over the Civil Rights Bill that 
"[w]e are not making a general criminal code for the States." Id. at 1120. Wilson also 
stated that "the rights" of individuals "possesse[ d] as a citizen of the United States" 
could "only be secured to him by laws which operate within the State in which he 
resides." Id. at 2513. Thomas Davies of New York, in debates over the Civil Rights 
Act, stated "[t]his government is one of delegated powers, and ... every law ... is 
circumscribed by the limitation of the Constitution. The States have reserved all 
sovereignty and power which has not been expressly or impliedly granted to the Federal 
Government." Id. at 1265-66. Representative Samuel Shellabarger stated that the Civil 
Rights Bill's "whole effect is not to confer or regulate rights, but to require that 
whatever of these enumerated rights and obligations are imposed by State laws shall be 
for and upon all citizens alike without distinction based on race or former condition of 
910 
[VOL. 34: 809, 1997] Privileges and Immunities Clause 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, stated, "[t]he Constitution does not 
delegate to the United States the power to punish offenses against the 
life, liberty, or property of the citizen in the States . . . but leaves it as 
the reserved power of the States, to be by them exercised."321 
Bingham also stated: 
[T]he care of the property, the liberty, and the life of the citizen, under the 
solemn sanction of an oath imposed by your Federal Constitution, is in the 
States, and not in the Federal Government. I have sought to effect no change 
in that respect in the Constitution of the country. I have advocated here an 
amendment which would arm Congress with the power to compel obedience to 
the oath, and punish all violations by State officers of the bill of rights, but 
leaving those officers to discharge the duties enjoined upon them as citizens of 
the United States ... by [the] Constitution.322 
slavery." Id. at 1293. Finally, Columbus Delano, a Republican Representative from 
Ohio, worried that under the Civil Rights Bill, "Congress has authority to go into the 
States and manage and legislate with regard to all the personal rights of the citi-
zen-rights of life, liberty, and property. You render this Government no longer a 
Government of limited powers .... " Id. at app. 158. See also HAROLD M. HYMAN, 
A MORE PERFECT UNION: THE IMPACT OF THE CML WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION ON 
THE CONSTITUTION 438-40 (1973); NELSON, supra note 306, at 114-15; Maltz, supra 
note 306, at 936 (stating that "the concept of federalism was one overarching concern"); 
Maltz, supra note 11, at 230-36. 
321. THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES, supra note 2, at 186. 
Bingham also stated that "the citizens must rely upon the State for their protection. I 
admit that such is the rule ... as it now stands." Id. at 159. Bingham cited The 
Federalist No. 45 (James Madison): "The powers reserved to the Federal States will 
extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, 
liberties, and properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and 
prosperity of the State." Id. at 159. Furthermore, Bingham seemed to distinguish 
between fundamental rights and their instantiation in municipal law. Bingham stated that 
"[t]he rights of life and liberty are theirs whatever States may enact," but also stated: 
[W]ho ever heard it intimated that any-body could have property protected in 
any State until he owned or acquired property there according to its local law 
. . . . I undertake to say no one. 
As to real estate, every one knows that its acquisition and transmission under 
every interpretation ever given to the word property, as used in the Constitu-
tion of the country, are dependent exclusively upon the local law of the States 
. . . . But suppose any person has acquired property not contrary to the laws 
of the State, but in accordance with its law, are they not to be equally 
protected in the enjoyment of it, or are they to be denied all protection? 
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1089 (1866). Democratic Congressman Andrew 
J. Rogers of New Jersey made a similar distinction between natural rights, a "right which 
God gives us," and civil rights, which are "derived from the Government and municipal 
law, as laid down in the organism of a State, and to extend to such persons as it may see 
fit." Id. at 1122. 
322. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1292 (1866). 
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Bingham did not believe that the Fourteenth Amendment in any way 
infringed upon the powers of the states because it merely forbid that 
which the states did not possess the power to do-abridge the privileges 
and immunities of the citizen.323 
Senator Bingham was not alone in his understanding of Section 1 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment as prohibiting the states from abridging the 
privileges and immunities of citizens, while leaving the states free to 
regulate these fundamental capacities of citizenship in different manners. 
For example, Representative Shellabarger also indicated that the state 
governments could exercise the right to regulate the fundamental 
privileges and immunities of citizens without abridging them. 
Shellabarger stated: 
Now, the inquiry I wish to make is this: suppose that at the time of taking a 
statutory apprentice, or at the time of the birth of a child, the age of majority 
for the child and the expiration of the apprenticeship is fixed by the law of this 
District, or of any of the States, at the age of twenty-one years; and suppose the 
State, or the Legislature of the District, in the exercise of municipal legislation, 
should change the law so as to terminate the minority and the apprenticeship 
at eighteen instead of at twenty-one years, and thus should take from the parent 
and from the master three years of service, would that be a depriving the citizen 
323. As Bingham stated during the debates: 
I repel the suggestion made here in the heat of debate, that the committee or 
any of its members who favor this proposition seek in any form to ... take 
away from any State any right that belongs to it. . . . The proposition pending 
before the House is simply a proposition to arm Congress . . . with the power 
to enforce the bill of rights as it stands in the Constitution today. It "hath that 
extent--no more." 
Gentlemen admit the force of the provisions in the bill of rights, that the 
citizens of the United States shall be entitled to all the privileges and 
immunities of citizens of the United States in the several States, and that no 
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of 
law; but they say, "We are opposed to its enforcement by act of Congress 
under an amended Constitution, as proposed." That is the sum and substance 
of all the argument that we have heard on this subject. Why are gentlemen 
opposed to the enforcement of the bill of rights, as proposed? Because they 
aver it would interfere with the reserved rights of the States! Who ever before 
heard that any State had reserved to itself the right, under the Constitution of 
the United States, to withhold from any citizen of the United States within its 
limits, under any pretext whatever, any of the privileges of a citizen of the 
United States, or to impose upon him, no matter from what State he may have 
come, any burden contrary to that provision of the Constitution which declares 
that the citizen shall be entitled in the several States to all the immunities of 
a citizen of the United States? 
Id. at 1088-89; see also id. at 1090 (statement of John Bingham) (noting that "the 
adoption of the proposed amendment will take from the States no rights that belong to 
the States"); id. at 2542 (statement of John Bingham) (concluding that "this amendment 
takes from no State any right that ever pertained to it"); Fairman, supra note 7, at 33; 
Gingras, supra note 15, at 44-45 (discussing Bingham's views). 
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of property without due process of law within the meaning·ofMagna Charta or 
of the Constitution of the United States? Is not the property in these personal 
relations within the full control of the municipal legislation of every supreme 
legislature?324 
Similarly, Senator Richard Yates of Illinois distinguished between 
regulating the rights of citizens and destroying them. According to 
Yates: 
To define the length of residence necessary to enable a man to vote, to say 
what his age shall be, is one thing; and to say that he shall not vote at all 
because he is black or white, is an entirely different thing. In the latter case, 
color is made the disqualification, just as race would be if Germans were 
excluded from the ballot-box. The State may preserve a right; it may fix the 
qualifications; it may impose certain restrictions so as to have that right 
preserved in the best form to the people; but it is not legitimately in the power 
of the State, ... it is not in any earthly power to destroy a man's equal rights 
to his property, to his franchise, to his suffrage, or to the right to aspire to 
office---I mean according to the true theory of republican government. That is 
the one thing, that in this country, the Government cannot do. 325 
Although in this passage Yates discussed political rights such as the right 
to vote and to hold office, which were not considered to be privileges 
and immunities of citizenship, his distinction between the destruction of 
a right and its regulation is instructive. 
Finally, Senator George F. Edmunds also distinguished between the 
regulation of a right and its destruction or abridgment. Edmunds 
commented: 
Every lawyer, knows ... that it is one thing to have a right which is absolute 
and inalienable, and it is another thing for the body of the community to 
regulate . . . the exercise of that right. 
. . . I may be daily deprived of my liberty under the regulations of the State, 
which apply to us all alike. If I am deprived of it, rightfully or wrongfully, I 
324. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 1636 (1862). 
325. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. app. 350 (1868). In his annual message 
to the Illinois legislature in January, 1865, Richard Yates, acting as Governor of Illinois, 
also stated: 
I am for unlimited state sovereignty in the true sense, in the sense that the 
State is to control all its municipal and local legislation and I would be the 
first to resist all attempts upon the part of the Federal Government to interpose 
tyrannical usurpation of power in controlling the legislation. The States are 
sovereign in every sense in which it is desirable they should have sovereignty 
Maltz, supra note 11, at 233-34 (quoting 1 REPORTS TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF 
ILLINOIS, 24th Sess. 28 (1865)). 
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can only get restored to it by the process of the law under the regulations that 
legislation shall provide. My friend admits that one of the privileges of a 
citizen of the United States is to hold property. Where is he to hold it? He 
must hold it in some State or Territory, must he not? Now, then, is he to 
acquire it in spite of the State law by an instrument unwitnessed, unsealed, 
unsigned? By no means. He must conform to the regulation of the local law 
which declares that his deed must be witnessed by two witnesses, must be 
sealed, must be acknowledged, must be delivered. And yet no man here 
thought of supposing that a privilege of a citizen was denied, although it is 
confessedly by my friend agreed to be a privilege, from the fact that the States 
regulate the exercise of it . . . [E]verybodl knows that a right may be perfectly 
secure and yet be subject to regulation.32 
Thus, congressional Republicans made a distinction between the 
legitimate regulation of a fundamental right and its abridgement or 
destruction. In the nineteenth century mind, there was a well-defined 
conception of the legitimate sphere of government action in regulating 
the fundamental rights of the citizenry. 327 The line between legitimate 
326. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1003 (1869). 
327. The Supreme Court subsequently acknowledged this right of regulation in the 
states preserved under the Fourteenth Amendment in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 
(1876). The Court stated that individuals, upon entering society, conferred upon the 
government the power to regulate "the conduct of its citizens one towards another, and 
the manner in which each shall use his own property, when such regulation becomes 
necessary for the public good." Id. at 125. Justice Field, one of the Slaughter-House 
dissenters, recognized this broad police power, acknowledging that the states possessed 
the power to "control the use and possession of ... property, so far as may be necessary 
for the protection of the rights of others, and to secure them the equal use and enjoyment 
of their property." Id. at 145. Field continued, stating: 
It is true that the legislation which secures to all protection in their rights, 
and the equal use and enjoyment of their property, embraces an almost infinite 
variety of subjects. Whatever affects the peace, good order, morals, and health 
of the community, comes within its scope . . . . Indeed, there is no end of 
regulations with respect to the use of property which may not be legitimately 
prescribed, having for their object the peace, good order, safety, and health of 
the community, thus securing to all the equal enjoyment of their property .. 
Id. at 145-46. Justice Field later expounded upon these views in Barbier v. Connolly, 
113 U.S. 27 (1884), in which he stated that the first section of the Fourteenth 
Amendment 
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undoubtedly intended not only that there should be no arbitrary deprivation of 
life or liberty, or arbitrary spoliation of property, but that equal protection and 
security should be given to all under like circumstances in the enjoyment of 
their personal and civil rights; that all persons should be equally entitled to 
pursue their happiness and acquire and enjoy property; that they should have 
like access to the courts of the country for the protection of their persons and 
property, the prevention and redress of wrongs, and the enforcement of 
contracts; that no impediment should be interposed to the pursuits of any one 
except as applied to the same pursuits by others under like circumstances; that 
no greater burdens should be laid upon one than are laid upon others in the 
same calling and condition, and that in the administration of criminal justice 
no different or higher punishment should be imposed upon one than such as 
is prescribed to all for like offences. 
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regulation of fundamental rights and their abridgement was not as fuzzy 
as it might appear to be to modem legal scholars.328 · 
Although the states remained free to regulate the mode or manner in 
which the privileges and immunities of the citizen might be exercised, 
they were not free to abridge or destroy these rights--they were inherent 
or inalienable rights of the citizen. According to Congressman William 
Lawrence of Ohio, matters involving contracting, suing, and property 
rights were left to the states "subject only to the limitation that there are 
some inherent and inalienable rights, pertaining to every citizen, which 
cannot be abolished or abridged by State constitutions or laws."329 
However, there were other constraints placed upon the state's power of 
Id. at 31. The difference between an arbitrary deprivation of fundamental rights and a 
proper exercise of the state's police power is the difference between an abridgement of 
the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States and a proper regulation of 
the exercise of these rights. Justice Field continued, stating: 
[T]he amendment-broad and comprehensive as it is ... was [not] designed 
to interfere with the power of the State, sometimes termed its police power, 
to prescribe regulations to promote the health, peace, morals, education, and 
good order of the people, and to legislate so as to increase the industries of the 
State, develop its resources, and add to its wealth and prosperity. From the 
very necessities of society, legislation of a special character, having these 
objects in view, must often be had in certain districts, such as for draining 
marshes and irrigating arid plains. Special burdens are often necessary for 
general benefits-for supplying water, preventing fires, lighting districts, 
cleaning streets, opening parks, and many other objects. Regulations for these 
purposes may press with more or less weight upon one than upon another, but 
they are designed, not to impose unequal or unnecessary restrictions upon any 
one, but to promote, with as little individual inconvenience as possible, the 
general good. Though, in many respects, necessarily special in their character, 
they do not furnish just ground of complaint if they operate alike upon all 
persons and property under the same circumstances and conditions. Class 
legislation, discriminating against some and favoring others, is prohibited, but 
legislation which, in carrying out a public purpose, is limited in its application, 
if within the sphere of its operation it affects alike all persons similarly 
situated, is not within the amendment. 
Id. at 31-32. 
328. See, e.g., State v. Medbury, 3 R.I. 138, 141 (1855) (counsel for defendant 
stated that "the difference between the regulation and the destruction of a right is too 
obvious for argument"). 
329. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1832 (1866). Lawrence also stated in 
response to concerns of invading the powers of the state governments, "I answer [that] 
it is better to invade the judicial power of the State than permit it to invade, strike down, 
and destroy the civil rights of citizens. A judicial power perverted to such uses should 
be speedily invaded." Id. at 1837. 
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regulation. Regulation of the fundamental rights of the citizen had to be 
"equal." As Senator Lot M. Morill of Maine stated, 
The peculiar character, the genius of republicanism is equality, impartiality 
of rights and remedies among all citizens, not that the citizen shall not be 
abridged in any of his natural rights. The man yields that right to the nation 
when he becomes a citizen. The republican guarantee is that all laws shall bear 
upon all alike in what they enjoin and forbid, grant and enforce. This principle 
of equality before the law is as old as civilization, but it does not prevent the 
State from qualifying the rights of the citizen according to the public 
necessities. 330 
This equality may have flowed from a fundamental immunity-to be 
free from unequal regulation. As Senator Wilson stated concerning the 
term "immunities" in the Civil Rights Act, it "merely secure[ d] to 
citizens of the United States equality in the exemptions of the law."331 
In particular, it was the function of the Civil Rights Act to enforce the 
privilege or immunity of citizenship of being subject to equal regulation 
of the fundamental privileges and immunities of citizenship. The 
language of the Act guaranteed "the same" rights of citizenship. For 
example, Congressman Shellabarger said of the Civil Rights Bill: 
[E]xcept so far as it confers citizenship it neither confers nor defines nor 
regulates any right whatever. Its whole effect is not to confer or regulate rights, 
but to require that whatever of these enumerated rights and obligations are 
imposed by State law shall be for and upon all citizens alike without distinc-
tions based on r3:ce or former condition of slavery. 332 
Shellabarger also said of Section 1 of the Bill: 
[I]f this section did in fact assume to confer or define or regulate these civil 
rights, which are named by the words contract, sue, testify, inherit, &c., then 
it would . . . be an assumption of the reserved rights of the States and the 
people. But, sir, except so far as it confers citizenship, it neither confers nor 
defines nor regulates any rights whatever. Its whole effect is not to confer or 
regulate rights, but to require that whatever of these enumerated rights and 
obligations are imposed by State laws shall be for and upon all citizens alike 
without distinction based on race or former condition of slavery. 333 
In addition, Senator Trumbull stated regarding the Civil Rights Bill that 
it "will have no operation . . . where all persons have the same civil 
rights without regard to col?r or race. "334 Thus, the power to regulate 
330. CONG. GLOBE,,39th Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1866). 
331. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1117 (1866). Senator Trumbull stated 
that the Act "in no manner interfere[ d] with the municipal regulations of any State which 
protects all alike in their rights of person· and property. It could have no operation in 
Massachusetts, New York, Illinois, or most of the States of the Union." Id. at 17 61. 
332. THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES, supra note 2, at 188. 
333. Id. 
334. Id. at 122. 
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the rights of citizens was left in the hands of the state governments 
under both the Civil Rights Act and the Fourteenth Amendment. As 
Senator Bingham stated, Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment took 
"from no State any right that ever pertained to it."335 
Both the Miller majority and the dissenters in the Slaughter-House 
Cases recognized this principle. Justice Bradley stated in his dissent that 
"[c]itizenship of the United States ought to be, and, according to the 
Constitution, is, a sure and undoubted title to equal rights in any and 
every State in this Union, subject to such regulations as the legislature 
may rightfully prescribe."336 According to Justice Miller, "[t]he power 
here exercised by the legislature of Louisiana is, in its essential nature, 
one which has been, up to the present period in the constitutional history 
of this country, always conceded to belong to the States, however it may 
now be questioned in some of its details. "337 Justice Miller, quoting 
Chancellor Kent,338 gave the test for whether a regulation by a state 
pursuant to its police power violated the Fourteenth Amendment's 
prohibition on abridging the privileges and immunities of citizens: 
"Unwholesome trades, slaughter-houses, operations offensive to the senses, 
the deposit of powder, the application of steam power to propel cars, the 
building with combustible materials, and the burial of the dead, may all," says 
Chancellor Kent, "be interdicted by law, in the midst of dense masses of 
population, on the general and rational principle, that every person ought so to 
use his property as not to injure his neighbors; and that private interests must 
335. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2542 (1866). 
336. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 113 (1872). 
337. Id. at 62. 
338. Chancellor Kent discussed the general power of the government to regulate 
property rights in order to protect the rights of all the citizens when they come into 
conflict in his Commentaries: 
But though property be thus protected, it is still to be understood that the 
lawgiver has a right to prescribe the mode and manner of using it, so far as 
may be necessary to prevent the abuse of the right, to the injury or annoyance 
of others, or of the public. The government may, by general regulations, 
interdict such uses of property as would create nuisances, and become 
dangerous to the lives, or health, or peace, or comfort of the citizens. 
Unwholesome trades, slaughter-houses, operations offensive to the senses, the 
deposit of powder, the application of steampower to propel cars, the building 
with combustible materials, and the burial of the dead, may all be interdicted 
by law, in the midst of dense masses of population, on the general and rational 
principle, that every person ought so to use his property as not to injure his 
neighbors, and that private interests must be made subservient to the general 
interests of the community. 
2 KENT, supra note 70, at •340 ( citations omitted). 
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be made subservient to the general interests of the ~ommunity." This is called 
the police power; and it is declared by Chief Justice Shaw that it is much easier 
to perceive and realize the existence and sources of it than to mark its 
boundaries, or prescribe limits to its exercise. 339 
Justice Miller indicated that the regulation in question in the Slaughter-
House Cases would be permissible since not all such exclusive privileges 
were forbidden traditionally.340 However, Justice Miller did not let his 
opinion rest on this argument, because he restricted the privileges and 
immunities protected under the Clause to a limited set of "national" 
privileges and immunities, which did not include the right to be free 
from monopolies. 
In contrast to Justice Miller, Justice Field, in his dissent, found that the 
state of Louisiana had exceeded the limits of its police power in passing 
the regulation because it had "infringed" upon a fundamental right of the 
people. According to Justice Field: 
All sorts of restrictions and burdens are imposed under it [the police power], 
and when these are not in conflict with any constitutional prohibitions, or 
fundamental principles, they cannot be successfully assailed in a judicial 
tribunal. With this power of the State and its legitimate exercise I shall not 
differ from the majority of the court. But under the pretence of prescribing a 
police regulation the State cannot be permitted to encroach upon any of the just 
rights of the citizen, which the Constitution intended to secure against 
abridgment. 341 
Justice Bradley also acknowledged that "[t]he right of a State to regulate 
the conduct of its citizens is undoubtedly a very broad and extensive 
one, and not to be lightly restricted."342 However, he also stated that 
"there are certain fundamental rights which this right of regulation 
cannot infringe."343 Justice Bradley later commented on this power of 
regulation in Missouri v. Lewis where he stated that the Amendment 
"does not profess to secure to all persons in the United States the benefit 
of the same laws and the same remedies. Great diversities in these 
respects may exist in two States separated by an imaginary line . . . . 
Each State prescribes its own modes of judicial proceeding."344 
Thus, the distinction between a permissible regulation of a fundamen-
tal privilege or immunity and an impermissible abridgement was carried 
339. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 62 (footnotes omitted). 
340. Justice Miller argued: "Nor can it be truthfully denied, that some of the most 
useful and beneficial enterprises set on foot for the general good, have been made 
successful by means of these exclusive rights, and could only have been conducted to 
success in that way." Id. at 66. 
341. Id. at 87. 
342. Id. at 114. 
343. Id. 
344. Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22, 31 (1879). 
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over to the congressional understanding of the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause of Section 1 as well as the interpretation of the Clause by the 
Slaughter-House dissenters. Just as the fundamental privileges and 
immunities of citizens could be regulated in different ways through 
positive local laws under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article 
:rv, Section 2, so too could the privileges and immunities of citizens of 
the United States be regulated without abridgement under the Privileges 
or Immunities Clause of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. These 
regulations prescribing the mode or manner in which the fundamental 
rights of citizens could be exercised were municipal regulations, 
analogous to special privileges, prohibited by neither the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2, nor the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This Article has attempted to illuminate the nineteenth century 
understanding of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article :rv, 
Section 2. Such an inquiry is useful in gaining an accurate understand-
ing of the original meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. The "privileges" and "immunities" guaranteed 
under Article IV, Section 2 were the same as those later guaranteed 
under Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. These were those 
capacities of the citizen that existed anterior to the establishment of 
government, but which could be regulated pursuant to the common good 
by the government that was subsequently established. 
Although several commentators have argued that the privileges and 
immunities of citizenship guaranteed under Section 1 that were 
traditionally within the regulatory control of the state governments, such 
as the right to contract and to hold property, are afforded merely 
antidiscrimination protection under Section 1,345 it is likely that ·they 
345. See, e.g., Harrison, supra note IO. William E. Nelson has contended that "[b]y 
understanding secti~n one as an equality guarantee, the puzzle of how Congress could 
simultaneously have power to enforce the Bill of Rights and not have power to impose 
a specific provision of the Bill on a state is resolved." NELSON, supra note 306, at 119. 
Nelson notes that many of the states ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment did not provide 
for all of the same Bill of Rights protections in their state constitutions and yet did not 
oppose ratification or change their constitutions to reflect the federal Bill of Rights after 
ratification. Id. at 118. 
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were originally intended to be provided substantive protection as well. 
There was a widespread belief in nineteenth century America that the 
privileges and immunities of citizenship were guaranteed substantive 
protection under Article IV, Section 2, or at least there was a presump-
tion that certain privileges and immunities of citizens would exist in all 
free governments. The states remained free to regulate the exercise of 
these fundamental capacities of citizenship in different ways through 
municipal regulation. However, they did not remain free to abridge 
them. The difference may appear to be a subtle one from the modem 
viewpoint. However, a studious inquiry into the nature of the police 
power as understood in nineteenth century America would further 
illuminate the distinction. 
It is particularly noteworthy that although these commentators agree that the right to 
contract and other such privileges and immunities of "state" citizenship receive merely 
antidiscrimination protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, they seem to argue that 
the provisions of the Bill of Rights receive substantive protection as well. For example, 
they would agree that the Fourteenth Amendment forbids a state government from 
passing a generally applicable law outlawing all political speech. Such a law would 
apply equally to all and yet would be prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment's 
guarantee of substantive protection for the privileges and immunities of citizenship. 
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